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Preface 
This s tudy on the i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n process in four newly i n d u s t r i a l i s i n g 
c o u n t r i e s i s publ ished in the framework of the ILO resea rch p r o j e c t on 
/ employment, t r ade and North-South co -ope ra t ion (Phase I I ) . Designed to be a 
syn thes i s of the coun t ry s tud i e s on B r a z i l , Mexico, t h e Republic of Korea and 
4 Singapore which appeared e a r l i e r in t h i s s e r i e s , i t has a l s o made cons ide rab le 
use of o the r r e l e v a n t m a t e r i a l . 
The research p r o j e c t i s the follow up of an e a r l i e r p r o j e c t ca r ry ing 
the same t i t l e . I t addresses the following q u e s t i o n s : (a) What government 
p o l i c i e s , i n s t i t u t i o n a l and o the r non-economic f a c t o r s have shown to be 
important in the promotion of success fu l i n d u s t r i a l adjustment p o l i c i e s in 
i n d u s t r i a l i s e d c o u n t r i e s ; (b) what government p o l i c i e s and o the r economic and 
non-economic f a c t o r s have con t r ibu ted t o the successfu l economic development 
of the newly i n d u s t r i a l i s i n g coun t r i e s (NICs); and (c ) what l e s s o n s , i f any, 
can be learned from the success of the NICs t h a t can be usefu l t o o the r 
developing c o u n t r i e s which have committed themselves to a broadly s i m i l a r 
growth p a t h . 
These ques t ions a r e being approached a t two l e v e l s : ( i ) By means of a 
number of country case s t u d i e s on developed c o u n t r i e s ( t h e United Kingdom, the 
United S t a t e s , Japan, t h e Federa l Republic of Germany, t h e Ne the r l ands ) , newly 
i n d u s t r i a l i s i n g c o u n t r i e s (Republic of Korea, Singapore, B r a z i l and Mexico) 
and developing c o u n t r i e s (Cameroon, Tun i s i a and t h e P h i l i p p i n e s ) ; ( i i ) 
Through two s y n t h e s i s r e p o r t s : one on the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d , and one on the 
newly i n d u s t r i a l i s i n g c o u n t r i e s . 
The c o u n t r i e s t h a t came to be known as the newly i n d u s t r i a l i s i n g c o u n t r i e s 
(NICs) emerged in the e a r l y 1970s as a group of middle-income developing 
c o u n t r i e s t h a t were showing sus ta ined and h ighe r - and sometimes much 
w h i g h e r - t h a n average growth in both manufacturing and o v e r a l l p roduc t ion . The 
NICs have come t o p lay a p i v o t a l r o l e in the changing i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i v i s i o n 
of labour . Through r ap id growth they have a t t a i n e d a l e v e l of 
1
 For a d e s c r i p t i o n of the r e s u l t s of Phase I , see G.T. Renshaw ( e d . ) : 
Employment, t r a d e and North-South Co-operat ion (Geneva, ILO, 1981) . 
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industrialisation comparable to that of some of the more "established" 
industrialised countries. The size of their economies have turned them into 
important markets. They have become important recipients of overseas bank 
loans and direct investment. 
Some, particularly the Asian NICs, have proved to be very dynamic 
exporters. Although their share of all imports is small, and that of overall 
demand even smaller, the competitiveness of these exports has given rise to 
concern among established producers. The ensuing pressure for protectionism 
in many industrialised countries has been justified by, on the one side, the 
costs involved in adjusting to these imports and, on the other side, the 
"unfair" advantage of lower wages in exporting contries. Such arguments 
neglect the importance of the rapidly growing NICs as export markets. They 
also disregard that considerably more pressure for adjustment comes from 
technological change, changes in demand and imports from other OECD countries, 
and that keeping out developing country imports is unlikely to change this. 
Moreover, developing countries, including NICs, can hardly be blamed for 
paying low wages, since that is one of the characteristics of their lower 
level of development and one that they try to solve by industrialisation and 
export. 
This study compares four newly industrialising countries: Brazil, Mexico, 
the Republic of Korea and Singapore. It considers their economic and 
industrial growth in roughly the two decades between 1960 and 1980 and focuses 
on their long-term development. It does not explicitly deal with the 
post-1980 period when recession in the OECD led to overall lower growth, nor 
with the "debt crisis" that caused so many financial problems and social 
hardship in the Latin American NICs. Their crisis is far from over, although 
economic growth has meanwhile resumed and Brazil's exports, for example, have 
shown spectacular growth in recent years. Concentrating on long-terra issues, 
however, can show more clearly the structural trends at stake. It will become 
clear that many aspects of the financial and social crisis find their origin 
in pre-1980 developments. 
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This study thus examines the circumstances under which high growth 
occurred. It considers the role of policies, foreign and domestic enterprises 
and above all it asks who benefited from growth. The reason for doing this is 
twofold. First, there may be lessons to be learned for other developing 
countries. However unique and complex each economy is, all face a set of 
questions similar to the ones that are being asked here. One cannot 
generalise to the whole developing world from these selected illustrations, 
but they do contain certain dimensions of a dynamic process from which lessons 
may be learned. Second, in the OECD countries, particuarly among those which 
have been affected by their imports, the success of the NICs is often 
discussed as largely due to exploitation of workers, dominance of 
multinationals, excessive State aid, etc. A closer examination shows that 
reality is much more complex. It is hoped that the better informed discussion 
that will ensue, will contribute to an understanding of the long-term 
implications of NIC and developing country development for the North-South 
interaction and interdependence. 
The author of this study is a staff member of the ILO. Any comments 
provoked by it would be welcome. 
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C h a p t e r 1 
INTRODUCTION 
T h i s s t u d y r e v i e w s t h e deve lopmen t of t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r y i n fou r 
newly i n d u s t r i a l i s i n g c o u n t r i e s , B r a z i l , Mexico, S i n g a p o r e and t h e R e p u b l i c of 
Korea be tween 1960 and 1 9 8 0 . I t f o c u s e s on t h e r o l e of government p o l i c i e s 
and t h a t o f d o m e s t i c and f o r e i g n e n t r e p r e n e u r s i n t h e p r o c e s s of g rowth and 
goes o n . t o a sk how d i f f e r e n t g r o u p s h a v e b e n e f i t e d from g r o w t h . The s t u d y ' s 
aim i s t o s e e whe the r any c o n c l u s i o n s r e g a r d i n g p o l i c y can b e d e r i v e d which 
c o u l d a s s i s t o t h e r d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s w i s h i n g t o f o l l o w a s i m i l a r growth 
pa t h . 
The newly i n d u s t r i a l i s i n g c o u n t r i e s (NICs) a s a g roup r o s e t o p rominence 
in t h e second h a l f o f t h e 1970s . I n a wor ld economy t h a t had b e e n g rowing 
f a s t t h e y w e r e found t o h a v e b e e n d o i n g p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l . T h e i r above 
a v e r a g e pe r fo rmance a t t r a c t e d much a t t e n t i o n from o t h e r , l e s s s u c c e s s f u l , 
d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . T h e i r r a p i d growth t u r n e d them i n t o dynamic e x p o r t 
m a r k e t s . T h e i r , a t f i r s t , na r row s p e c i a l i s a t i o n in e x p o r t s o f a few p r o d u c t s 
and p r o d u c t c a t e g o r i e s o n l y , c a u s e d g rowing c o n c e r n among c o m p e t i t i o n i n t h e 
" o l d " i n d u s t r i a l i s e d w o r l d . Many, a l b e i t f o r d i f f e r e n t r e a s o n s , came t o ask 
what c a u s e d r a p i d growth and u n d e r what c i r c u m s t a n c e s d i d i t o c c u r . 
Today (summer 1985) a s t h e wor ld economy a p p e a r s t o b e s l o w l y r e c o v e r i n g 
from i t s most s e r i o u s p o s t - w a r r e c e s s i o n , t h i s i n t e r e s t i n t h e NICs may seem 
o u t d a t e d . Some of them, l i k e Mexico and B r a z i l , h a v e b e e n s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d 
by t h e " d e b t c r i s i s " which h a s f o r c e d them t o t a k e somet imes d r a c o n i a n 
m e a s u r e s t h a t h a v e caused much h a r d s h i p , unemployment and m i s e r y . Economic 
growth in t h e A s i a n NICs h a s a l s o s lowed down and growth r a t e s in t h e e a r l y 
1980s h a v e been c o n s i d e r a b l y lower t h a n i n t h e two p r e v i o u s d e c a d e s . Does 
t h i s make t h e e a r l i e r h i g h growth of t h e NICs l e s s r e l e v a n t ? We do n o t t h i n k 
s o . T h e i r , a t t i m e s , e x t r a o r d i n a r y growth pe r fo rmance c e r t a i n l y w a r r a n t s 
c l o s e r s t u d y , even t o d a y , b e c a u s e i m p o r t a n t l e s s o n s may be l e a r n e d . 
The t u r n a r o u n d i n t h e i r p e r f o r m a n c e , when o v e r a l l wor ld economic growth 
s lowed down, d o e s p o i n t a t an i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n t h a t i s r e t u r n e d t o a number 
of t i m e s in t h i s s t u d y . I t t r i e s t o compare t h e pe r fo rmance o f some 
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individual countries and in particular asks what the influence of government 
policy and other, essentially domestic, factors has been on performance. It 
gives, by implication, less attention to the influence of the external 
environment which is largely taken as given. Considering that, in aggregate, 
their participation in world trade and financial flows, even today, is 
limited, this seems justifiable. Nevertheless, it is clear that their rapid 
growth has been helped by the steady growth in overseas lending and investment 
which took place in the 1960s and 1970s and that rapid growth of manufactured 
exports has been helped by strong overseas demand. 
It is also clear that many external factors are responsible for the 
problems that the heavily indebted countries are facing today. These include 
the expensive dollar, high interest rates, reduced private bank lending, and 
the reduced export possibilities due to lower demand and higher protectionism 
on main markets. So although the focus of this study is on national 
developments and policies, the importance of these external factors is duly 
acknowledged. The focus on domestic factors should therefore not be explained 
as a judgement about the relative weight of each group of factors when it 
comes to "success" or "failure". People and governments have simply more 
chance of influencing domestic than international events. 
One of the main reasons for undertaking this study was to find what 
lessons can be learned for other countries from the development of these NICs 
which at least until recently were considered to be among the most successful 
developing countries. This is another reason why the focus is on domestic 
factors. 
Which are the newly industrialising countries? There is no, and never has 
been agreement on which country was a NIC and which was not. Different 
definitions have been used and different countries have been included in the 
list. Three examples of studies that appeared between 1979 and 1981 will 
illustrate this. A report by a working group of the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office ("The newly industrialising countries and the adjustment problem") that 
was published in 1979 (in London) defined (p. 7) NICs "as the countries in 
which industrial production ... exceeds a certain proportion of GDP and which 
are increasing industrial production more rapidly than are the EICs 
[established industrial countries] of north-west Europe and North America.". 
Using this definition they came to a total of 23 NICs (10 in Asia, three in 
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Latin America, seven in Southern Europe and the Middle East , and three in 
Eastern Europe). 
Balassa in the "Reader's guide" to his book The newly indus t r ia l i s ing . 
countries in the world economy (New York, 1981) defined (p . xix) NICs "as 
countries tha t had per capita incomes between US$1,100 and US$3,500 in 1978, 
and where the share of the manufacturing sector in the Gross Domestic Product 
was 20 per cent or higher in 1977". He counted 18 NICs; four in Asia, five 
in Latin America, two in southern Europe and the Middle East and three in 
Eastern Europe. 
The OECD's report on "The impact of the newly indus t r ia l i s ing countries on 
production and trade in manufactures" (Paris) which was published in 19 79, 
described the NICs (p. 18) as "a group of countries . . . whose share in world 
indus t r ia l output and in world exports of manufactures has increased rapidly 
since the early 1960s and pa r t i cu la r ly during the 1970s". Their l i s t included 
10 countr ies: four in (South-East) Asia, two in Latin America and four in 
Southern Europe. 
The number of countries included in the l i s t of NICs thus varies depending 
on whether a s t a t i c or a dynamic defini t ion is used and on whether - apart 
from the level of indus t r ia l production - exports are included as a c r i t e r i a . 
I f we exclude the European countr ies , there seemed to be a hard core of 
countries that appeared on a l l three l i s t s , two in Latin America and four in 
Asia. Among these we selected four for further study: Brazil and Mexico in 
Latin America, and Singapore and the Republic of Korea in Asia. I t is useful 
to repeat some of the common features of these countries: they had (in 1980) 
per capita incomes of over US$1,500, about one quarter of t he i r GDP was 
generated in manufacturing and each contributed about 1 per cent to world 
exports. Each had shown fa i r ly - and some very - fast growth of manufacturing 
output, employment and exports . 
Yet they also differed in many aspects; Brazil and Mexico's per capita 
income was more or less equal (a t around US$2,000 in 1980), but Singapore's 
(at nearly US$4,500) was three times as high as that of a c i t izen of the 
Republic of Korea. In the Republic of Korea and Singapore manufacturing 
output had grown rapidly from a re la t ive ly small base in 1960, when the two 
Latin American countries had already a sizeable manufacturing industry in 
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place. In Singapore agr icu l ture is v i r tua l ly non-exis tent , whereas in the 
other three even today nearly one third of the labour force s t i l l works in 
tha t sec tor . Virtually a l l exports from the Republic of Korea and Singapore 
are manufactures, whereas for Brazil t h i s was only half and for Mexico even 
l e s s . As a r e s u l t , whereas the Republic of Korea was responsible for 1.4 per 
cent of world manufactured exports in 1980, Mexico, for instance, exported no 
more than 0.3 per cent of the t o t a l . 
Looking beyond economics the differences between them are even more 
s t r i k i n g . Brazil is the world's f if th largest country, Mexico the world's 
th i r teenth la rges t , whereas t iny Singapore's t o t a l land area is no more than 
620 sq. km. Differences in population s ize are smaller . Brazil had 120 
million inhabitants in 1980. Mexico 70 mil l ion, the Republic of Korea 38 
million and Singapore 2.4 mil l ion. 
Other important differences r e l a t e to natural resource endowments. Brazil 
and Mexico are well-endowed with many mineral resources. Mexico is the fourth 
largest o i l producer in the world (but Brazi l , u n t i l recent ly , imported 80 per 
cent of i t s o i l requirements). Singapore and the Republic of Korea have few 
natural resources to speak of. Agricultural production in the Republic of 
Korea and Brazil has shown reasonable growth, but in Mexico agr icu l tura l 
growth has slowed to a very low r a t e . The land d i s t r ibu t ion in Mexico and 
Brazil are among the" most unequal in the world, whereas in the Republic of 
Korea differences in farm s ize are uniquely small . 
The study thus focuses on the years from 1960 and 1980 and discusses some 
of the causes and consequences of rapid growth in manufacturing in four NlCs. 
I t was or ig ina l ly meant to be no more than a synthesis of four case studies 
2 
that the ILO had commissioned. These studies had been wri t ten according to 
An annex br ief ly discusses some of the socio-cul tural differences 
between the four countries that were considered relevant for the res t of the 
s tu dy. 
1 
These studies were published by the ILO as working papers. They 
are: Linda Lim and Pang Eng Fong'. Trade, employment and indus t r i a l i sa t ion in 
Singapore (Geneva, ILO, 1982); Robert Edward Looney; Trade, employment and 
indus t r i a l i sa t ion in Mexico (Geneva, ILO, 1982); Rogerio L.F. Werneck*. 
Indust r ia l growth, foreign trade and economic pol icy: Some aspects of the 
r i s e of Brazil as a NIC (1965-80) (Geneva, ILO 1984); Tony Michell; The~ 
Republic of Korea: Employment, indus t r i a l i sa t ion and trade (Geneva, ILO, 
vmr. 
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the same outl ine but i t was perhaps unavoidable that some authors would give 
more a t tent ion to some aspects of the indus t r i a l i sa t ion process than to 
o thers . I t has therefore been necessary for t h i s study to consult a number of 
other sources as well in order to enable comparisons to be made. Even so, a 
scarci ty of data has often prevented more precise comparisons. 
The out l ine of the country case studies was broadly as follows: ( i ) to 
document the process of economic and indus t r ia l growth and the role of 
internat ional t rade in t h i s ; ( i i ) discuss how government has influenced th i s 
growth process; ( i i i ) analyse the enterprise s t ruc ture that has emerged and 
how that has influenced the growth process; and f inal ly (iv) discuss what the 
benefi ts of growth have been and how these have been d i s t r ibu ted . The present 
study wil l roughly follow the same out l ine and each of these issues is 
discussed in a separate chapter. A few preliminary remarks seem appropriate 
though. 
Economic growth and manufacturing growth are discussed from 1960 to 1980. 
That is in a sense an a rb i t ra ry period, but has nevertheless the advantage of 
covering a suff ic ient ly long period for cer tain trends to be iden t i f i ed . Yet 
to s t a r t in 1960 does not do sufficient jus t i ce to the two Latin American 
countries where indus t r ia l i sa t ion had been well underway before that year. 
That explains, in pa r t , why post-1960 manufacturing growth ra tes there were 
lower than in the two Asian countries where manufacturing growth accelerated 
in the 1960s from a low base. To stop in 1980 means ignoring the dramatic 
consequences of the f inancial c r i s i s in the Latin American countr ies , as well 
as the effects of slower OECD demand growth on the Asian NICs. Without in any 
way wanting to play down the hardship that has been caused by the more recent 
events, i t seems useful to l imit the analysis to a period in which s t ruc tura l 
changes can be ident i f ied and the effect of pol ic ies assessed. The current 
s i tua t ion is so dominated by acute external constraints that the domestic room 
for manoeuvre and the range of policy options have become extremely reduced. 
That is qui te different from the pre-1980 period when th i s range and these 
options were - a t l eas t in appearance - much greater . As we would l ike to see 
the pre-1980 period as normal and the post-1980 as the exception i t seems more 
useful to stop the discussion the re . Whether in the end we wil l be proved to 
have been too optimist ic in th i s remains an open question, although we dearly 
hope that we are not . 
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The role of government is central in the process of rapid 
industrialisation though the relationship between policies and performance is 
rarely as direct as it is sometimes made out to be. Through its trade and 
industrialisation policies government can try and influence entrepreneurs' 
decisions by turning the terms of supply and demand in their favour. How 
effective these policies are is not always clear. Some incentives may do no 
more than compensate for distortions caused by other policies. Some 
constraints may be too great to be compensated for by any policy. Certain 
macro policies and government stability and concern [or the absence of 
alternatives] may be much more important factors for encouraging entrepreneurs 
to invest in industry or a specific industry. Governments' ability to 
influence the level and the direction of investments may thus be limited. 
Government guidance may be important but a market economy will rely on 
private enterprises as the main initiator of economic activity. Nevertheless 
we found that domestic private entrepreneurs have played only a secondary role 
in the industrialisation process of many countries. We will try to come up 
with some reasons for this. Foreign investors have often been much more 
successful in making use of the opportunities offered. Where government 
wanted rapid growth but only a limited foreign presence, it has virtually been 
forced to step in itself. 
A successful growth model cannot just be defined in terms of economic 
growth rates. It must also consider who has benefited from growth and how 
these benefits have been distributed. Doing so is thus an essential but also 
hazardous component of the exercise. Employment, wage and income distribution 
data will be examined but these may not be complete nor wholly reliable and 
this may make conclusions difficult to draw. Moreover, results should be 
compared to the magnitude of the problem. Income distribution data tend to be 
only available for the economy as a whole and may say more about the situation 
in agriculture than in manufacturing. 
The next chapters will discuss each of these issues in more detail. The 
next chapter will give some factual data about the economic and industrial 
development in each of the four countries. Chapter 3 will review the role of 
government policies in the process of growth. Chapter 4 will ask what the 
role of domestic private and other entreprises has been. Chapter 5 will 
present some data on wages, employment and the income distribution in an 




ECONOMIC AND MANUFACTURING GROWTH OF FOUR NICs 
This chapter is of a rather factual nature. Whereas the next chapters 
consider the role of government policies and entrepreneurs in the growth 
process as well as the benefits that resulted from it, this chapter limits 
itself to the presentation of some facts about economic and manufacturing 
growth in the countries concerned. It is meant to focus on the manufacturing 
industry and on the years 1960 to 1980 but it is clear that earlier years and 
the rest of the economy must be taken into account for understanding the 
developments in that sector in that period. The discussion will therefore be 
rather broad and start well before 1960. 
Rapid economic growth in the newly industrialised countries occurred in 
the context of a world economy that until 1980 had shown remarkably high 
growth of economic output, trade and investment. First spurred by the post-
(Second World) war recovery, world output and demand increased by 5 per cent 
per year on average between 1955 and 1970 (OECD, 1982). From 1963 to 1973 it 
was as high as 6 per cent per annum on average. After 1973 economic growth 
slowed down, but after two years of slow growth the world economy grew fast 
again from 1976 to 1979. Expansionary policies in the OECD looked after 
this. When following the second oil shock the industrialised countries gave 
more priority to combatting inflation, their restrictive policies plunged the 
world economy into a recession from which it has yet to fully recover. 
World trade grew even faster than total output after 1960. Improved 
transport and communications and lower trade barriers allowed the 
international trading volume to grow nearly 50 per cent faster than output 
between 1963 and 1973 (GATT). Among traded commodities, it was manufactures 
that grew particularly fast: 11 per cent per year in volume terms. After 
1973 world trade growth slowed down. Nevertheless, at a 5 per cent yearly 
average, world manufactured trade still grew nearly 50 per cent faster than 
average output growth between 1973 and 1981 (ibid.). 
International investment flows followed a pattern that was broadly similar 
to that of world trade. Between 1960 and 1973 the annual average growth rate 
- 8 -
of outward direct investment by the main OECD countries was close to 12 per 
cent in current dollars. Growth slowed down after 1973. In current dollars 
it was still around 12 per cent between 1974 and 1979 but as inflation was 
much higher in these years, rea.1 overseas investment growth was much lower 
(OECD). 
This dynamic world environment forms the background against which the 
sometimes spectacular growth of the NICs occurred. The following sections 
will discuss the performance of each in some detail. 
Mexico 
In the nineteenth century most people in Mexico were engaged in 
agriculture, but minerals and petroleum were the main sources of export 
earnings. Until the 1910 revolution, mining and related services were largely 
controlled by foreigners. The poverty of the peasant population and this 
foreign dominance of the most profitable sectors were among the main factors 
which caused the revolution. 
Economic growth was remarkably slow in the 1920s in spite of a period of 
recovery. The 1930 world crisis hit Mexico hard, as prices of, and demand 
for, its main (primary) export products plummetted. Industry then became a 
more attractive alternative. The 1930 Tariff Code and the 1935 Customs Law 
increased tariffs to compensate for a shortfall in fiscal income (Bruce 
Wallace), but they can also be seen as the first signs of encouragement of 
import-substituting industrialisation. This inward-looking industrialisation 
had some ideological standing as it was much in line with the nationalistic 
spirit of the revolution and the 1917 Constitution. The manufacturing 
industry grew at nearly 6 per cent per year in the 1930s, but overall growth 
was nearer 4 per cent. The unsettling effect of the reforms undertaken by the 
Cardenas Government - the petroleum industry was nationalised and land reform 
accelerated - may have had some influence (see table 1). 
The outbreak of the Second World War proved very favourable to Mexico's 
economic development. The war led to great overseas demand for the country's 
primary products. Deficient supply from abroad and increasing domestic demand 
also caused a boom for domestic producers of manufactures (Wallace). Looney 
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industry. "With foreign supplies of capi ta l equipment d i f f i cu l t to obtain, 
firms were forced to find ways to use t h e i r exis t ing capi ta l stock with 
increasing effect iveness . Improvisation and adaptation of exis t ing equipment 
were common. . . . The innovative ac t i v i t y observed during this period . . . 
included adaptation of techniques to f i t the country's market s i z e , and of 
products to f i t the nat ion 's unique prof i le of demand." (Looney, 1982, p . 59). 
Economic growth averaged 6 per cent per year in the 1940s, but high 
inf la t ion led to devaluations in 1948, 1949 and, af ter the Korean war boom, in 
1954. 
In 1955 a policy of "desarollo es tabi l izador" ( s t ab i l i s ing development) 
was i n i t i a t e d . This policy stressed the importance of price and exchange ra te 
s t a b i l i t y for sustained growth. Taxes were kept low and the tax basis narrow 
to promote the necessary private savings for investment. The peso was kept 
fully convertible and capi ta l imports were encouraged to contribute to the 
financing of the public sector d e f i c i t s . 
"By assigning a key role to the capi ta l account in the balance of payments 
(BOP), the preoccupation of the Government of maintaining both national and 
foreign inves tors ' confidence was raised to a ranking of major importance." 
(Wallace, p. 30). This preoccupation also stressed the need for price 
s t a b i l i t y as inf la t ion would lead to devaluation, which in turn was expected 
to lead to capi ta l outflows. 
The period of "desarollo es tabi l izador" is associated with rapid and 
steady economic growth, but also with a growing imbalance in the economy and 
society as a whole. Gross national product grew by 5.6 per cent per year on 
average between 1950 and 1960 and by 7.1 per cent between 1960 and 1970. 
Manufacturing output grew by 6.1 per cent in the 1950s and by 9.2 per cent in 
the 1960s. Inf la t ion was 2.0 per cent between 1960 and 1965 and 2.8 per cent 
between 1965 and 19 70. 
A se r ies of imbalances a lso developed. Both agr icul ture and industry 
proved increasingly incapable of absorbing Mexico's t r ad i t i ona l ly high 
demographic growth. The rural-urban and the personal income d i s t r ibu t ion 
worsened. The well-protected manufacturing industry needed progressively more 
capital and intermediate goods imports to maintain i t s growth pace while 
- 11 -
agr icul ture was increasingly incapable of providing the foreign exchange 
needed to finance these imports. The growing trade def ic i t needed to be 
financed by higher capi ta l imports. This, and the conver t ib i l i ty of the peso, 
v i r t ua l l y forced the government to follow a very conservative pol icy. 
Meanwhile i t s own income was low and t h i s l e f t l i t t l e room for i n i t i a t i v e to 
redress the social s i tua t ion . The conservative policy and the pauperisation 
of large sections of the population led to growing social tensions and popular 
protests in the la te 1960s. 
In response to these protests and in an effort to redress the imbalances, 
the Echeverria Administration that took over in 1970 decided on a programme of 
reform. I t i n i t i a t ed a policy of "desarollo compartido" (shared development) 
that s t ressed job creat ion, income red is t r ibu t ion and a more balanced 
geographical d i s t r ibu t ion of industry in a context of sustained economic 
growth and export promotion of manufactures. More funds were allocated to 
education, health care and the social infras t ructure in general. However i t 
soon became clear tha t these objectives were not consistent with the 
instruments ava i lab le . Moreover, the new administration faced one immediate 
problem. 
The current account which had been worsening s teadi ly in the la te 1960s 
showed a par t icu la r ly large def ic i t in 1970. I t was US$1,000 mill ion or 
nearly twice the s ize of the previous year. Government considered that 
reduced public expenditure would slow economic growth and reduce the current 
account d e f i c i t . However, as public spending tends to be t r ad i t i ona l ly low in 
the f i r s t year of a "sexenio" (and fast a t the end) because i t takes the new 
team considerable time to s e t t l e down, the cut proved much bigger (over 25 per 
cent compared to the previous year) than expected. This indeed narrowed the 
current account de f i c i t , but a lso slowed down economic growth. 
Alarmed by the sharp drop in economic growth ( i t halved from 6.8 in 1970 
to 3.4 per cent in 1971), the government acted quickly to stimulate i t . 
Public investment and overall federal spending increased rapidly in 1972 and 
1973. Economic growth accelerated (to 7.2 per cent in 19 72) but so did the 
current account d e f i c i t . This def ic i t went from US$836 million in 1971 to 
USjl,405 mill ion in 19 73 and to US$4,181 mill ion in 1975. 
- 12 -
Higher government spending was not met by higher revenues. The government 
did not succeed in having i t s new tax reform b i l l adopted. Private sector 
opposition was so great tha t the b i l l was never submitted to Congress (Sol i s , 
p. 76). By 1975 the budget def ic i t had reached 9 per cent of ,GDP and the 
current account def ic i t 5 per cent of GDP. 
Inf lat ion increased from 5 per cent in 1970-72, to 12 per cent in 1973 and 
23 per cent in 1974. This was considerably higher than inf la t ion in the 
United States , Mexico's main trading par tner . The margin of overvaluation of 
the peso reached 30.4 per cent in 1975 (Center for Applied Studies, p . 77) . 
This led to great pressure on the peso which was further aggravated by i t s 
free conver t ib i l i ty and capi ta l outflows. In 1976, af ter having been pegged 
to the US dol lar for 22 years, the peso was allowed to f loat which led to a de 
facto devaluation of about 80 per cent . 
Upon taking office in 1976, the new Lopez P o r t i l l o Government embarked on 
a post-devaluation s t a b i l i s a t i o n programme tha t had, as i t s main features, a 
reduction of the current account and budget d e f i c i t s . Public expenditure was 
reduced and income from s t a t e enterpr ise increased. Tax revenue increased 
only marginally though. In 1977, the year a f te r the devaluation, the current 
account de f i c i t had narrowed to 3 per cent of GDP. The budget def ic i t dropped 
to 5.7 per cent in 1977. GDP grew a t 3 per cent . One wonders what would have 
happened thereaf ter in the absence of o i l . 
As i t happened the discoveries of huge o i l reserves and t he i r a v a i l a b i l i t y 
for export great ly reduced the foreign exchange cons t ra in t . Oil exports 
increased from US$1,000 mil l ion in 1977 to US$7,000 mill ion in 1980. I t a lso 
led to a return of inves tors ' and bankers' confidence. Government embarked on 
an expansionary policy, and economic growth went up quickly. Between 1978 and 
1980 the economy grew a t 7.5 per cent per year on average. The resumption of 
rapid growth soon led to a l l kinds of bottlenecks and shortages appearing 
which, i f anything, had a negative effect on government ef for ts to reduce 
inf la t ion . As a r e su l t t h i s remained high a t around 30 per cent between 1977 
and 1980. 
The large current account def ic i t s of 1974-76, which together accounted 
for over US$10,000 mil l ion, had in large part been financed by borrowing 
abroad. This contributed grea t ly to the foreign debt which increased from 
- 13 -
US$6,091 million in 1970 to $26,100 million in 1976 (see table 2). Current 
account deficits were "small" in 1977 and 1978 (US$1,800 million and 2,600 
million respectively) but increased to US$6,300 million and US$11,400 million 
in 1980 and 1981. Higher interest payments were an important contributing 
factor to these deficits. They-went up from US$1,724 million in 1976 to 
US$8,383 million in 1981. 
Most (in 1980 about two-thirds) of the external debt is owed by the public 
sector and of that a large part is owed by PEMEX (the state petroleum 
company). It is interesting to note that the balance of payments problems of 
the first half of the 1970s were unrelated to the sharp increase in the price 
of oil that Mexico produced itself. On the other hand, this price increase 
did not improve its export position as oil exports were non-existent until 
1974 and relatively unimportant until 1977. But it was saved from the very 
rude adjustment problem of most countries that resulted from their higher oil 
import costs. 
It is also remarkable that the yearly increases in foreign debt after 1977 
occurred simultaneously with the rapid increases in oil revenues. Net 
long-term public debt increased by US$6,566 million in 1977 and even higher 
amounts in subsequent years. In 1981 this increase was US$16,5000 million. 
At the same time yearly revenues from oil exports increased from US$988 
million in 1977 to US$13,3000 million in 1981. Together these provided for an 
enormous inflow of resources in a relatively short time. Many of these were 
needed to finance the growing interest payments and the investments of the oil 
sector. 
Sectoral growth: The most important feature of Mexico's economic growth 
has undoubtedly been the poor performance of the agricultural sector in the 
last two decades. This sector, that had grown at a rate of 4.5 per cent per 
year in the 1950s and 4.3 per cent from 1960 to 1965, showed a dramatic 
decline thereafter. In the late 1960s average growth had dropped to around 
2 
1.2 per cent. Between 1970 and 1974 it was 0.2 per cent. 
Mexico imported some oil at the time of the first oil shock but this 
was only a little over 6 per cent of all merchandise imports in 1974. 
2 
The slowdown of agricultural growth was in large part due to a 
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Petroleum, construction and manufacturing have been the dynamic sectors. 
The former's contribution to GDP slowly increased after 1960 and accelerated 
in the late 1970s when new wells came on stream (table 3). Petroleum output 
increased by over 15 per cent per year between 1977 and 1979 and pulled 
overall output growth. In 1980 it grew at nearly 30 per cent (Schlagheck). 
Sectoral employment data are given in table 4. Services, manufacturing 
and mining, and construction have absorbed most new workers. The number of 
people active in the primary sector declined both in relative and in absolute 
terms between 1960 and 1975. After 1975 the number of people active in that 
sector showed some increase. 
Manufacturing grew by nearly 6 per cent per year on average in the 1950s 
(particularly in the second half of that decade it was fast). In the 1960s it 
grew by as much as 8.5 per cent per year. In the 1970s growth became more 
irregular. It was slow in 1971 and between 1974 and 1977, and (sometimes 
quite) high in other years. All in all, manufacturing growth was 6.7 per cent 
between 1971 and 1980. Its share in GDP increased from 19.2 per cent in 1960 
to 23.8 per cent in 1980. 
Growth has been concentrated at the capital-intensive end of the industry 
(tables 5 and 6). Non-metallic minerals, chemicals, rubber, plastics, basic 
metal and metal products were the dynamic categories which grew at over 8 per 
cent per year between 1950 and 1978. Sectors that received much foreign 
investment such as transport equipment and machinery were the fastest growing 
at over 10 per cent per year between 1964 and 1980. Metal products doubled 
its share in the total between 1950 and 1978. 
footnote 2 continued from p. 13: 
This was particularly the case for non-irrigated land (the irrigated area 
increased) which is mainly cultivated by small farmers. The agricultural 
terms of trade worsened after 1965 when agricultural prices were kept constant 
and the general price level increased by about 3 per cent per year. In the 
early 1970s, the official guarantee prices, which were meant to encourage 
production, dropped even lower than international prices. The larger 
production units then came to concentrate more on products of which the price 
was not controlled, but the smaller ones kept producing basic foodstuffs. 
Their lower earnings did not permit them to invest more. Simultaneously, 
investments from outside the sector (banks, State) (which anyway tended to be 
more directed towards the large units) also declined (Cassio Luiselli 
Fernandez: "La crisis agropecuaria y la polftica demogrfifica", in Gerardo M. 
Bueno (ed.): Opciones de la polftica ec6nomica en Mexico despugs de la 
devaluacidn (Mexico, Editorial Tecnos, 1977)). 
- 16 -
Table 3 . Mexico: Structure of gross domestic product by sector , 1950-78 
(percentages) 
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31.2 31.7 31.8 31.2 30.2 29.6 29.4 
3.3 3.0 3.2 3.9 4.0 4 .1 4.2 
4.9 5.6 5.8 7.2 7.7 7.5 7.5 
16.5 15.2 14.3 13.4 13.4 13.2 12.7 
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Sources. For 1950; Fischer (1982) (Nacional Financiera, 1978); for 
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Despite overall slower growth in the 1970s some products did well; trucks 
and artificial fibres tripled their production level between 1970 and 1980. 
This fast increase was in large part due to rapid growth of the economy from 
1978-80 when transport equipment grew by 23 per cent per annum. The share of 
motor vehicles in all manufacturing production increased from 5 per cent in 
1970 to 7 per cent in 1980. Its share in manufacturing employment went up 
from 3.6 to 5.1 per cent in these years (Comercio Exterior, Nov. 1983). 
Machinery and steel products both grew at 11 per cent per year. Such high 
production growth was still considerably less than the increase in demand 
which, in the case of steel, was nearly 20 per cent per annum in these years. 
More traditional products such as food and wood products showed much slower 
growth (table 7). 
International trade: Mexico's participation in international trade has 
been modest and even declined in the 1960s. Imports and exports together were 
the equivalent of 13 per cent of GDP in 1965 (Reynolds, p. 202). Imports 
accelerated in the early 1970s, but slowed down thereafter. By 1978 imports 
and exports of goods and services were no more than 14 per cent of GDP. Rapid 
trade growth related to the oil boom raised this percentage to 18 in 1980. 
Imports consisted mainly of machinery and intermediate goods, such as 
basic chemicals. Imports of consumer goods were only 15 per cent of the total 
in 1965 or US$232 million. After that year consumer goods other than food 
steadily decreased in importance. Food imports increased rapidly in the early 
1970s when domestic production was virtually stagnating (table 8). 
Mexico's exports are basically primary products: tomatoes, coffee, cotton 
and some mineral products, such as silver. Petroleum and gas became important 
in the second half of the 1970s and accounted for about two-thirds of total 
exports in 1980 (table 9). 
Manufactured products, which had known a short-lived export boom during 
the Second World War (when they made up about one third of the total) 
accounted for only 10 per cent of the total in 1960. Thanks to fairly rapid 
growth (and slower growth of primary exports) they steadily gained in 
importance thereafter and reached US$1,428 million (or nearly 50 per cent of 
the total) in 1974. However, as a percentage of output they remained low. 
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t h i s was s t i l l no more than 5 per c e n t . I n 1974 only i n a few cases was more 
than 10 per cent of p roduc t ion exported ( sugar , b a s i c chemica ls , f e r t i l i s e r s 
and i n s e c t i c i d e s and n o n - e l e c t r i c machinery) . 
In 1975 and 1976 manufactured expor ts dec l ined in r e l a t i v e terms and 
temporar i ly even i n abso lu t e terms ( t o US$1,390 in 1977). After 1977 
manufactured exports increased aga in , but t h e i r r e l a t i v e importance continued 
to decrease due to the overwhelming share of o i l . 
In the 1960s machinery and equipment, processed foods, wood and wood 
products and paper and pub l i sh ing were fas t -growing manufactured e x p o r t s . In 
the 1970s machinery and t r a n s p o r t equipment (motor v e h i c l e s and p a r t s ) 
continued to be the f a s t e s t growing s e c t o r . Between 1977 and 1980 alone t h i s 
category doubled in v a l u e , from US$440 m i l l i o n to US$900 m i l l i o n . I t 
accounted for 25 per cent of a l l non-Maquila manufactured e x p o r t s . Other 
sec to r s of importance were chemicals , pharmaceu t i ca l s , and t o a l e s s e r e x t e n t , 
pub l i sh ing and wood p roduc t s . 
T r a d i t i o n a l l y most of Mexico's expor ts go to the United S t a t e s . Between 
1940 and 1960 t h i s was never l e s s than 70 per cent and o f t en over 80 per cent 
(Reynolds, p . 240) . Despi te e f f o r t s to d i v e r s i f y , in 1980 s t i l l over 60 per 
cent of them went to the Northern ne ighbours . The United S t a t e s i s a l s o the 
dominant s u p p l i e r of Mexico's impor ts , and t h i s makes i t very s e n s i t i v e t o any 
v a r i a t i o n in growth and demand nor th of i t s border ( s ee t a b l e s 10 and 1 1 ) . 
Table 10. Mexico: Exports by country of d e s t i n a t i o n , 1960-80 
(percentage of expor t s ) 












































































Table 11. Mexico: Imports by country of or ig in , 1960-80 
(percentage of imports) 
Country 1960 1965 1970 1975 1977 1978 1979 1980 
United States 
USSR 







































































Source. Dominguez (1982). 
F ina l ly , the border indus t r i a l i sa t ion , or Maquila Programme should be 
mentioned. This programme aims a t generating employment and foreign exchange 
by allowing foreign firms to take advantage of low labour cos t . This 
programme resembles the kind of offshore bonded processing of the Export 
Processing Zones as they ex i s t in some Asian countr ies . In 1982 nearly 
130,000 people worked in Maquila indus t r ies , producing mainly e l e c t r i c a l and 
electronic products (60 per cent of the t o t a l ) and footwear and c lothing. 
Exports reached US$1,000 million in 1979, or one-third of a l l Mexico's 
manufactured exports (including Maquilas). Tradi t ional ly almost a l l Maquilas 
were United States owned, but more recently a number of European and Japanese 
firms have also s tar ted production (Tomasini, 1980; LARR). 
Singapore 
Under Brit ish r u l e , the free port of Singapore owed i t s high level of 
prosperity (second only to Japan in Asia) to i t s entrepot function in the 
trade between Western Europe and South East Asia. I t collected such products 
as t i n and rubber from Dutch and other Bri t i sh colonies (now Indonesia and 
Malaysia) for export to the West and dis t r ibuted European manufactured 
products to the region. 
- 26 -
Over the years the entrepot trade gave r i s e to a whole range of f inancial , 
communications, commercial and shipping serv ices . Singapore became a true 
service cen t re . Over 70 per cent of the population was engaged in t h i s sector 
in 1947 (Tro l l i e t and de Mitry). 
L i t t l e industry developed. The protection that would have been necessary 
to shel ter such an ac t i v i t y was considered to run counter to the country's 
trading in te res t s based as these were on the absence of any trade b a r r i e r s . 
The industr ies that developed were: " ( i ) Industr ies based on easy access 
mater ials , e . g . industr ies processing rubber, coconut and vegetable o i l s , 
timber and other t rop ica l produce, ( i i ) Industr ies catering to the local 
market and protected from import competition by high transport cos t s . They 
included industr ies producing beverages, clay products and furni ture. 
( i i i ) Auxill iary and services indust r ies which had to be located near the 
sources of demand such as engineering, pr in t ing and publishing, motor vehicle 
repair and ship repair a c t i v i t i e s . " (Pang and Tan, p . 142). 
Economic growth was re la t ive ly slow in the 1950s. After the Korean war 
boom, growth of internat ional t rade slowed down, which meant less a c t i v i t y for 
Singapore. The unstable po l i t i ca l s i tua t ion a t home and in i t s immediate 
v ic in i ty were both the cause and the resu l t of high unemployment. 
Economic growth was re la t ive ly modest in the f i r s t half of the 1960s, very 
high (16.1 per cent per year on average'.) in the second half, slowed down in 
the early 1970s (in pa r t i cu la r , immediately af ter the o i l c r i s i s ) , but was on 
average s t i l l around 8 per cent in the 1970s. Altogether i t was 9.5 per cent 
on average per year in real terms between 1960 and 1982 ( table 12) . 
The acceleration of economic growth af te r 1965 found i t s origin in 
economic policies tha t stimulated manufacturing and construction, the boom in 
world t rade , as well as in some "special" fac tors . The year 1965 marked the 
end of Indonesia 's "confrontation policy" which had slowed down t rade with 
that country and had had a negative effect on s t a b i l i t y in the region. This 
had, in turn, depressed (foreign) investments. Singapore also profi ted from 
the escalat ion of the Vietnam war that meant growing demand for goods and 
services the re . F inal ly , the discovery of o i l in the region led to a boom in 
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The sharply lower growth between 1973 and 1975 was the resu l t of the o i l 
c r i s i s , lower demand as a r esu l t of the global recession and, to a lesser 
extent , of the end of the Vietnam war. Manufacturing suffered in par t icular 
and grew a t only 0.9 per cent per annum in these years . The fact that overal l 
GDP growth did not drop further was largely the resu l t of sustained high 
growth of construction, and infras t ructura l a c t i v i t i e s (Wong, p . 131). The 
departure in 1971 of the bulk of the Bri t ish troops seems not have affected 
growth ra tes much. This is remarkable considering that i t reduced the Br i t i sh 
contribution to Singapore's GDP from 20 per cent to only 1 per cent (Trol l ie t 
and de Mitry). 
The 1970s saw a continuation of the s t ruc tura l changes that were already 
v i s ib le in the 1960s. The contribution of entrepot t rade to GDP declined (but 
remained very important) and that of "other services" (f inancial and business 
services , tourism, a i r , sea and telecommunications) increased. After the 
spectacular growth a decade e a r l i e r , the share of manufacturing in GDP 
remained v i r tua l ly the same in the 1970s. In 1982 i t was 21.5 per cent 
compared to 20.5 per cent in 19 70 ( table 13). 
In the 1960s economic growth was achieved with remarkable price 
s t a b i l i t y . Inf lat ion was around 1 per cent per year. In the 1970s, world 
inf la t ion and the o i l pr ice c r i s i s did not leave Singapore unaffected and the 
consumer price index rose by 5.6 per cent per year during the decade ( i t was 
20 per cent in 1973 and 1974). Inf la t ion slowed down af ter 1975, but rose 
af ter the second o i l price hike and peaked at 8.2 per cent in 1981 before 
fal l ing rapidly to 1 per cent in 1983 (Lim and Pang). Singapore, which is 
both an importer and exporter of o i l has seen i t s debt posi t ion l i t t l e 
affected by the 1973 o i l c r i s i s . By 1978 i t s net foreign debt was estimated 
a t only US$1,000 mill ion (Tro l l i e t and de Mitry). 
Sectoral growth: Vir tual ly a l l sectors of the economy contributed to the 
overall dynamic growth of the economy at 9.5 per cent per year between 1960 
and 1982. Agriculture was the only sector tha t lagged behind (a t 2.8 per cent 
average per year) but the small weight of th is sector (3.8 per cent of a l l 
output in 1960, 1.0 per cent in 1982) prevented th i s poor performance from 
pulling the overal l figure down. Construction a t 16.1 per cent and 
manufacturing a t 15.1 per cent growth per annum (and 23.4 per cent per annum 
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1970s (of 8.6 per cent between 1971 to 1982) was largely the resul t of a 
slowdown in these sectors (to 8.7 per cent and 8.6 per cent respec t ive ly) . 
The trade sector los t some importance but other service sec tors , such as 
transport and communications a t 11.1 per cent per annum between 1960 and 1982 
did very wel l . Financial business services was in fact the fastest growth 
sector a t 14.6 per cent per annum. 
Manufacturing has become the most important sector in terms of 
employment. From employing only 14.3 per cent of the t o t a l in 1957, i t 
increased to 29.5 per cent in 1982. The share of commerce declined. This 
ref lects the decreasing importance of entrepot trade as a generator of job 
opportunities in Singapore. Despite t he i r growing share in GDP, transport and 
communications and financial and business services employ re la t ive ly few 
people ( table 14). 
Before 1960 few manufacturing a c t i v i t i e s ex is ted . After 1960 and 
par t icular ly af ter 1965, manufacturing grew rapidly . In terms of output, the 
fas tes t growth sector was recorded in petroleum refining and petroleum 
products. "Situated on the main shipping route from the Persian Gulf to East 
Asia, as well as contiguous to the producing areas of South-East Asia, 
Singapore has a locat ional advantage for petroleum ref in ing, which the 
government was quick to exploit by offering pioneer-industry pr ivi leges to the 
large internat ional o i l companies." (Geiger, p . 170). Until 1972, Viet Nam 
was i t s main customer. 
E lec t r ica l and electronic products was the second most important sector in 
terms of output growth. Much of t h i s consisted of assembly of 
semi-conductors, integrated c i r c u i t s , radios, te lev is ions , tape recorders and 
household appliances. I t is the sector where most jobs were created ( table 
16). 
Another high growth sector was transport equipment. This was mainly 
shipbuilding and ship repair (including o i l r i g s ) . Especially in the case of 
oil r i g s , one could again speak of a locational advantage in view of the 
country's nearness to some main o i l f i e lds . I t also included automobile and 
truck assembly. Text i les , c lothing, leather and footwear a lso showed very 
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In the 1970s e l ec t r i c a l and electronic products such as ca lcula tors , 
r e f r ige ra to rs , a i r conditioners, as well as radios , te levis ions and 
semi-conductors was the fastest growing sector . Other dynamic sectors 
included cement and cement products, professional and sc i en t i f i c equipment and 
photographic and opt ica l goods, p las t i c products and furni ture. Petroleum 
refining and transport equipment and o i l r igs remained key sectors ( table 15). 
The changing manufacturing s t ruc ture is also a ref lec t ion of the growing 
or ientat ion towards exports. In 1960 over two-thirds of manufacturing output 
was for the domestic market; by 1980 th i s was l i t t l e more than a t h i r d . 
Internat ional trade - . Trade - mainly entrepot trade - was of v i t a l 
importance to Singapore well before 1960. After 1960 i t s importance, 
par t icu la r ly that of manufactured exports, further increased. Between 1970 
and 1981 d i rec t manufactured exports increased over tenfold (Lim and Pang, p. 
42 and table 18). Today manufactures are more important than entrepot t r ade , 
and Singapore has become a country where to ta l export income (in terms of 
output) is higher than GDP (in terms of value added). In 1978, for instance, 
when GDP was USfcl6,299.3 mil l ion, to ta l export income amounted to $22,985.5 
million (Chen). 
Manufactured exports grew from S$164.3 mill ion in 1960 to S$l,523.0 
million in 1970, and to S$16.203.0 million in 1979. This high increase in the 
1970s is in part explained by the price increase of oi l which makes up a 
s ignif icant portion of the country's exports: exports of petroleum products 
increased from S$580 mill ion in 19 70 to S$7,07 5 mill ion in 1979. However, 
even without petroleum the average growth in the 1970s was 28.7 per cent . 
(Chia, 1982, p . 48). 
The most important single export product is petroleum products which 
accounted for about 40 per cent of the to ta l in the 1970s ( table 17). Second 
is e l e c t r i c a l goods and electronics which increased the i r share of t o t a l 
export sales from 14 per cent in 1970 to 21.7 per cent in 1979. Other exports 
include transport equipment and o i l r igs (7.3 per cent in 1979), indus t r ia l 
machinery (4.7 per cent) and garments (3.2 per cen t ) . Exports have become 
increasingly important for Singapore's manufacturing industry. In 1970 less 
than 40 per cent of i t s output was exported. By 1980 th i s was over 60 per 
cent . In some sectors such as e l e c t r i c a l machinery th i s is much higher ( table 
18). 
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Table 17. Singapore: Domestic expor t s by commodity, 1970-82 
(im) 
Commodity 1970 1975 1980 1982 
Total 
Food 
Beverages and tobacco 
Crude materials*-
Mineral fue ls* 
Animal and vege tab le o i l s 
Ch emi ca 1 s 
Manufactured goods by ma te r i a l s 
Machinery and t r a n s p o r t 
Miscel laneous manufactured a r t i c l e s 
Miscellaneous t r a n s a c t i o n s n . e . s . 
1
 Excludes processed rubber and sawn t imber . 
2 Figures from 19 75 inc lude petroleum naphtha which was p rev ious ly included 
under chemica l s . 
Sources. Lim and Pang (1984) from: Singapore , Department of S t a t i s t i c s ; 
Yearbook of S t a t i s t i c s 1980/81 (Singapore , Singapore Nat ional 
P r i n t e r s , 1981), p . 134; idem'. Yearbook of S t a t i s t i c s 1982/83 
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Domestic manufacturing activities in Singapore have a very high import 
content. On average this was 58.3 per cent for direct imported inputs and 
64.8 per cent for direct and indirect inputs in 1973. For certain sectors 
such as rubber processing, it was as high as 95 per cent, for petroleum 
refining 80.per cent (ibid.). 
"This high import content reflects various factors - the lack 
of domestically produced industrial raw materials and fuel, 
complete freedom to import in the absence of exchange control and 
with minimal import duties, lack of policy requirement regarding 
domestic value added content for access to various investment 
incentives, and inadequate development of domestic intermediate 
and supporting industries", (ibid.). 
Japan, the United States and Malaysia are the country's main export 
markets, but together they take less than one half of the total (table 20). 
On the import side the main trading partners are also Japan, the United 
States and Malaysia. The high price of oil - which make up 40 per cent of the 
country's imports (table 19) - has raised Saoudi Arabia to the ranks of main 
suppliers by value (table 21). 
Table 19. Singapore: Retained imports by commodity, 1960-82 
(*m) 
Commodity 1960 1970 1980 19821 
Tota l 817.7 4 610.2 35 697.7 44 929.6 
Food 263.1 506.3 1 507.9 1 663.4 
Beverages and tobacco 21.6 68.1 221.4 256.6 
Crude m a t e r i a l s - 2 8 . 5 -541 .5 - 1 130.8 -349.7 
Mineral fue l s 199.2 984.5 14 535.7 19 709.5 
Animal and vege tab le o i l s 9 .2 34.6 299.2 373.8 
Chemicals 67.2 301.3 1 841.1 1 759.0 
Manufactured goods 205.2 1 397.7 5 118.2 5 783.1 
Machinery and equipment 69.6 1 395.1 10 781.0 12 634.1 
Miscellaneous manufactures 139.8 435.3 2 265.2 2 928.0 
Miscellaneous -128.7 28.8 258.8 171.8 
1 Pre l iminary 
Source. Lim and Pang (1984) from: Singapore , Minis t ry of Trade and 
I n d u s t r y : Economic Survey of Singapore , 1982 (Singapore , 
Singapore Nat ional P r i n t e r s , 1983), pp. 110-112. 
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Table 20. Singapore: Exports by region and country of destination 
(percentages) 
1970 1975 1980 1982 
A s i a 
N o r t h - E a s t A s i a 
Hong Kong 
J a p a n 
S o u t h - E a s t A s i a 
Ma lays i a 
South A s i a 
West A s i a 
Europe 
EEC (10 ) 
U n i t e d Kingdom 
EFTA 
S o c i a l i s t Europe 
Nor th America 
U n i t e d S t a t e s 
LAFTA 
Ocean ia 
A u s t r a l i a 
R e s t of wor ld 
T o t a l (US$ m l l n ) 
6 0 . 9 
19.0 
6 . 7 
11 .8 










1 1 . 1 
0 .0 
6 .6 
3 . 8 
3 .8 
1 8 3 2 . 2 100 .0 
4 8 . 0 





2 . 2 
4 . 9 
1 8 . 1 
14 .4 
4 . 4 
1.8 
0 . 9 
16 .5 
1 5 . 6 
0 . 2 
11 .8 
5.6 
5 . 1 




















Sources. Lim and Pang (1984) from: Singapore, Department of Statistics: 
Yearbook of Statistics, 1980/81 (Singapore, Singapore National 
Printers, 1981), pp. 130-131; idem: Yearbook of Statistics, 1982/83 
(Singapore, Singapore National Printers, 1983), pp. 142-143.) 
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Table 21. Singapore: Imports by region and country of origin, 
1975-82 
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Source. Lim and Pang (1984) from: Singapore, Department of 
Statistics: Yearbook of Statistics, 1980/81 
(Singapore, Singapore National Printers, 1981), pp. 
126-131; idem: Yearbook of Statistics, 1982/83 
(Singapore, Singapore National Printers, 1983), pp. 
138-143. 
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The Republic of Korea 
The Republic of Korea was established as an independent republic in August 
1948. From 1910 to 1945 Korea had been a Japanese colony and from 1945, when 
North and South had been split, until 1948 the southern part had been 
administrated by an American military government. For a good understanding of 
the country's economic development some remarks on the pre-1948 period are in 
order. 
Before the "opening up" to the outside world that started in 1876, some 
cottage industry existed in Korea, such as brewing, metal working and cabinet 
making or producing such basic consumer goods as textiles, ceramics and paper 
(Brown). The industrial base broadened after 1876 and even before annexation 
by Japan a(n) (American built) power station existed, a match factory had 
started (by the Russians) and the government established a modern cocoonery 
and industrial training centre (Kuznets). 
After annexation by Japan in 1910, Korea's industrialisation accelerated. 
Manufacturing's share of all commodity output was no more than 6.7 per cent 
around 1910, but reached 29 per cent around 1940(1). Manufacturing production 
increased by a factor 17 (Kuznets). Until the 1930s most was light industry 
with the majority of it located in the South. 
After 1930, when the needs of the Japanese military increased rapidly, 
more heavy industry developed. Most of this heavy industry became located in 
the north where such resources as hydro-electric power, iron and coal deposits 
were more abundant. As a result, the balance of industry switched to the 
north. Chemical products (including fertiliser), rubber and paper, and 
textiles grew fast. Growth depended, in large part, on the Japanese. 
Virtually all capital equipment for the more modern establishments came from 
Japan and so did many technicians and engineers. 
International trade also increased rapidly in these years. The trading 
volume increased by a factor of 10 between 1910 and 1940. The overall trade 
ratio was calculated as 53.3 per cent in 1939-41, and as much as 63 per cent 
of total manufacturing production was exported in 1940; 95 per cent of this 
went to the "Yen block", i.e. Japan, Manchuria and the Japanese controlled 
parts of China (Kusnets and Brown). 
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When Japanese ru le ended in 1945, the South Korean economy was much less 
strong than i t s ea r l i e r his tory might have led to bel ieve . 
"The collapse of the Japanese economy, of which i t had been a 
fully in tegra l pa r t , meant a loss of v i t a l spare parts and other 
imports, as well as a loss of markets. The separation from the 
complementary coa l , e l e c t r i c i t y , f e r t i l i z e r and heavy industry of 
the North was another blow. Deterioration of industry through 
war-time cannibalization, heavy use, and inadequate maintenance 
was a third major factor , and the lack of experience in operating 
their own economy and government a fourth." (Brown, p. 30). 
Output, including manufacturing output was very low in the f i r s t years 
after l i be r a l i s a t i on . Gradually, however, and with considerable help from the 
United Sta tes , the economy recovered. By 1948 industry produced shoes, 
t e x t i l e s , rubber ty res , basic s t ee l shapes and such engineering products as 
pumps, b icycles , t i n cans and ba l l bearings (Westphal). The years 1948 to 
1950 were in fact characterised by considerable economic growth. 
The damage done by the war (1950-53) was considerable. The physical 
damage to property has been estimated as the equivalent of the Republic of 
Korea's 1953 GNP, "or more than ten times the annual r a t e of fixed capital 
investment" (Brown, p. 35). "I t took un t i l 1957 before per capita income 
levels returned to or exceeded the i r pre-Korean war l eve l s . " (Brown, p. 36). 
United States aid great ly contributed to the recovery. A t o t a l of 
US$2,080 mill ion poured into the Republic of Korea (Michell). Much of th i s 
was not very effect ively used however as i t came in the form of e i ther 
non-essential consumer goods or as United States agr icul tura l surplus items 
which depressed domestic agr icul ture rather than as capi ta l which could be 
2 
used to redevelop the country. 
Economic growth after the war was considerable (see table 22). GDP grew 
by 5.5 per cent between 1954 and 1958. Growth of agr icu l ture , s t i l l the 
dominant sector , was re l a t ive ly slow at 4.0 per cent per year. The land 
reform had been completed, but government's r e s t r i c t i v e pol icies kept farm 
1
 Compared with an estimated US$6,000 mill ion damage 
"Whilst the Koreans were concerned with reconstructing the economy, 
and with balancing the budget, the Americans were interested in pushing United 
States surplus items and bolster ing up the country against communism." 
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prices low and peasants from investing in t he i r own land. Manufacturing grew 
fas t . Manufacturing and mining growth together were as high as 15.1 per cent 
per year between 1954 and 1958. Inf la t ion was around 30 per cent on average 
in these years . 
The slowdown of economic growth in the l a t e 1950s ( i t was 3.6 per cent 
between 1959 and 1962) has been explained by a combination of factors: the 
dismissal (in 1958) of the government team that co-ordinated the economic 
recovery; growing unrest and repression; the announcement by the United 
States government that i t wanted to phase out i t s a id; and the s t a b i l i s a t i o n 
policy tha t reduced aggregate demand. 
Post-1962 economic growth was very f a s t . I t is common to contras t th i s 
fantast ic growth with the previous slow growth years . But, as the previous 
paragraphs showed, one must be careful not to paint these years in too dark 
colours. I t is t rue that in the " t r ans i t ion" period (1959-62) economic growth 
was comparatively low, but industry s t i l l managed to grow a t 9.4 per cent per 
annum in these years . 
From 1962 to 19 78 the economy grew at an average ra te of 10 per cent per 
year in real terms. Growth was high but i r regular and peaks of 14.9 per cent 
(1973) and 15.1 per cent (19 76) occurred followed or preceeded by "troughs" of 
5.8 per cent (1972). To some extent t h i s was the resul t of developments in 
the agr icul tura l sector , the yearly growth of which varied between -5.9 per 
cent (1967) and +15.6 per cent (1964). 
The re la t ive ly "slow" growth between 1970 and 1972 (-7.5 per cent 
average per year) was, however, largely policy-induced. After two years of 
very rapid growth (11.3 per cent in 1968 and 13.8 per cent in 1969), the 
economy threatened to become overheated. In the la te 1960s, the money supply 
had increased by 46 per cent in 1969 and the current account def ic i t jumped 
from US$191 mill ion to US$440 mill ion in 1968 (or 8.4 per cent of GDP) and to 
US$622 million in 1970 (EPB). The government then took a set of r e s t r i c t i v e 
monetary and f iscal pol icies and measures to reduce foreign capi ta l inflows 
(Kuznets). The 1972 and 1973 current account de f ic i t s were only 3.6 per cent 
and 2.3 per cent respectively (EPB). 
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The Republic of Korea weathered the f i r s t o i l c r i s i s qui te wel l . The 
value of o i l imports t r ip led between 1973 and 1974, but a s t r i c t conservation 
programme that was implemented with only a short delay kept the 1974 volume of 
oi l imports a t the 1973 leve l . The 1975 import volume was only 11 per cent 
over the 1973 l eve l , which is remarkable considering that manufacturing output 
was nearly 30 per cent higher. 
To be sure , the Republic of Korea's current def ic i t widened from US$300 
million in 1973 to US$2,000 million (or 11.2 per cent of GDP) in 1974 but a 
rapid export drive brought the de f ic i t back to i t s 19 73 level in 19 76 (when i t 
was 1.1 per cen t ) . Receipts of i nv i s ib l e s , which increased by a factor five 
between 1975 and 19 79, and which were in large part due to the many 
construction contracts tha t were awarded to Republic of Korean firms in the 
Middle East , a lso contributed to th i s improvement of the balance of payments. 
Meanwhile, the country had to finance these current account def ic i t s by 
increased borrowing abroad, and i t s foreign debt increased to a level such 
that i t is now one of the biggest developing country debtors in the world. 
The reason why th is has not t ranslated into a debt c r i s i s as in the Latin 
American countries are bas ica l ly twofold'. 
F i r s t , i t s debt s t ructure was more favourable. The large inflow of 
foreign loans in the la te 1960s had quickly worsened the debt service 
r a t i o . This had made the country aware of the importance of having a sound 
2 debt s t ruc tu re . Whilst other countr ies ' v u l n e r a b i l i t y to higher i n t e r e s t 
ra tes was great ly enhanced by the re la t ive ly short maturity of t he i r 
outstanding debt, the Republic of Korea had a fa i r ly long debt maturity in the 
Commercial lending had become an important feature of the Republic of 
Korea's development financing in the 1960s. Foreign loans were par t icu la r ly 
a t t r a c t i ve af ter the 1965 i n t e r e s t ra te reforms, when ra tes on domestic loans 
became considerably higher than those on foreign loans. When allowing for 
domestic inf la t ion and the effect of devaluations, Frank, Kim and Westphal (p . 
116) found that i n t e r e s t ra tes on foreign loans were negative for domestic 
borrowers between 1965 and 1969. 
9 
Foreign loans increased tenfold between 1964 and 1969. Many of these 
were short-term supplier c r e d i t s . This led to a rapidly worsening s t ruc ture 
of the foreign debt . The cost of debt servicing increased rapidly (and 
reached 19-20 per cent of export earnings between 1970 and 1972). Alarmed by 
these figures the government decided to l imit the approvals of short-term 
maturity loans. 
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l a t t e r 1970s. The average maturity of i t s debt had even marginally improved 
from less than 12 years in 1974 to 13 years in 1977 (IBRD, 1979). 
Second, higher debt servicing costs were met by very high growth of export 
earnings, and th i s kept the debt service ra t io within reasonable bounds. The 
r a t i o to v i s ib l e exports increased from 11.2 per cent in 1975 to 12.1 per cent 
in 1980 and 14.2 per cent in 1982. The r a t i o to a l l export earnings remained 
v i r tua l ly the same during that period (a t 10.5 per cent) (EPB). 
In 19 79 GDP growth slowed down to 6.4 per cent. In that year the economy 
was put under pressure by the second o i l price shock. Moreover, in that year 
the archi tect of the Republic of Korea's rapid growth, President Park, was 
murdered. I t took a year before a new stable government was i n s t a l l e d . In 
1980 economic growth was negative (-6.2 per cen t ) , but in the following two 
years i t recovered to a moderate 6 per cent increase each year. 
Altogether GNP went up from US$2,700 million in 1963 to US$65,000 million 
in 1982. In per capita terms, the increase was from US$100 - in 1963 to 
US$1,546 in 1979, and US$1,678 in 1982 (current p r i ces ) . 
Inf lat ion has, on average, been well over 10 per cent per annum. The 
a l l - c i t i e s consumer price index which fluctuated between 10 and 15 per cent in 
the 1966-72 period, dropped to 3.1 per cent in 19 73. I t jumped to the 24-25 
per cent range for the years 1974-75 but declined thereaf ter only to jump to 
28.7 per cent in 1980. I t slowed down to 7.2 per cent in 1982 (EPB). 
The exchange ra t e of the won with the dollar was periodically adjusted 
after 1964. In the l a t e r 1950s when the won had grown increasingly 
overvalued, the al locat ion of foreign exchange to importers took place through 
a complicated system of government auctions (Brown). This changed however in 
1961. Between January ( c iv i l i an government) and June (mil i tary government) a 
The country's good cred i t ra t ing (and thus low margins) was another 
favourable factor . In a sense one could say tha t the Republic of Korea had 
" i t s debt c r i s i s " ten years before the other major debtors had i t . I t was 
lucky in that i t occurred at a time of high world trade growth, low 
protectionism and, above a l l , low in t e r e s t r a t e s . I t made the country well 
aware of the dangers of a badly structured and uncontrolled foreign debt. 
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number of devaluations led to an exchange rate of 130 won to US$1. In May 
1964 the won was devalued to 256 won to the dollar. From 1965 to 19 74 the 
exchange rate was allowed to devalue gradually to maintain purchasing power 
parity. From 1974 to 1979 the exchange rate was pegged at 484 won to the 
dollar. Thereafter devaluations were resumed. 
Sectoral growth*. Manufacturing (in Korean s ta t is t ics often combined with 
mining) was by far the most buoyant sector in the economy. In no year between 
1963 and 1978 was i ts yearly growth less than 10 per centC.). In many i t was 
over 20; 27.2 per cent (1968), 29.2 per cent (1973) and 22.6 per cent 
(1976). Agricultural growth was much slower and showed considerable yearly 
variations. 
Changes in the structure of the economy have above all taken place between 
agriculture and manufacturing and within the tertiary sector. The la t te r ' s 
share of GDP remained between 40 and 50 per cent between 1960 and 1981. 
Agriculture saw i ts share decline from 46.1 per cent in 1962 to 19.6 per cent 
in 1981. Manufacturing share increased in the same period from 7.8 per cent 
in 1962 to 30.0 per cent in 1980 (see table 23). 
Table 23. Republic of Korea: Structure of GNP by sector, 1953-81 
Sector 1953-55 1962 1965 1970 1975 1980 1981 
Agriculture, forestry 
fishing 50.4 46.1 45.8 33.0 27.0 17.3 19.6 
Industry 10.6 
Mining and quarrying ) 6.8 2 «2 2 «3 
Manufacturing ) 7.8 9.5 
Construction 1.9 2.8 3.5 
Services1 39.0 43.9 42.5 
Includes construction, except for 1953-55. 
Sources. For 1953-55: Kuznets (1977) from BOK*. Economic Statistics 
Yearbook, 19 73 (based on 19 70 constant factor costs); for 










Table 24 gives s e c t o r a l employment d a t a . Agr i cu l t u r e showed a cons tan t 
dec l i ne but in 1980 s t i l l a t h i r d of the labour force worked t h e r e . 
Manufacturing employment grew r a p i d l y . In the 1960s, those manufactured 
products t h a t showed t h e most rap id export growth were among the c o u n t r y ' s 
most l a b o u r - i n t e n s i v e manufactures (Kuznets, p . 120). In the 1970s employment 
c r e a t i o n in manufacturing was a l s o f a s t . The number and the share of people 
working in c o n s t r u c t i o n showed a v i r t u a l l y cons tan t i n c r e a s e . Many of these 
c o n s t r u c t i o n workers a r e engaged in l a rge p r o j e c t s abroad, mainly in the Arab 
o i l -p roduc ing c o u n t r i e s . 
Table 24. Republic of Korea: Percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n of persons 
employed by i n d u s t r y , 1963-82 ( s e l e c t e d yea r s ) 
Sector 1963 1965 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 
A g r i c u l t u r e , f o r e s t ry 
f i s h i n g 63.1 58.6 50.4 45.9 34.0 34.2 32.1 
I n d u s t r y 1 8.7 10.3 14.3 19.1 22.6 21.3 21.9 
Mining and quarry ing 0.7 0.9 1.1 0 .5 0.9 0.9 0 .8 
Manufacturing 8.0 9.4 13.2 18.6 21.7 20.4 21.1 
Cons t ruc t ion 2.5 2.9 2.9 4 .3 6 .1 6.2 5.8 
Serv ices 25.6 28.1 32.3 30.7 37.3 38.2 40 .3 
1
 Excluding c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
Source. EPB (1983) . 
In the ea r ly 1960s output and expor ts of such l a b o u r - i n t e n s i v e 
manufactured products as t e x t i l e s , c l o t h i n g , footwear, plywood and wigs r o s e 
very f a s t . As i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e became more impor tan t , t he r e l a t i v e 
importance of t r a d i t i o n a l i n d u s t r i e s producing for the domestic market 
d e c l i n e d . 
In the 19 70s, "heavy" indus t ry gained s t e a d i l y in importance compared to 
" l i g h t " i n d u s t r y . In terms of value-added i t s share went up from 18.7 per 
cent in 1960 to 55.0 per cent in 1982. Motor v e h i c l e s and sh ipbu i ld ing 
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bas ic m e t a l s . Motor v e h i c l e s showed a spec t acu l a r increase (from 85,000 to 
205,000 u n i t s ) between 1977 and 1979, but was hard h i t by the 1980 r e c e s s i o n . 
In sh ipbu i ld ing the country has become the second most important world 
producer . 
Despi te the s h i f t towards heavy i n d u s t r y , t h e t e x t i l e s and c l o t h i n g 
indus t ry has remained an important p roduc t ion and expor t s e c t o r over the 
y e a r s . In 1975 i t s t i l l accounted for nea r ly 32 per cent of value added. And 
in 1978 n e a r l y one t h i r d of the manufacturing labour force worked t h e r e . 
In t h a t year two s e c t o r s employed n e a r l y 60 per cent of t o t a l 
manufacturing employment: t e x t i l e s , garments , l e a t h e r and footwear ( t h e share 
of which had ha rd ly decreased s ince 1961 when i t was 35.4 per cen t ) and metal 
products t h a t inc ludes such f a s t growing s e c t o r s as e l e c t r o n i c s , automobiles 
and sh ipbu i ld ing and where employment has gone up from 12.5 per cent of t o t a l 
in 1961 to 26.9 per cent in 1978 ( t a b l e s 25, 26 and 2 7 ) . 
Table 27. Republic of Korea: Manufacturing labour force by s e c t o r s , 
1960-791 ^ — B 1 
Sector 1960 1965 1970 1975 1977 1978 1979 
Food and beverages 
Textile, weaving 
Wood and wood 
products 








































































Employed in enterprises with over five employees. 
Source. Michell (1984), p. 74, from Mining and Manufacturing Surveys and 
Census. 
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Internat ional t rade: In the 1950s the Republic of Korea's par t ic ipat ion 
in foreign trade had been r e l a t i ve ly small. Exports and imports as a 
percentage of GNP was 12 per cent in 1953-55, and 13 per cent in 1960-62. 
Before 1963, sales to the United Nations forces stationed in the Republic of 
Korea accounted for most of i t s "exports". After 1963 merchandise exports 
grew rapidly , but as l a t e as 1968 mil i tary transactions s t i l l accounted for 25 
per cent of to ta l export earnings of goods and services (Cole and Lyman). 
The Republic of Korea also benefited from the Viet Nam war through exports 
of goods and services (e .g . construct ion) . These increased when a large 
Republic of Korean mil i tary force went the re . Nevertheless t o t a l receipts 
from Viet Nam seem never to have exceeded 20 per cent of current account 
receipts between 1967 and 1971 (Cole and Lyman; Kuznets). 
Exports grew in a spectacular manner in the 1960s and 19 70s. They made up 
5 per cent of GNP in 1962, 10 per cent in 1966, 15 per cent in 1971. After 
1973 they were around 30-35 per cent . Start ing from a low base (US$86.8 
mill ion) in 1963, the yearly increases in the country's exports u n t i l 1978 
were rare ly less than 20 per cent, and in some years (1963, 1972, 1976) they 
were over 50 per cent*. In 1973 the dol lar value of exports was nearly double 
that of the year before (EPB, 1983). 
Although the Republic of Korea has always had a def ic i t on i t s trade 
balance, import growth has been s l igh t ly less high than export growth. That 
is because in the ear ly 1960s the country s tar ted with a huge trade d e f i c i t . 
In 1963 exports were US$86.8 million against imports of US$560.3 mi l l ion . 
Most exports are manufactures. The country has few mineral resources and 
not much agr icu l tu ra l land. By 1963, 52 per cent of exports consisted of 
manufactures. After 1963 the share of manufactures in exports went up 
quickly. Since the early 1970s i t has been around 90 per cent of to ta l 
exports (EPB). 
Until 1961 such raw materials as basic ores, iron o re , fish and raw s i l k 
headed the l i s t of main export products. Soon thereaf ter these were overtaken 
"Korea benefited much less from the Viet Nam war than did Japan from 
the Korean war." (Kuznets, p. 71). 
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by such products as plywood, clothing, footwear and t e x t i l e s . Clothing has 
remained over the years the most important single export item, and even in 
1980 i t accounted for about 20 per cent of a l l exports . After 1968 the 
capital in tens i ty of manufactured exports increased. In the 1970s 
telecommunications, e l ec t r i c a l machinery, cement, t e x t i l e s , chemicals, ships 
and boats, iron and s tee l pipes, became other important export items ( table 
28). 
In the 1960s Japan and the United States were the Republic of Korea's main 
markets. Unti l 1973 they consumed together between 60-70 per cent of i t s 
exports. In the la te 19 70s the i r share declined. I t was no more than 43 per 
cent in 1981 ( table 29) . 
In that period the European market became more important (10 per cent in 
1972 to 18.6 per cent in 1979). In more recent years developing countries 
have also become important markets; together they bought 22 per cent of t o t a l 
exports in 1979, and increased th i s share to 36.7 per cent in 1981(i) 
(Michell). 
Import composition is presented in table 30 and main suppliers in table 
31. In imports too, the country has become less dependent on the United 
States and Japan. Higher costs of imported o i l have made i t into the main 
import category (30 per cent of the to t a l ) and the Middle East an important 
supplier . 
Brazil 
Until well into the twentieth century Braz i l ' s economy was mainly based on 
the production and export of primary products, the most important ones being 
sugar, gold and coffee. As l a t e as 1980 the majority of i t s exports were 
primary products in raw or semi-processed form. 
Indus t r ia l i sa t ion in Brazil s ta r ted l a t e in the nineteenth century. 
Industry produced t ex t i l e s and food products, as well as spare parts for the 
coffee sec tor . Some of these industr ies were local ly owned, some 
foreign-owned, mainly Br i t i sh . The l a t t e r also invested in infrastructure 
such as rai l roads and power s t a t i o n s . Most industry developed in the southern 
- 53 -
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part of the country that thanks to coffee and other crops was already the most 
1 prosperous region. 
Industrialisation accelerated after 1930. In the early 1930s depressed 
overseas demand resulted in a disastrous situation for coffee, the country's 
main export crop. A devaluation aimed at reducing the internal repercussions 
of the coffee crisis also made imports more expensive and encouraged further 
domestic industrialisation. Metal products, cement and chemicals showed 
dynamic growth. 
Economic and industrial growth were further encouraged by the 
development-oriented policies of Getulio Vargas. His strong central rule 
reduced the power of individual states. Tariffs on inter-state trade were 
abolished and this contributed to a greater economic integration of the 
country. Government investments supported industry. In 1941 the state-owned 
Volta Redonda integrated steel works were inaugurated. 
Strong overseas demand during the Second World War affected Brazil's 
industry in two ways. First, it encouraged exports, including industrial 
exports. Second, strong demand abroad reduced supply available for Brazil and 
thus encouraged import substitution. 
The end of the war had the opposite effect. Lower overseas demand and 
abundant supply of imports led to balance of payment problems. In response, 
government adopted a more protectionist attitude. Rather than devaluing the 
cruzeiro, a licensing system was introduced in 1947, and in 1949 the "Law of 
Similars" was enacted which prohibited imports for which a domestic substitute 
existed (Robock). 
All in all, Brazil entered the 1950s with already a sizeable manufacturing 
sector. In 1949, 20 per cent of the national product originated in 
manufacturing (Carvalho and Haddad, p. 33). 
1
 If anything, this concentration of economic activity in the south 
grew thereafter. In 1970, no less than 58 per cent of total value added was 
produced in the State of Sao Paulo, 16 per cent in Rio de Janeiro and 6 per 
cent in the State of Minas Gerais. Only 20 per cent of total value added in 
manufacturing was produced outside these three states (Robock). 
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The end of t h e Korean War boom a l s o caused balance of payments problems, 
and t h i s led to more p r o t e c t i o n . A m u l t i p l e exchange r a t e and a t a r i f f system 
were in t roduced . Manufactures became p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l p r o t e c t e d . 
In t h e second ha l f of the 1950s government p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e economy 
increased r a p i d l y . The s t a t e inves ted heav i ly in i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , such as 
e l e c t r i c power, roads and o the r t r a n s p o r t . The c o n s t r u c t i o n of the new 
c a p i t a l , B r a s i l i a , was s t a r t e d . Publ ic investments increased t h e i r share of 
the t o t a l from 25 per cen t in t h e e a r l y 1950s t o over 35 per cen t in t h e 
second ha l f of the decade. The i r sha re of GNP r o s e from 15.4 per cen t in 
1948 to 21 per cent in 1962 (Morley). 
The economy grew f a s t in t h e 1950s. GDP increased by 9 per cen t and 
i n d u s t r i a l output by 10 per c e n t . "Modern" c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e s e c t o r s such as 
s t e e l , au tomobi les , chemicals and e l e c t r i c a l machinery, wi th t h e i r h igh 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n of m u l t i n a t i o n a l s were among t h e f a s t e s t growers . 
However, some se r ious imbalances a l s o developed. The balance of payments 
showed a widening gap. The p r o t e c t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s had not reduced t h e va lue 
of imports as much as expec ted . Imports of f i n a l products decreased but as a 
r e s u l t of r ap id economic growth those of i n t e rmed ia t e and c a p i t a l goods 
i nc rea sed . Exports were discouraged by the overvalued exchange r a t e and by 
t h e p r o t e c t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s in g e n e r a l . The budget d e f i c i t a l so widened as 
2 growing government expendi tu re was not met by increased income. This 
d e f i c i t was financed through p r i n t i n g money and by borrowing ab road . 
I n f l a t i o n , which had been below 20 per cent in most yea r s be fo re 1958 
acce l e r a t ed and reached 47 per cen t by 1962. 
The government t h a t came to power in 1960 a t tempted to reduce i n f l a t i o n , 
and push back the c u r r e n t account and budget d e f i c i t s . However, faced with 
much oppos i t i on to i t s measures , i t f a i l e d . P o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y and t h e 
more c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e of the government to fo re ign investment had moreover a 
nega t ive e f f e c t on t h e s e investment flows. I n f l a t i o n reached 90 per cent in 
1964. 
1
 I t went up from 23 per cen t in 1953 t o 39 per cen t in 1961 (Luis 
P o s s a s ) . 
The budget d e f i c i t reached t h e equ iva l en t of 4 .2 per cen t of GNP in 
1963 (Morley). 
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The mi l i ta ry government that took over in March 1964 introduced i t s own 
s t ab i l i s a t ion programme. Helped by a policy which great ly limited trade union 
power and worker r i g h t s , and a t the cost of lower growth (3.4 per cent between 
1962 and 1967) i t managed to reduce inf la t ion to 27 per cent by 1967. The 
current account de f i c i t was eliminated. Simultaneously protect ion and the 
bias against exports were reduced. "After 1964, exchange premiums and advance 
deposits were eliminated or reduced, t a r i f f s were lowered (1967), and a 
crawling peg system was adopted." (Carvalho and Haddad, p . 37). Specific 
incentives to encourage exports were a lso introduced. 
In 1967 government adopted a more expansionary pol icy. I t s tated that a 
moderate inf la t ion r a t e would be to lera ted. Helped no doubt by the very 
favourable external environment and by considerable over-capacity of domestic 
industry, economic growth accelerated. I t reached an average of 8.5 per cent 
per year between 1965 and 1980 ( table 32). In 1980 real GDP was t r i p l e i t s 
1965 value. Per capita income that had grown a t 5.5 per cent per year, was 
double i t s 1965 value in 1980. 
The years 1968-73 saw par t icu lar ly high economic growth (10.1 per cent per 
annum). Indus t r ia l growth reached 12.9 per cent per year in th i s period. 
In teres t ingly inf la t ion declined from 28.3 per cent in 1968 to 15.1 per cent 
in 19731 (Carvalho and Haddad). Manufactured exports grew a t around 42 per 
cent per year from US$163 million in 1967 to about US$1,900 mill ion in 1974 
(Bergsman) and as a percentage of manufactured output they increased from 5 
per cent in 1968 to over 10 per cent in 1974 ( i b i d . ) . 
The 1973 o i l shock h i t Brazil hard. The country imported about 80 per 
cent of i t s o i l requirements. Inf lat ion accelerated ( i t was near 30 per cent 
in 1974), but fear for worse kept the Government i n i t i a l l y from passing the 
full effect of the internat ional oi l price r i s e to the domestic consumer. 
At f i r s t the consumption and import volume was thus hardly affected and the 
The generalised indexation system which exis ts in Brazil makes the 
country extremely vulnerable to such sudden price increases. The system which 
was set up for the correction of inf lat ionary dis tor t ions is widely applied to 
the active and the passive side of the financial system, house r a t e s and wages 
and sa la r ies in the public and private sec tor . 
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Table 32 . B r a z i l : Growth r a t e s of GDP by s e c t o r , 1951-81 
Year GDP Agr i cu l t u r e Manufacturing1 Services 




























































































































































GDP, a g r i c u l t u r e and indus t ry growth r a t e s for 1951-65 
a re der ived from FGVs old s c e n a r i o s . 
Sources . For 1951-65 and GDP 1965-69, Carvalho and Haddad, p . 
22 , from Fundaqao G e t u l i o Vargas, Conjuntura 
Economica, va r ious y e a r s . For 1966-69 and s e r v i c e s 
1970-7 7, World Bank*. Economic Memorandum on B r a z i l , 
1979, p . 72 , from Fundaqao Ge tu l io Vargas, for 
1970-81. 
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o i l b i l l exploded. 
2 Imports doubled in value (in USfc terms) in 1974 but remained roughly a t 
the same level un t i l 1979 when the country was h i t by the second o i l price 
hike. Exports were a t f i r s t slow to catch up, but high sugar and coffee 
prices and government encouragement of exports subsequently helped export 
growth and by 1977 the trade balance was in equilibrium ( table 33). The 
current account def ic i t s which for the years 1974-76 alone amounted to US$20 
bn were largely financed by borrowing abroad. By 1976 the net foreign debt of 
3 
US$19,400 million was three times as high as in 1973. 
The government did not react to the worsened BCP disequilibrium by 
4 deflating the economy. I n i t i a l l y i t responded by accelerating the import 
subst i tu t ion process. New incentives and cheap credi t were provided for the 
development of capi ta l good industr ies (Tyler) . After 1976 government was 
forced to take more deflationary action and was spending on these 
capi ta l - in tens ive projects cu t . 
Thanks to overseas borrowing the economy could continue to grow a t a 
re la t ive ly high ra te of over 6 per cent between 1974 and 1980. In f la t ion , 
however, accelerated and reached 50 per cent in 1979 and 100 per cent in 1980. 
1
 I n i t i a l l y the volume of o i l imports increased by 4 per cent in 1975 
and by 14.7 per cent in 1976 ( table p. 45, Werneck). Later on the government 
took dras t ic measures to discourage o i l consumption and to reduce o i l 
imports. I t closed petrol s ta t ions over the weekend, s ta r ted the gasohol 
programme, e t c . 
2
 The o i l b i l l increased from US$1 to US$3.2 bn but that was only one 
third of the to ta l increase. The cost of other raw materials - wheat, copper, 
chemicals, coal - nearly doubled (Cline in Cline) . 
The higher indebtedness a f te r 1975 was a t the time seen as quite 
acceptable as i t was assumed that high growth would soon generate a trade 
surplus and that a new equilibrium in the foreign accounts - a t a higher level 
of indebtedness - would be quickly a t t a ined . Worsening terms of t rade , the 
second oil shock and above a l l higher in t e re s t r a t e s , unfortunately proved the 
country wrong (Werneck). 
^ This was no doubt, in par t , for po l i t i c a l reasons. I t s poor showing 

















































































































NO © O 00 










f - i i - i i n C M 
f-i oo m co 
ON CM 0 0 CM 
< J CM CO CO 
© 
CO 
© r— f - i f - i N O 










































































































































CM f - l CM © 
N O NO O N CM 
ON N ON ON 





























































m .» co 
NO f-l <t 
ON m CM i l l 
CM 
i - l 
m 
co 
© m C M f i 
< t O N r * i n 




















f - l 
2 





















2 NO ON r» 
r» oo CM 










0 ) f -^. * f \ q j 
O ( O CQ f j 
c o o <s 
CO C u E h j O 
CO 
X > CO CO 












f - s - f l 
« > 
0) f * - f l C U f l 
^ 01 
C T) 
-I v-f e 
0 co 
u u 
U 09 CO 
a t i u 
1 41 <u 
e n o 
O C 14 





















4 J U 
a e 
0 1 CO 
U - I 
U CO 











ON CO ON ^O 
ON co m o 
CM co op f i 
CM 








oo - H 
SI « - l 
g-o 
• - 1 B 
CO U 00 
41 B 
I- l CO 
• H O 
a 
o *-> 
• f l 01 
4 J B 
CO ^ 
CO 
• H 09 
4 J f l 
f i 01 
g ^ 







































































The 19 79 o i l pr ice hike did not create such a wide gap in the trade 
balance as the previous one had done. The o i l import volume went down 
immediately (by 13.1 per cent in 1980) and the value of exports increased fast 
(from US$15,200 mill ion in 1979 to US$20,100 mill ion in 1980). But by then 
the yearly in te res t payments had reached a level of US$6,000 mill ion or ten 
times the amount of only s ix years e a r l i e r . In 1980 net in te res t payments (a t 
US$6,300 mill ion) were over twice the size of the def ic i t on the trade balance 
(table 34). 
Sectoral growth: Industry has been the fas tes t growing sector of the 
decades between 1950 and 1980, but i t i s remarkable that agr icul ture also 
maintained reasonable, and sometimes more than reasonable growth. I t grew by 
nearly 5 per cent per year between 1952 and 1973 (Carvalho and Haddad). 
Between 1972 and 1977 i t was estimated at 5.6 per cent average per year. 
Werneck reports that the primary sector as a whole grew at a yearly average of 
5.1 per cent betwen 1966 and 1980. In that period the manufacturing industry 
grew by 9.6 per cent on average. This sector which had grown by 9.5 per cent 
in the 1950s slowed to a yearly average of 2.8 per cent between 1962 and 1967 
but grew by 13 per cent during the "miracle" years 1967-73. From 1975 to 1980 
i t s growth was an average 6.5 per cent per year. Manufacturing contributes 
around 27 per cent to GDP ( table 35). 
Table 36 gives data on the s t ructure of the economically act ive 
population. Industry and services have gained a t the expense of agr icul ture 
but in 1980 many people (30 per cent of the to t a l ) were s t i l l employed in the 
primary sector . The fa i r ly high growth ra t e of th is sector and the constant 
pushing forward of the agr icul tura l frontier have, no doubt, played an 
important role in t h i s . 
Manufacturing growth has taken place above a l l in sectors that are 
"modern" and cap i ta l - in tens ive , such as machinery, p las t i cs and transport 
equipment. Intermediate and basic sectors such as chemicals and iron and 
s t ee l also grew fas t . Machinery, p l a s t i c s , e l ec t r i ca l and e l ec t r i ca l goods, 
transport equipment, rubber, chemicals, perfumery and metals a l l grew at over 
10 per cent average per annum between 1966 and 1980. Texti les and such 
labour-intensive sectors as clothing and footwear were among the slowest 
































































































- * \ e « n © e n e N © i n m > © e n f » • 
• • • • • * * • • • * • co 
H H H C h ^ H M M t O ^ C 
r^  en Oc« - j o v O o CN .» o - * m 
0 0 t O l A t O ( n c A l A C A C A O i n « O ^ 
H ^ ^ C O f l O ( M n M 9 3 - < s t O m 





















































> <u Q 
M-4 
o 








* • C 
- * C N - * C S O \ - * - C N 0 0 O c n » O v O i - t 
• I C O 1*1 O H ^ " 1 0 > ^ O » CO H 
I O co c M c n c n e n e n o o - * c n > o r » e N 
<-< v O J » > 0 ^ - J v O O N N N O 
oo o c N < M O » o o \ f i o > - i « * m r » 
H H H H N H M n ^ m i O v O 
c i N o o o \ c o i o m H H H 1 o i n ^ 
c M - * o e j N e n u " i a \ < n - 3 ' 0 0 i - i . - J e n 
m r » - < o o e n . - i o O i - i . » i > - v O e N o > 
n n ^ ' t m i O F i N C A ' f H O i o 
-H H H N M ^ ^ 
e n e n m O O - 3 ' ^ O i n O ^ c n 
l tO %£- .3- i n <7\ QO f-« m u-i co cs oo _ _ . 
CN ^ H r ^ r i ^ N O i O N C O i O C n 
O r » . i - i m o c n m c M i - i C M M 3 > - i i r > r ~ p H ^ r " 
ejs <N o -» oo O 0 » N N N * c » « i n H O 4 
m«s N m r» ^ N i o i n m H H a \ o i n a \ c o 
H « n n ^ m < o o \ N N H m N i n o i n 
f-4 *D w-4 \0 
r- CM r*» CM oo o ^ O ^ t c s c n ^ m v O r - o o O N O 




K 0 0 
S f 
X r -
H - » 
s o\ t-c 
• • •» 
>> " f i C 
i- l 01 
s a c o O f l 
O 01 
> 
• 0) H T3
c o 





«—. - H 
<-l • - ! 
00 * ^ 
ON N 
f l CO 
w W 
CO 
u 0> fc 





e c - * 
c 
• • -I-l 
vO U 
f 6 
r » U <* 01 ON o> 
f - i 
4J 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C 01 ^v 
C U M 




• u l 
u > o 
01 O vO 













































o f t 
C I 














t - t 
CM 



























l - l 
NO 





l - l 


















































o f t 
ON 
p * 





I - I 
P I 






























• • 4 
0 0 
m 0 0 
NO 
ON 












































co p * 
• 9 
co 













co i n 



























































I - I 
r* I - I 
I - I 





























i - 4 
• 9 
NO 



































i - l 





































































































































i - l 
l - l 
• 9 
































































































































































































































































































« : «o 





















a a 01 O 
•o oi 













Table 37 . B r a z i l ; Growth r a t e of manufacturing s u b - s e c t o r s , 1949-80 
Sector 1949-62 1962-67 1968-74 1975-80 1966-80 
Non-metal l ie minerals 
Meta l lu rg ica l 
Machinery 
E l e c t r i c a l and 
e l e c t r o n i c goods 
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n goods 




P l a s t i c s 
T e x t i l e s 
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Sources. For 1949-67; Morley (1982), p. 31, from 1949-62, Morley and 
Smith (1971, p. 123); 1962-67; IBGE'. Anuario Estatfstico, 
1972. 
For later years; Werneck (1984), p. 41, from data in Bonelli 
and Werneck (1978) and in Anuario Estatfstico do Brasil, 1981. 
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Such sectors as chemicals, s t ee l and metal products have become the 
larges t manufacturing sec tors . More t r ad i t iona l labour-intensive sectors have 
declined in importance ( table 38). 
Internat ional trade*. Braz i l ' s par t ic ipa t ion in internat ional t rade was 
very limited un t i l 1967. In that year the US dollar value of exports and 
imports was no more than 20 per cent higher than i t was ten years e a r l i e r ( ' . ) . 
After 1967 exports and imports both increased rapidly. Exports increased by 
25 per cent per annum between 1967 and 1973. The combined value of exports 
and imports went up from US$3,300 million in 1967 to US$12,400 million in 1973 
and US$43,000 mill ion in 1980. Nevertheless as a per cent of output, exports 
and imports are s t i l l small . Exports, for example, were the equivalent of 6.6 
per cent of GNP in 1970. They reached 7.7 per cent in 1973, but dropped to 
5.9 per cent the next year. In the l a t e 1970s they increased rapidly and 
reached 7.9 per cent in 1980 (and 9.3 per cent in 1981). 
Exports grew by about 18.5 per cent per year between 1965 and 1980. 
Manufacturing exports grew even fas te r . They were very dynamic during the 
"miracle" years (1967-73) and in the l a t e 1970s, when they increased by over 
30 per cent per year (19 77-80). In 1966 only 16.8 per cent of a l l exports 
were manufactures or semi-manufactures. By 1980 th i s had reached 56.5 per 
cent . The increase in manufactures' share took place not thanks t o , but 
despite very rapid growth of cer ta in agr icu l tu ra l exports , such as soy beans, 
sugar, and other primary exports such as iron o re . 
Tradi t ional ly , Brazil exported only a small portion of i t s manufacturing 
output. The rapid export growth of the 19 70s has changed th i s and by 1980 
exports of manufactures were the equivalent of 12.5 per cent of manufacturing 
output. 
Among manufactured exports the share of " t r ad i t iona l " sectors such as food 
and beverages has shown a steady decline and tha t of "modern" sectors such as 
machinery, e l e c t r i c a l and transport equipment a steady increase. Table 39 
gives the percentage d i s t r ibu t ion by broad sector . Unfortunately, such a 
broad categorisat ion does not bring out the spectacular r i s e of some narrower 
categories such as t ransport equipment that increased from US$69 mill ion in 
1972 to US$1,512 mill ion inl980, or machinery, boi lers and mechanical 
apparatus that went up from US$55 million to US$945 million in the same period. 
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The EEC and t h e United S t a t e s a re B r a z i l ' s main t r a d i n g p a r t n e r s . But 
toge the r they account for l e s s than h a l f of the va lue of t o t a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
t r a d e . An i n t e r e s t i n g f ea tu re of B r a z i l ' s expor t s i s t h a t t h e developing 
coun t r i e s have become p r o g r e s s i v e l y more impor tant markets . Whereas in 1970, 
developing coun t r i e s accounted for 17 per cent of a l l expor t d e s t i n a t i o n s , in 
1981 t h i s percentage had gone up to 37 per cen t ( see t a b l e 4 0 ) . 
Rapid economic growth was a l so accompanied by a r ap id r i s e in imports 
which increased by 23.8 per cen t per year between 1965 and 1980. Cap i t a l 
goods were t h e most important i tem u n t i l 1973. The share of o i l in t o t a l 
imports went up from 10 per cen t in 1972 to 22.4 per cen t in 1974, 33.9 per 
cent in 1977 and 44 .4 per cent in 1980 ( t a b l e 4 1 ) . 
Table 4 1 . B r a z i l ; Imports by commodity group, 1966-80 
Year Value (FOB) Composition (%) 
US$ m i l l i o n Annual C a p i t a l In te rmedia te goods Consumer 
growth goods goods 
r a t e (%) 
Oi l and Raw 

























































































































Source. Werneck (1984) (Banco Cen t r a l do B r a s i l ) . 
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As with exports there i s now more var ie ty in the sources of B r a z i l ' s 
imports. Due to i t s high dependence on o i l , Middle Eastern suppl iers have 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The rapid growth of Brazil, Mexico, the Republic of Korea and Singapore in 
the 1960s and 1970s was led by their dynamic secondary sector. Their 
manufacturing industry grew particularly fast. The two Asian countries grew 
more rapidly than either Brazil or Mexico. This was in part due to the fact 
that the two Latin American countries had already a sizeable manufacturing 
industry in place by 1960. In Singapore and the Republic of Korea this sector 
was small and its subsequent rapid growth lifted overall economic growth rates 
to a high level. 
Economic growth was high on average but it also showed great variations. 
This was perhaps least so for the Republic of Korea which grew at 10 per cent 
average per year from 1962 to 1978. In Singapore growth was relatively slow 
in the early 1960s (5.5 per cent per annum between 1960 and 1965) but 
accelerated in 1965 and was 16.1 per cent on average per year between 1966 and 
1970. In the 1970s economic growth slowed down but remained at a high level: 
due to some years of low growth in the first half of the decade, economic 
growth was "only" 8.6 per cent on average. The Brazilian economy grew by 10.1 
per cent on average between 1968 and 1973. In earlier years a stabilisation 
programme had caused slow growth: from 1962 to 1967 it was 3.4 per cent on 
average. From 19 74 to 1980 economic growth was 6 per cent per annum. The 
Mexican economy showed steady growth at 7.1 per cent per annum in the 1960s. 
In the 1970s, however, growth became more erratic. It dropped to 3.4 per cent 
in 1971, recovered in subsequent years, but dropped again to 2.8 per cent on 
average between 1975 and 1977. Following the discovery of huge new oil 
reserves the economy rebounded and grew by 8.5 per cent between 1978 and 1980. 
Rapid economic growth has taken place in conjunction with drastic 
structural changes. The most important of these is the large number of people 
that left the agricultural sector (figure 1). This put considerable pressure 
on employment creation elsewhere in the economy, a problem that was 
particularly serious in Mexico where labour force growth is high and where 
agricultural growth slowed down dramatically after 1965. 
There is a marked difference in the pattern of industrialisation among the 
four countries. In Brazil and Mexico high growth was concentrated in such 
sectors as steel, chemicals, transport equipment and machinery, which are 
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cap i t a l - and sk i l l - i n t ens ive , but which use re la t ive ly l i t t l e labour. In 
Singapore, in contras t , rapid growth took place above a l l in labour-intensive 
industries such as t e x t i l e s , clothing and e l ec t r i ca l and e lect ronic goods, 
which use re l a t ive ly l i t t l e capi ta l and ski l led labour. In the Republic of 
Korea the high growth industr ies of the 1960s were also labour- intensive. In 
the 1970s, however, rapid growth became progressively concentrated in more 
capi ta l - in tens ive industr ies such as s t e e l , t ransport equipment and other 
heavy industry. 
The different degrees of labour-intensiveness is well i l l u s t r a t e d by the 
examples of Brazil and Singapore. In manufacturing in 1980, Brazil needed 
only 16 per cent of i t s workforce to produce 29 per cent of output. 
Singapore, in contras t , needed 30 per cent of i t s workforce to produce 28 per 
cent of i t s GDP. 
Tradi t ional ly , internat ional t rade has been very important for the 
entrepot port of Singapore. Brazi l , Mexico and the Republic of Korea traded 
l i t t l e before 1960. After 1960 the Republic of Korea showed spectacular 
export growth. On average, th i s increased by over 30 per cent per annum in 
the 1960s and over 20 per cent in the 1970s ( table 43) . Today around one 
third of i t s GDP is exported. For Mexico internat ional t rade remained 
re la t ive ly unimportant un t i l the o i l boom. After 1977 both exports and 
imports increased rapidly , and together they were the equivalent of 18 per 
cent of GNP in 1980. Braz i l ' s foreign trade increased rapidly (from a very 
low base) af ter 1967. Exports as a percentage of GNP reached 7.9 per cent in 
1980. Foreign trade remained a l i f e l i n e for the Singapore economy. Today, 
the value of the country's exports ( in terms of output) is higher than that of 
i t s GDP (in terms of valud added). (Figure 3 compares exports and GNP for the 
four countr ies . ) 
Vir tual ly a l l of the Republic of Korea's and Singapore's exports are 
manufactures. In Brazi l , where manufactured export growth outpaced primary 
export growth, manufactures and semi-manufactures made up 56 per cent of a l l 
exports in 1980 commpared to only 16 per cent in 1966. In Mexico the opposite 
happened. Petroleum and gas became such important items that in 1980 they 
alone accounted for two-thirds of the t o t a l . Manufactures, in cont ras t , made 
up only 7.3 per cent of the t o t a l , or less than half of i t s share 10 years 
e a r l i e r . (Figure 2 compares the share of exports of each country in world 
exports and manufactured exports .) 
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Figure 1. SECTORAL DISTRIBDTION OP GDP AHD EKPLOYKEIIT (%) 
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Source: The World D.Telopn.nt Report. 1982. 
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Table 4 3 . Popu la t i on , GDP, per c a p i t a GDP and expor t s ( s e l e c t e d c o u n t r i e s ) 
Braz i l Mexico Re pub 1 i c 
of Korea 
Singapore 
Popula t ion ( i n 1980) 
Populat ion growth 1970-80 
(per c e n t , per year) 
GDP (1960, '000 mln US$) 
GDP (1980, '000 mln US$) 
GDP per c a p i t a (1980 US$) 
Average annual growth 
1960-80 (per cent ) 
Merchandise e x p o r t s , 1980 
( '000 mln US$) 
Average annual growth 
1960-1970 (per cen t ) 









































Source. World Bank; World Development Report , 1982 (Washington, DC). 
Each country achieved a g r e a t e r d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of t h e i r export markets in 
the 1970s. The share of developing coun t r i e s grew p a r t i c u l a r l y f a s t . Mexico 
i s the except ion though; i t s t i l l depends for over 60 per cent of i t s expor ts 
and imports on one coun t ry , the United S t a t e s . 
Braz i l and the Republic of Korea, which depend to such a l a r g e ex ten t on 
imported energy, were hard h i t by the 19 73 o i l - p r i c e h i k e . Thei r l a rge 
cur ren t account d e f i c i t s forced them to borrow more abroad. Thanks to d r a s t i c 
ac t ion aimed a t c u t t i n g energy consumption and promoting v i s i b l e and i n v i s i b l e 
e x p o r t s , t h e Republic of Korea narrowed i t s cu r ren t account gap q u i c k l y . 
Because i t was very concerned about the i n f l a t i o n a r y e f f e c t s , Braz i l delayed 
passing the fu l l impact of the o i l p r i c e inc reases onto the consumer. This 
expla ins in l a rge pa r t why the former ' s debt p o s i t i o n increased l e s s 
d rama t i ca l ly than the l a t t e r ' s ( see f igure 4 ) . Mexico's high debt exposure is 
qu i t e un re l a t ed to the o i l p r i ce i n c r e a s e . I t r o s e d r a s t i c a l l y as a r e s u l t of 
the expansionary programmes of the ea r ly 1970s which, in the i n a b i l i t y of 
genera t ing domstic r e s o u r c e s , were financed by borrowing abroad . 
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I t s more favourable debt structure and the high l eve l of i t s export 
earnings help explain why debt servic ing has been l e s s of a problem for the 
Republic of Korea than i t has been for the two Latin American countries 
(f igure 5 ) . 
k 
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GOVERNMENT AND THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
There i s no agreement on the p r e c i s e r o l e of government in the economy. 
Between those who argue t h a t markets a r e too imperfect t o assure opt imal 
al locat ion of resources and that thus considerable intervention is necessary, 
and those who argue that the market is a cheap and r e l a t ive ly simple 
a l locat ive instrument where too much interference by bureaucracy would lead to 
inefficiency and open up the poss ib i l i ty for corruption, there is a vast 
middle ground where most agree on some role for government although there is 
rarely a consensus about how much. 
The need for government intervention to promote economic and indus t r ia l 
growth and an acceptable pattern of income d i s t r ibu t ion appears to be more 
c r i t i c a l in developing than in most indust r ia l ised countr ies . Deficient 
information flows, d i spa r i t i e s in bargaining power among different 
socio-economic groups and the scarci ty of e ssen t i a l inputs are but a few of 
the factors which explain t h i s . 
But governments are not as inf luent ia l as some of them would l ike in 
achieving thei r objectives. A government i s only one of the actors involved 
and unless i t owns or controls the en t i re productive capacity i t must r e ly on 
persuading the other actors to move in i t s desired d i rec t ion . When i t comes 
to d i s t r ibu t ing the benefits of growth the freedom of action of any government 
i s also l imited, as long as i t does not want to put i t s own survival a t s take . 
Government is not a neutral force. In some cases power is in the hands of 
a few people and their background and in te res t s may disproportionately 
influence the outcome of economic decision-making. The po l i t i c a l system may 
be controlled by a small £ l i t e , a small group of people in government and 
business who share the same background and outlook. Their decisions would 
benefit them most of a l l . Investment would be channelled into projects that 
increase thei r wealth, s ta tus and power. Income from property would be 
encouraged a t the expense of employment (Mehmet). In other cases government 
operates more as a neutral force and i t s loya l t i es to one social c lass or 
group are less clear or d i r e c t . 
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Government is also not necessari ly a force that speaks with only one voice 
or works towards the same end. Inconsistencies ranging from lack of 
co-ordination to open confl ict between different branches of government have 
affected local and foreign investors a l ike . 
This chapter - and indeed the whole study - deals with socio-economic 
development and i t is impl ic i t ly assumed that th is has the highest policy 
p r io r i t y . This is probably a fair assumption as even a government whose prime 
concern is to perpetuate i t s own power wil l find that th is is eas ier in an 
environment of steady socio-economic progress. The s i tua t ion of some 
countries is such, however, that concern for internal and external securi ty 
has top p r i o r i t y . This concern is then used as an explanation for the 
government assuming extraordinary powers. But even th i s need not be 
incompatible with s t r iv ing for economic and indus t r ia l growth as the case of 
the Republic of Korea shows. 
Today, governments may consider concern for the economy one of the i r prime 
r e spons ib i l i t i e s , but often they became involved qui te "by accident". In 
Latin America, for instance, which was the developing continent to f i r s t 
i ndus t r i a l i s e , governments became involved because the people affected by the 
1930 c r i s i s , by sca rc i t i e s during the Second World War, by the wave of imports 
af ter that war or by depressed world market prices following the end of the 
Korea War, turned to t he i r governments for ass i s tance . In Brazi l , for 
example, the f i r s t case of major centra l government intervention occurred in 
the early 1930s. Depressed demand and low world market prices for coffee 
threatened disastrous effects for the Brazilian economy that depended so much 
on coffee, i t s main export product. Under pressure from producers, and aware 
of the threat to the economy, the new Vargas government bought up a l l the 
stocks and destroyed them. In combination with a sharp devaluation, and a 
public works programme t h i s prevented deeper stagnation and maintained 
domestic income and demand at a reasonable level . I t a lso had a favourable 
effect on i ndus t r i a l i s a t i on . Imports became expensive and there was less 
foreign exchange available to pay for them. Some capi ta l previously invested 
in coffee went into industry to benefi t from new profi table opportunit ies 
(Robock; Luiz Possas). 
The example of Brazil where government became involved in the economy 
almost by accident (but where i t now plays a very important role) contrasts 
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with that of Singapore where government, r ight from the s t a r t , was very 
expl ic i t about i t s ' po l i cy aims, including ra is ing the l iving standards of the 
population, and how i t wanted to achieve them. Through closely supervising 
the economy i t has been successful in reaching these object ives . 
In Mexico the Government became only re luctant ly involved in the economy. 
In fact the country's " s t ab i l i s ing development" policy of the la te 1950s and 
1960s which stressed price s t a b i l i t y in the absence of exchange controls , 
together with low tax r a t e s , allowed government very few i n i t i a t i v e s . 
Passively the government did intervene through protection against imports. 
though. In the Republic of Korea i t can be claimed that the announcement in 
the late 1950s by the United States to reduce i t s aid to the country, caused 
the government to take a more act ive in te res t in the economy. 
However, whatever the way in which i t s involvement s t a r t ed , the government 
played a very important role during the high growth period in shaping the 
industr ia l s t ructure of each of the four countr ies . The r e s t of this chapter 
wi l l review th i s government intervention. I t wi l l ask how "planned" each 
intervention was and what actual indus t r ia l and trade pol ic ies consisted of. 
Final ly , i t wi l l look a t two se ts of instruments tha t governments have at 
thei r disposal - incentives, and the d i s t r ibu t ion of funds for investment -
and ask how effective each has been for reaching s ta ted goals . A third 
instrument, d i rect government investment, wil l be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Planning and co-ordination 
In the discussion on the precise role for government, planning has a 
central p lace. Once i t i s accepted tha t there i s a role for government, a 
plan can be an extremely useful instrument. A good plan contains a 
development strategy that specifies i t s object ives, sets clear and r e a l i s t i c 
t a rge t s , spel ls out how the targets should be achieved and when, and who is 
1
 The government went beyond th is and made i t clear to the population 
that i t considered cer ta in vir tues essen t ia l : hard work and savings, pride in 
the country's achievements and understanding of i t s d i f f i c u l t i e s , and healthy 
minds in healthy bodies to assure the desired qual i ty of l i f e . Furthermore, 
i t act ively discouraged people from smoking, drinking, wearing long h a i r , e t c . 
(Geiger, p. 215). 
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responsible for achieving them. A published plan serves for greater 
co-ordination within the public sector as individual actions and problem 
solving can be checked for consistency with the plan. 
Plans are also important for those outside the public sector . A published 
plan shows which problems are of public concern and, by omission, which are 
not . I t shows that there is suff ic ient consensus for a problem to be raised 
in an o f f i c i a l document. Published targets would help private enterpr ises 
which also make projections and have to make investment decisions. I t would 
a s s i s t them great ly if these could be checked against government projections 
a t an early date (Kuznets). 
Preparing a plan can be an extremely useful exercise. Indeed, i t has been 
argued that the preparation of a plan can be more important than i t s 
execution. I t is a huge and complicated exercise which takes a lo t of time 
and requires a minimum of s t a t i s t i c a l data. The preparation of a plan forces 
different branches of government to view the economy as a whole and to ask 
cer ta in crucial questions about the future. I t forces government to assess 
i t s role in th is future, makes i t aware of the need for essent ia l inputs and 
helps to identify crucial cons t ra in ts . 
Implementing a plan may be much more d i f f i c u l t . In ternal , and above a l l , 
external circumstances may change rapidly and have serious unforeseen 
consequences. Two bad harvests in a row or a quadrupling of o i l prices may 
radical ly change a l l assumptions. An unforeseen event in the f i r s t year of a 
medium-term plan that foresees high growth may upset projections for a l l 
future years . A plan must thus be implemented flexibly and ideal ly planning 
and pragmatism go hand in hand. 
A published plan is above a l l an indication (or confirmation) that 
government aspires to a role in the economy now and in the future. I t 
indicates further that i t thinks i t can influence events e i the r by enforcing 
or by guiding. I t is in th i s respect i l l u s t r a t i v e that when in the l a t e 1970s 
the Fifth Five-Year Plan was about to come out in the Republic of Korea, 
Mexico had only jus t published i t s f i r s t development plan. I t is also 
in teres t ing to note that in Mexico the sectoral development plans came out 
be fore the "global" plan. This sequence did not allow a consistency check 
between objectives and financial means, nor between the objectives of 
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different plans. So although these plans gave an indication of a desire to 
come up with an integrated, forward-looking policy at the sectoral l eve l , they 
also confirmed the low level of in te r - sec to ra l co-ordination. 
The huge size and complexity of the i r economies and related data gathering 
problems have, of course, made attempts a t planning much more complicated in 
Brazil and Mexico. There have nevertheless been a number of planning efforts 
in Brazi l . An Economic Planning Commission was set up in 1944. There was the 
1948 JALTE plan for national development, the "Comisao Mista" (the jo in t 
Brazil-United States Development Commission) and the 1956-61 "Plan of 
Targets". Two four-year development plans were also published; the f i r s t 
(1972-75) and second (1975-79) National Development Plan. The importance 
attached to planning in Brazil has varied a great deal with the personali ty of 
the minister responsible. 
In Singapore the efficiency of policy-making is f ac i l i t a t ed by the high 
degree of co-ordination among different min is t r ies , which in turn is helped by 
the fact that r e l a t ive ly few people are involved and that they meet 
frequently. This high degree of day-to-day co-ordination and contacts may be 
among the reasons why no further plans were published af ter the 1961 % 
Development Plan. Development policy is very much project-oriented and 
takes place within the overall guidance and with the act ive par t ic ipat ion of 
2 Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, Dr. Goh Keng Swee and Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew who have been in government since independence. The 
planning s ty l e is characterised by great f l ex ib i l i ty and pragmatism. 
Currently, planning decisions are taken by a Development Planning Committee 
(DPC) that consists of the Prime Minister, the ministers of finance and 
development and the minister responsible for the project concerned (Chen in 
Chen). 
There is no doubt that a high degree of continuity and consistency in 
government policies i s favourable for investment. The po l i t i ca l s t a b i l i t y 
that has resulted from the long reign of Dr. Goh and Mr. Lee, who has been in 
power in Singapore without interruption since 1959 (26 years) has no doubt 
1
 In 1979, an indicative plan for the 1980s - the Ten-Year Plan - was 
made public. 
* Now retired from these functions. 
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contributed to the country's economic progress. In the Republic of Korea, 
Park Chung Hee was in power a l l along the high growth period from 1961 to 1979 
when he was murdered. In Brazil too, the mil i tary have in a way provided for 
po l i t i ca l s t a b i l i t y af ter 1964. I t is t rue that during mil i tary ru le a number 
of different presidents have "done the i r turn", but the influence of each 
appears to have been overshadowed by the influence (and s t a b i l i t y ) of the 
mil i tary as establishment (Evans, 1974). 
In Mexico, on the other hand, the government has changed at more regular 
intervals and th i s has had a s ignif icant influence on the economy and economic 
policy-making. Each Mexican president is elected for a period of s ix years 
("sexenio") and cannot be re-e lec ted . Although he is hand-picked by his 
predecessor and is of the same p o l i t i c a l party (PRI) there have been 
considerable differences between the policies of each. Moreover, the 
t rans i t ion from one president to the other usually involves a considerable 
shake up of the bureaucracy in which many lose the i r place and are assigned to 
sometimes completely different jobs in completely different sec to rs . 
The uncertainty represented by the pres ident ia l elect ions has added to the 
uncertainty of government pol ic ies resu l t ing from the absence of a plan. "The 
uncertainty that develops in the period immediately before and immediately 
af ter the elect ion of a new president has an important influence on the 
economic l i f e of the country: new investments are postponed, even normal 
production suffers , e .g . the demand for s t ee l diminishes." (de Rossi, p . 30). 
The worrying aspect of the sexenios is that the difference in policies 
between one sexenio and the next seems to be on the increase (Dominguez in 
Dominguez). The differences between "sexenios" puts the 1979 planning 
exercise a lso in a different perspect ive. The Indust r ia l Development Plan for 
instance was supposed to cover the period 1979-90. Although th i s permitted a 
long-term view of Mexico's indus t r ia l development i t a lso covered three 
sexenios and i t is doubtful whether the two other presidents involved in the 
years covered by the plan would feel bound by i t . 
Whatever i t s favourable influence on economic growth and investment, i t 
must be recognised that " s t a b i l i t y " may also have some ugly p o l i t i c a l 
connotations. In many cases great po l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y is the d i rec t resu l t of 
the weakness of forces outside the government and the impossibil i ty to remove 
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the government by democratic means. In th is respect , the uncertainty 
surrounding the sexennial rhythm should not be exaggerated. Most countries 
would be envious of the Mexican po l i t i ca l system tha t guarantees six years of 
s table government and few countries can boast a government party in power for 
over 60 years . 
The Republic of Korea has a long planning h i s to ry . A number of plans had 
been drawn up af ter independence and the f i r s t Five-Year Economic 
Development Plan, presented in 1961, was thus cer ta in ly not the f i r s t attempt 
a t planning in the Republic of Korea. Nevertheless i t was a r e l a t ive ly simple 
document. In the f i r s t years of i t s implementation economic growth was much 
slower and inf la t ion much higher than projected, and i t was largely ignored. 
However, jus t when planners were ordered to revise t he i r targets downwards, 
the economy reached the high growth levels which had been predicted for 1964 
and 1965. As these years coincided with the preparation of the second 
Five-Year Plan, this exercise was suddenly given much more importance. 
The second plan was in a number of aspects a turning point: within a year 
the planning function and the planners became integral parts of the 
decision-making process. A number of factors are said to have contributed to 
t h i s . Among them are the qual i ty of the plan - the new plan could draw on the 
f i r s t input-output tables made for the Republic of Korea in 1961 and 1963 
which allowed linkages to be evaluated more precisely; the contribution of 
foreign consultants; the high commitment of the chief of the newly 
established Economic Planning Board; the active par t ic ipa t ion of o f f i c ia l s 
from many sec tors , as well as the rea l i sa t ion that th i s plan might have some 
influence on the budgetary and policy action of the government. "Because the 
various agencies of the government began to suspect that the plan might have 
such an influence, they took i t more seriously and thereby contributed to i t s 
increased s ignif icance." (Cole and Lyman, p. 219). 
1
 Post-independence planning in the Republic of Korea dates back to the 
c iv i l war when an American firm (Robert R. Nathan and Associates) prepared a 
plan at the request of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. This 
plan was never implemented. The fact that (the then) President Syngman Rhee 
was never consulted during i t s preparation may have had something to do with 
th is (Tony Michell) . Jus t before the overthrow of President Rhee, the f i r s t 
(three-year) phase of a new Seven-Year Plan had been adopted, but the change 
of government prevented i t s implementation. The succeeding (Chang) government 
had a Five-Year Plan prepared and this was ready jus t before the 1961 coup 
d ' e t a t . 
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Planning in the Republic of Korea grew thus gradually in importance 
because of the significance attached to i t at the highest executive level , but 
also because a kind of virtuous c i r c l e of par t ic ipa t ion developed: as more 
of f ic ia l s of more agencies became involved, the plan gained in respect and 
importance. Par t ic ipa t ion , moreover, had some educational value: as 
of f ic ia l s from many minis t r ies had par t ic ipated in the discussions on the 
plan, they were more aware of the resource l imita t ions ( i b i d . , p . 219). 
Planning allowed the ident i f ica t ion of bottlenecks and indicated to 
business and government agencies what the p r i o r i t i e s were for the years to 
come. Plans were not meant to forecast precise growth r a t e s , and indeed these 
(sometimes) widely differed from what had been targeted: "This is hardly 
unusual by internat ional standards; what is unique is that deviations were 
generally posit ive (Jones and Sakong, p. 56) . 
whatever i t s significance as a policy instrument, planning was, however, 
never allowed to make government pol icies too r ig id . Each year the plan was 
subjected to an economic review to allow modifications to be made to the basic 
plan according to developments in the past year. These annual reviews were 
called Overall Resource Budgets (ORBs) ( Michell; Cole and Lyman). This 
f l ex ib i l i t y and pragmatism are i l l u s t r a t e d by the government's quick react ion 
to the f i r s t o i l c r i s i s . Shortly af ter the 1973 o i l price hike, in no more 
than three weeks a f a i r ly sophisticated document was prepared that combined "a 
respect for al locat ing efficiency (increase in price of petroleum products to 
more or less world levels) with a concern for equity (taxes were realigned to 
reduce the net burden on the middle class and increase i t on the r i c h ) . There 
was also recognition of the dangers of adjustment windfalls (petroleum product 
price increases and allowable pass-throughs by users were to be allowed only 
af ter scrutiny of prof i t and loss accounts) ." (Jones and Sakong, p . 61). 
This brief summary of planning in the Republic of Korea would not be 
complete without mentioning the c r i t ique that i t has received more recently 
from Republic of Korean researchers . They are especially c r i t i c a l of the 
Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan that was launched in the early 1970s. This 
plan is now considered to have been too ambitious as i t kept huge investment 
These were l a t e r called "Annual Economic Management Plans" (Michell). 
- 91 -
funds away from other sec tors . (This plan and i t s c r i t ique wi l l be discussed 
in the next sec t ion . ) In more general terms, i t seems clear that as the 
economy has become more complex, i t is increasingly d i f f i cu l t to guide i t in 
the way the f i r s t Five-Year Plans have done. In a way the Fifth Plan that was 
published in 1980 recognised th i s as i t announced reduced government 
intervention in the economy. 
Indus t r i a l i sa t ion and internat ional trade policies 
In most developing countries early indus t r ia l i sa t ion came about fa i r ly 
spontaneously. In response to local needs, production of low cost , low 
qual i ty , consumer goods emerged v i r tua l ly without government involvement. 
These goods required no complicated technology or s k i l l s and had a low minimum 
eff ic ient scale of production. They include t e x t i l e s , clothing, processed 
foods, production and repair of shoes and other leather products, of furniture 
and other wood products. Others emerged because the cost of t ransporta t ion 
would add disproportionately to the i r production cost , such as bricks and 
other building mater ia ls , and l a t e r on beer and soft dr inks . A th i rd category 
was the local processing of mineral and agr icu l tura l raw materials for export, 
such as copper or sugar ref inery. 
A country that wanted to maintain the growth momentum of i t s indus t r ia l 
sector beyond th i s early indus t r i a l i sa t ion phase was generally considered to 
have two options; reduce or increase i t s par t ic ipat ion in internat ional 
t r ade , "deepen the import subst i tu t ion process" by ra is ing protec t ionis t 
barr iers or encourage production for export. 
I t is doubtful whether export promotion or import subs t i tu t ion was ever 
such a clear and conscious choice as i t is sometimes made out to be. 
Protection offered to domestic producers was often, i n i t i a l l y , only a reaction 
to sudden Balance of Payments problems, when trade bar r ie rs were erected to 
reduce imports. Or protection was awarded a t the request of a producer in 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
Protected indus t r ia l i sa t ion can be ju s t i f i ed when the social benefits of 
establ ishing an industry are greater than the net benefi ts accruing to the 
individual industry. This is the case when knowledge of new production 
techniques and processes wi l l eventually be shared with other producers, and 
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a l so , when workers, who have been trained by or for the par t icu la r industry, 
will be hired by other indus t r i es . Protectionism should be temporary, 
however, and the expectation must ex i s t that af ter a cer tain time the industry 
will be able to produce at in ternat ional ly competitive prices (Meier). 
However, in pract ice such cost benefi t considerations have ra re ly preceded 
the awarding of protect ion. Moreover, the effects on the balance of payments 
of import subst i tu t ion were not necessari ly as favourable as expected: the 
final product was no longer imported but many or most of i t s intermediate 
inputs were, and i f the domestic producer was not very e f f ic ien t the foreign 
exchange cost of these could come very close to that of the previously 
imported product or even higher . Besides, se t t ing up domestic production 
involved the importation of machinery which was often taxed a t low ra te s which 
induced over-capacity and encouraged capi ta l - in tens ive processes. 
In any case prolonged import subs t i tu t ion appears to be the privileged 
option of the larger , resource-rich countr ies . They have a potent ia l ly 
large-enough domestic market to allow producers to reap the benefi ts of 
economies of scale while agr icu l tu ra l and mineral exports pay for imports of 
intermediate inputs and capi ta l goods. 
Smaller and poorer countries usually do not have th i s option if they are 
looking for a high growth path. They must par t i c ipa te in in ternat ional 
t rade . Compared to slow growing domestic demand, in ternat ional demand may 
appear to have unlimited growth prospects to the small producers. Export 
expansion may thus be very advantageous. I t allows a country to produce more 
e f f i c i en t ly , benefit from scale economies and internat ional spec ia l i sa t ion , 
earn foreign exchange, e t c . Past experiences show a high corre la t ion between 
export and GDP growth. 
However, th i s greater rel iance on the outside world may a lso lead to 
greater insecuri ty . Competition may be f ie rce , demand insecure and prices may 
fluctuate wildly. Current slow growing demand and growing protectionism in 
the OECD are cases in point . 
The same can be said for countries that re ly heavily on imports for 
thei r o i l needs. 
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Moreover, most of the advantages may seem more obvious to governments than 
to the individual producer. For him exporting may be a shot in the dark, a 
risk he is not keen to take. Given the choice, most producers would probably 
prefer to supply their home market behind protected walls rather than go 
abroad and sell to unknown markets a product that may be difficult to sell 
because quality and price compare unfavourably with competitors. They may 
recognise the advantages of producing for export, but feel that those are 
outweighed by the disadvantages caused by insufficiently trained staff and 
management, deficient infrastructure, and so on. 
This reluctance on the part of domestic producers is among the main 
reasons why foreign investors, and multinationals in particular, with their 
financial muscle and marketing experience have become such important partners 
of governments that were keen to export. It has also caused successful 
governments to take an active lead in providing firms with support both at 
home and abroad, in order to help exporters, provide them with information 
about foreign markets, organise trade fairs, etc. 
The main reason why export promotion and import substitution are presented 
as alternatives is because the distortions that are introduced in the economy, 
as a result of an uncontrolled import substitution process, make it very 
difficult for domestic producers to compete abroad if these distortions are 
not rectified or compensated for. Inefficiencies resulting from protection 
also affect the producer who is forced to use the uncompetitive product as an 
input and who cannot import an alternative. 
A policy that tries to encourage exports should therefore start by 
restoring the potential exporter to a "free trade" situation. Strictly 
speaking this cannot be called an export incentive. Such measures include the 
tax-free importation of inputs and access to foreign exchange to purchase 
them. They could also include tax and interest rebates to bring them at 
"internationally comparable" levels as well as a "realistic" exchange rate. 
"Preferential" access to loans may do no more than to avoid the exporter 
having to go to the expensive unorganised market. 
In a country that for a long time followed an import substitution 
industrialisation policy superimposing a system of incentives to compensate 
for disincentives can become extremely complicated. Witness, for instance, 
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th i s comment by Overholt about the s i tua t ion in Brazil in 1978: "The whole 
economy is now run by a system of export subsidies, import deposi ts , credi t 
subsidies, dual exchange r a t e s , indexing, price controls , and other 
regulations which, i f taken together, prove to be extraordinari ly complex. I t 
takes, for instance, a major effor t by the country's best economic minds to 
discover the net effect on the trade balance of the conflict ing pol ic ies of 
taxing agr icu l tura l exports, subsidising agr icu l tura l c r ed i t , overvaluing the 
exchange ra te and col lect ing import deposits that deter iorate in the face of 
in f la t ion . Similarly, the desire for rapid growth has led to subsidisation of 
the s ta te firms and to incentives for multinational investment. These 
policies have led in turn to in f la t ion , which in turn leads to indexing. When 
the indexing units has negative consequences, other "creat ive" measures are 
necessary to effect correct ions. And on i t goes. The resul t i s a network of 
policies and of policy-implementing agencies of almost unmanageable 
complexity." (Overholt, p . 15). 
In the period considered each of our four countries have faced the 
question of how to proceed after the i n i t i a l indus t r i a l i sa t ion phase. How 
have they solved this question? Singapore has offered very l i t t l e protect ion 
to i t s manufacturing industry and t rue to i t s pre-1960 t r a d i t i o n s , post-1960 
indus t r ia l i sa t ion took place under very close to free trade condit ions. 
Brazil and Mexico followed an import subst i tu t ion path for a long time, but 
l a te r on, Brazil in the la te 1960s and Mexico in the early 1970s, came to 
s t ress the importance of exports more. Brazil was fair ly successful in th i s 
and by 1980 about half of i t s exports were manufactures. In Mexico th i s 
proved more d i f f i c u l t . The Republic of Korea that had hardly exported any 
manufactures before 1960 embarked in the early 1960s on a development s t ra tegy 
that combined vigorous export promotion, with protection of se lec t ive 
indus t r ies . The following paragraphs expand on t h i s . 
Singapore: Upon independence Singapore was a free port with l i t t l e 
i ndus t r i a l i s a t ion . Unemployment was high and the government decided that 
accelerated indus t r i a l i sa t ion and construction would absorb most idle labour. 
The smallness of the domestic market would normally leave l i t t l e room for 
import subst i tu t ion indus t r i a l i sa t ion but the prospects of a common market 
with Malaysia led to mild protection to encourage production for th is market. 
When the po l i t i c a l federation with Malaysia collapsed in 1965, protection was 
reduced and a policy of producing especial ly - but not exclusively - for 
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export was i n i t i a t e d . Industr ies that would absorb a lot of labour received 
pr ior i ty treatment. Tariff protection was granted to industr ies which were 
expected to develop export markets as well as supply local demand, such as 
t e x t i l e s , garments, footwear and te levis ion assembly (Lim and Pang). 
Although much has been made of the shif t in policy, both pre- and 
post-1965 pol icies had in common the fact that each stressed manufacturing (an 
ac t iv i ty that was re la t ive ly unimportant before in Singapore); and that 
import subst i tu t ion for the Malaysian market, for Singapore s t i l l meant 
exporting to the other members of the Federation (although i t is t rue that 
conditions and products were, of .course, different from producing for the 
"world market"). 
Very rapid economic growth in the second half of the 1960s led to labour 
shortages, more rel iance on foreign workers and an upward pressure on wages. 
In the early 1970s, plans were drawn up to res t ructure the economy and 
concentrate more on high value added industr ies (and se rv ices ) . Due to the 
recession following the f i r s t o i l price increase these had to be postponed. 
However, these conditions re-emerged in the la te 1970s. Moreover competition 
from new suppliers and inceased protection reduced expansion prospects of 
labour intensive manufactures. 
In 1979 the "second indust r ia l revolution" was launched. Under th is 
programme government encouraged the production of higher value-added goods and 
the upgrading of exist ing product l i ne s . Pr ior i ty was given to s k i l l and 
R&D intensive industr ies and the government announced an accelerated wage 
increase of 20 per cent per year for three years and special incentives to 
accelerate th i s process. Labour-intensive producers were encouraged to phase 
out or relocate elsewhere. 
Brazil; Since the la te 1940s Brazil has followed a policy of import 
subst i tu t ion indus t r i a l i s a t ion . Judging by the proportion of domestic demand 
that was supplied by imports i t was quite successful in t h i s . This proportion 
was only 6 per cent in 1964, compared to 70 per cent in 1939. Only in three 
industr ies was more than 10 per cent of demand imported: machinery (31 per 
cent ) , chemicals (11 per cent) and other manufacturing (13 per cen t ) . With 
the exception of these th ree , continued import subst i tut ion seemed no longer a 
viable growth strategy in the mid-1960s (Tyler, 1981). 
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Starting in 1967 government came to s t r e s s the importance of manufactured 
exports. Low domestic demand and the considerable overcapacity of 
manufacturing, after a number of years of s t a b i l i s a t i o n policy, in conjunction 
with the opportunities offered by rapid growth of world demand encouraged 
Brazil to par t ic ipa te more in internat ional t rade . Imports were l i be ra l i s ed . 
The balance of payments problems following the 1973 o i l shock stopped the 
process of import l i be ra l i s a t i on and sharply reversed i t . Higher t a r i f f and 
non-tariff bar r ie rs and other measures such as advance deposits for imports 
were imposed to slow down imports. Simultaneously, large investments were 
made in pulp and paper, petrochemicals, f e r t i l i s e r s , s tee l and non-ferrous 
metals that aimed at a further reduction of imports through the i r domestic 
product ion (Balassa, 1979). Export incentives hardly changed but increased 
protection made production for the domestic market more prof i table and 
indirect ly affected manufactured exports, the growth of which slowed down 
( i b i d . ) . Manufactured exports which had come to make up 7.5 per cent of 
manufactured output in 1974 declined to 4.6 per cent in 1976. Thereafter when 
the balance of payments continued to worsen, manufactured exports were given 
progressively more a t ten t ion , which led to spectacular export growth in the 
la te 1970s. 
Mexico: Mexico also followed an import subst i tu t ion policy. Tariff 
bar r ie rs were much lower than in Brazi l , however (around 20 per cent around 
1965 against 100 per cent in pre-1964 Brazil - Bergsman, 1979). Mexico's main 
protec t ionis t device was (and is) i t s licence system. An import l icence is 
given only if an a r t i c l e of comparable qual i ty cannot be obtained local ly in a 
fa i r ly short time at a "reasonable" pr ice . The licence system is cumbersome 
and works as a powerful deterrent to imports. As the licensing of imports i s 
related to the i n i t i a t i v e s of domestic entrepreneurs - and not the resu l t of a 
planned or co-ordinated indus t r i a l i sa t ion process - i t has resul ted in a low 
degree of integrat ion of Mexican industry. A capi ta l goods industry was 
par t i cu la r ly slow to develop. By the mid-1970s Mexico s t i l l imported 22 per 
cent of i t s consumption of capi ta l goods (Bergsman, 1979). 
Exports and manufactured exports in par t icu lar have t r ad i t i ona l ly been 
re la t ive ly unimportant to Mexico. The country does provide some export 
incentives but overall manufactured exports as a percentage of domestic 
production were never high. Moreover, in the mid-1970s exports suffered much 
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from the progressive overvaluation of the peso. Even af ter the 1976 
devaluation the growth of manufactured exports remained slow which, i t has 
been claimed, was due to the fact that af ter 1976 the peso remained overvalued 
(Centre for Applied Studies). The most successful export programme has been 
the Maquila or border indus t r ia l i sa t ion programme. 
Republic of Korea; The Republic of Korea government in power in the 1950s 
was not very development minded. Rapid manufacturing growth was basical ly the 
resu l t of efforts to res tore pre-war productive capacity. Indeed, President 
Rhee is said to have been reluctant to take major new i n i t i a t i v e s in areas 
where North Korea's industry was strong for fear of duplication af ter the 
expected re-uni f ica t ion . Exports were minimal, and the trade gap was largely 
financed by aid for the United States . 
In the early 1960s some dras t i c policy changes took place which ref lec t a 
to ta l ly different government outlook on industry and the economy at l a rge . 
Reliance on foreign aid was replaced by encouraging domestic savings and 
borrowing abroad (and to a lesser extent Direct Foreign Investment); key 
industries were encouraged; the indust r ia l s t ructure modernised through the 
provision of physical and ins t i tu t iona l infras t ructure; imports were 
l ibera l i sed and exports were encouraged. Government did, at f i r s t , not 
encourage specific industries but when i t saw that cer ta in (labour-intensive) 
products were quick to develop i t gave them i t s wholehearted support. 
In the early 1970s a new policy change took place which, with hindsight , 
can be considered almost as important as the ones of the early 1960s. 
Concerns somewhat similar to those of the Singapore Government (very rapid 
labour absorption, upward pressure on wages, expected loss of competitiveness 
in labour intensive exports) incited government to look for a l te rnat ive growth 
paths. Contrary to the Singapore Government which wanted to promote R&D and 
sk i l l - in tens ive a c t i v i t i e s , the Republic of Korea's government's choice was 
the heavy and chemical industry. The Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan was 
launched in 1972 and a Heavy and Chemical Industry Development Committee was 
set up in 1973 to co-ordinate government support for large new projects . 
"Instead of following the lead of private enterprises in sectoral resource 
al locat ing the government . . . t r i ed to lead the entrepreneurs according to the 
expected changes in the Korean comparative advantage." (Hong, 19 79, p. 69) . 
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The Republic of Korea's emphasis on heavy and chemical industry was, of 
course, more risky than Singapore's s t ra tegy. F i r s t , by the i r very nature 
these industr ies are much more cap i ta l - in tens ive , which makes planning errors 
more cos t ly . Second, with the Republic of Korea's reluctance to re ly too much 
on DFI, most of the heavy and chemical industry would be Korean (public or 
private) owned. What foreign capi ta l was needed had to be largely borrowed 
abroad (and added to the foreign debt ) . In Singapore most manufacturing 
industry is foreign owned and much more foreign r i sk capi ta l is involved. 
Government bore much of the investment cost related to the promotion of 
heavy industry. I t invested heavily in iron and s t e e l . Most industr ies were 
promoted with the idea that after some years of infant protection they would 
become viable exporters. Entrepreneurs were encouraged to build plants of 
such capacity that they would be ef f ic ient exporters (but have large 
overcapacity in the short run). However, contrary to those r e l a t ive ly simple, 
labour-intensive industr ies of the 1960s, these investments needed a much 
longer lead time. On top of domestic market protection, inf ras t ructura l 
support, tax concessions and foreign loan guarantees, they needed long-term 
preferent ial loans without i t being clear whether they would in the end prove 
viable exporters . As i t happened, shipbuilding and iron and s t ee l proved much 
more successful in capturing foreign markets than, for instance, machinery and 
petrochemicals which worked for a long time with considerable overcapacity. 
Moreover, in certain l ines several producers who had duplicated investments 
a l l had considerable overcapacity (Park Young Chul, 1983). 
Incentives 
After this rapid overview of broad trade and indus t r ia l i sa t ion pol ic ies we 
wi l l consider two sets of instruments tha t governments have used to influence 
the s t ructure and the size of industry and exports. The next section wi l l 
br ief ly deal with governments effor ts to influence the flow of f inancial 
resources to en terpr i ses . This section wi l l discuss trade and indus t r ia l 
incentives. As there are so many of those incent ives , and as they have 
changed so much over time i t is impossible to be complete. The discussion is 
thus , by necessi ty , rather impressionist ic . An effort has been made though to 
include the most important ones. 
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Export incentives tend to be defined as a l l measures that increase the 
p rof i t ab i l i ty of exports by reducing costs or increasing p ro f i t s . Industr ia l 
incentives can be s imilar ly defined as a l l measures which increase the 
p ro f i t ab i l i ty of manufacturing. They aim at encouraging the production of a 
cer ta in good or set of goods by favourably influencing the production 
conditions of firms. They are given because production of cer tain goods would 
have favourable spi l lover effects ( e x t e r n a l i t i e s ) . A pioneer enterpr ise can 
serve as a t ra ining centre which t ra ins people. Technical expert ise is 
accumulated which can be applied in other industr ies without them having to 
pay the same learning cos ts . Low cost and high qual i ty imputs can be 
important for other indus t r ies . If the i n i t i a l exports of the f i r s t few firms 
are of good qual i ty and sold a t a good p r i ce , th is may a t t r a c t more buyers to 
the country. On the other hand, "Bad experiences with one supplier could hurt 
others" (Keesing, 1979, p . 42). 
Singapore; The Singapore Government created the Economic Development 
Board (EDB) in 1961 to implement and oversee the country's indus t r i a l i sa t ion : 
"Until the l a t t e r half of 1968, the EDB provided a wide range of 
f a c i l i t i e s and services to indust r ia l investors within a single 
organisation, including investment promotion, provision of 
indust r ia l inf ras t ructure , financial and technical consultancy 
services, administration of f iscal incentives and undertaking of 
indus t r ia l feas ib i l i ty s tud ies . A "one stop" investment centre 
greatly f ac i l i t a t ed investors, thus reducing uncertainty, cost 
and gestat ion period. As the function of the Board became 
inceasingly complex, a major organisational restructuring took 
place in 1968. The EDB remained the function of investment 
promotion and co-ordination and overseeing the progress of 
promoted en te rpr i ses . Other functions were hived off into new 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . " (Chia, 1984, p . 147). 
Government provided indust r ia l e s t a t e s , f iscal and trade incent ives . 
Fiscal incentives to industry existed in Singapore since before Independence. 
The most important of them is the concept of "pioneer s t a tu s " which was 
introduced in 1959. Pioneer firms were exempt from the 40 per cent corporate 
income tax, as well as from tax on dividends for a period of between five and 
ten years. The pioneer system has been great ly refined over the years and the 
precise incentives given today depend on which product wil l be produced (the 
l i s t of approved products changes regular ly) , the level of investment, i t s 
cap i t a l - and s k i l l - i n t e n s i t y , research and development spending, e t c . 
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By 1980 there were 420 pioneer establishments in production, together 
employing around 120,000 people, mainly in metal products and engineering, 
e l ec t r i ca l and electronic products and t ex t i l e s and garments (Chia, 1982). If 
a manufacturing or related services firm does not qualify for pioneer s ta tus 
(or export incentives) i t can obtain an investment allowance. This allows a 
tax credi t of up to 50 per cent of new fixed investment in plant , machinery 
and factory bui ldings. The credi t can be set off against the prof i t s of the 
company for the year in which the capi ta l spending takes place (Lim and Pang; 
Chen). 
In connection with the "second indust r ia l revolution" a number of new 
incentives were introduced in addit ion and/or as replacement of exis t ing 
ones. These include tax incentives to encourage R & D in manufacturing firms, 
as well as incentives to help firms that cannot pay market wages to relocate 
elsewhere, e t c . 
Protection against imports has been modest in Singapore. Selective infant 
industry protection s tar ted in 1960 when the f i r s t protect ive t a r i f f s were 
introduced. Tariff protection increased gradually un t i l there were 400 
protected items in 1969. After 1970 the number went down rapidly and reached 
100 in 1975. Quantitative r e s t r i c t ions and special import licences were 
introduced in 1963 but abolished with the collapse of the common market. The 
few remaining quotas were transformed into t a r i f f s . 
One can say that the period 1963-65 was the only real import subs t i tu t ion 
period in Singapore. The r e l a t ive brevity of that period had the advantage 
that inefficiences associated with protection had not yet been deeply embedded 
in the indust r ia l s t ruc tu re . Moreover, powerful i n t e r e s t groups dependent on 
ta r i f f protection had not developed. 
There are no export r e s t r i c t ions and imported inputs for exports are 
allowed in duty free. A system of export incentives was introduced in 1967. 
The Export Incentive Scheme provides for 4 per cent tax , rather than the usual 
40 per cent on prof i ts of approved export projects over a cer ta in s ize for a 
period of five to 15 years . Exports are thus encouraged in cases where i t 
wi l l be unjust if ied to award pioneer s ta tus because of exis t ing local 
manufacture (Chen). 
- 101 -
Brazi l : Fiscal incentives in Brazil have had two aims", achieving a 
greater deconcentration of industry and encouraging p r io r i t y indus t r i e s . Many 
have been in existence since before 1964. In order to encourage the 
development of the poor North-East, Brazil ian corporations were permitted to 
cut the i r income tax l i a b i l i t y in half, provided they invested the saved half 
in North-Eastern projects approved by the SUDENE (Superintendencia do 
Desenvolvimento do Nordeste - created in 1966). A similar system was l a te r 
set up for the Amazonas Region (administered by SUDAM - set up in 1966) and 
for a number of other less developed regions. 
Incentives in manufacturing have included exemptions from t a r i f f s , the 
industr ia l products tax ( IPI ) , State taxes on the c i rculat ion of merchandise 
(ICM) and on imported equipment, and on instruments and tools for which no 
Brazilian equivalent exis ts (The "Law of Similars"); IPI credi t on the 
purchase of Brazilian-made equipment (for majority locally-owned projects) and 
preferent ial treatment from off ic ia l c redi t agencies. 
The number of p r io r i ty industry sectors to which these incentives applied 
was considerably expanded in 1970 and even further in 1974. However, towards 
the end of 1975 the l i s t of e l ig ib le industr ies was reduced and for the 
remaining ones the 100 per cent r e l i e f from duty and taxes was cut to 50 or 80 
per cent in most cases . Subsequently companies seeking incentives were asked 
to meet s t i f f e r c r i t e r i a , and further regulations ( e .g . an increase in the 
local content requirement for capi ta l equipment to 85 per cent) favoured local 
over foreign investment (Bank of Credit and Internat ional Commerce). 
Import subst i tu t ion in Brazil began to take shape in 1947, in reaction to 
a foreign exchange c r i s i s . When wartime r e s t r i c t i ons were l i f t ed , imports 
surged. Rather than devalue the cruzeiro, an import l icensing system was 
introduced. Later on in 1953 a multiple exchange system was introduced and in 
1957 t a r i f f protect ion. 
"Net protection for a l l tradeable goods osci l la ted between 50 and 
100 per cent during the 1950s and ear ly 1960s; for manufacturing 
the figure was a t least: double that l e v e l . Exports were 
discouraged by the seriously overvalued exchange r a t e ; implici t 
net export taxes were around 30 to 40 per cent overa l l , while for 
manufactures the level was much higher." (Bergsman, 19 79, pp. 
45-46) 
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In the mid-1960s, when exports were given more importance, the devaluation 
of the cruzeiro was accelerated and in 1968 a "crawling peg" system was 
introduced, which kept the exchange ra te much closer to i t s equilibrium 
level . Tariffs were cu t . After 1974, however, they increased again 
sharply. 
Other measures that favoured exports included freedom from income tax on 
that proportion of prof i t s derived from exports; exemption from a l l export 
fees, from the IPI and ICM on exported products, from IPI on imported 
replacement equipment and exemption from duties on imported inputs through 
drawbacks. 
In 1972 a special export programme called BEFIEX (Beneficios Fiscais para 
Exportacao) was introduced. Under th i s programme companies that agreed to 
undertake large scale export programmes were allowed to amortize s t a r t -up 
costs over 10 years. They can apply towards the payment of other federal 
taxes any portion of the 40-60 per cent supplementary withholding tax they 
might incur on remitted dividends (Teitel and Coleman; Balassa, 19 79; 
Carvalho and Haddad). 
Mexico; In Mexico f iscal incentives are also used to promote indus t r ia l 
decentral isat ion and to promote specific branches of industry. The main 
incentives for the promotion of industry are those introduced in 1955 with the 
"law of the promotion of New and Necessary Indus t r ies" . This law provides tax 
exemptions of between five and ten years for "New" industr ies ( e . g . those 
engaged in the manufacture of goods h i ther to not produced domestically, 
provided that these are not subs t i tu tes for other goods already being 
produced) and "Necessary" industr ies (those whose production is inadequate to 
meet domestic demand. The def ic i t must be subs tant ia l , though, and not due to 
temporary causes). Domestic inputs should account for at l eas t 60 per cent of 
direct manuacturing costs and at l eas t 10 per cent of value-added should take 
place in the plant (Sol i s , 1979). Tax rebates are also offered to specific 
industr ies such as automobiles, soft drinks and publishing ( i b i d . ) . 
Tyler (1981, p . 20) remarked that indus t r ia l protection is frequently 
excessive (in 1980). He is par t icu lar ly concerned about the fact that 
protection is often highest for the oldest and most mature industr ies such as 
t ex t i l e s and apparel. 
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An initiative that combines both fiscal and trade incentives are the 
"manufacturing programmes" ("Programas de Integracion Industrial"). These 
programmes offer protection from competing imports, import licenses for 
necesary inputs and tax preferences to producers prepared to start the 
production of a hitherto imported good. The manufacturing programme became 
one of the most important instruments for regulating industry and is now a 
requirement for all cases where enterprises apply for protection and for new 
investments by enterprises in which foreign investors hold a majority share. 
(Looney, 1982). 
Tariff protection in Mexico began in the 1930s and grew steadily 
thereafter. In 1970, 12,900 items were dutiable (Solis, 1979). The average 
level was low, however, and stood at around 10 to 15 per cent. Certain goods 
in the modern sector, such as TV sets, electrical appliances, radios and 
record players and cars have high tariffs. 
The use of import licenses in Mexico has been far more important as a 
protective instrument though. Import licences are granted whenever an article 
of comparable quality cannot be obtained locally in a fairly short period of 
time at a "reasonable" price. Firms that comply with the broad criteria for 
domestic industrialisation are assured that licenses will not be issued for 
similar imports. In theory, the licensing should be abolished after the firm 
has become competitive or if it does not make good quality produce. However, 
this seldom, if ever, happened. Controls are given for a period of three to 
five years, which is considered long enough to consolidate a producers 
position in the domestic market. In practice "there is no known case in which 
the controls have been cancelled" (ibid., p. 74). The potential producer is 
thus favoured over the potential importer even if the domestic product is not 
. . .
 c . 1 
competitive in terms of quality or price. 
There is also no mechanism, such as competitive bidding for licenses, to 
ensure that the licenses shall be granted to the most efficient businessman. 
"The possibility of dispensing import permits in a discretionary manner, has 
This is in part explained by the way licenses are awarded. Import 
license applications are considered by Advisory Committees. A typical 
committee consists of representatives of the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, and the Chambers and Associations whose interests are likely to be 
affected. 
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c rea ted oppor tun i ty for monopol i s t ic g a i n s , with the r e s u l t t h a t r e a l 
resources a r e channel led in to compet i t ion for the a c q u i s i t i o n of p e r m i t s . " 
( i b i d . , p . 95 ) . 
The number of l i c e n s e s to be processed a r e enormous. In 1973 these were 
over 250,000 ( S o l i s , 1981). Following the 1976 deva lua t ion the number of 
l i censes f e l l cons ide rab ly . P r o t e c t i o n continued t o be high for e l e c t r i c and 
e l e c t r o n i c machinery and equipment (122 per cent e f f e c t i v e ) and automobiles 
and p a r t s (120 per c e n t ) . 
In the e a r l y 1970s exports s t a r t e d t o gain more a t t e n t i o n from 
government. The Mexican Foreign Trade I n s t i t u t e was s e t up in 1970. The 
expor t - impor t l i n k for automobiles was introduced in 1973. This encouraged 
domestic car manufacturers to expor t c a r s and p a r t s in order to ca r ry a 
g r e a t e r p o r t i o n of t h e foreign exchange cos t s involved in the impor ta t ion of 
inputs themselves . I n r e t u r n they were allowed t o s e l l more ca r s on the 
domestic marke t . 
CEDI's ( i n d i r e c t t ax refund c e r t i f i c a t e s ) were int roduced in 1971. 
They are given to e x p o r t e r s for products with a t l e a s t 50 per cen t l o c a l va lue 
added, a r e n o n - t r a n s f e r a b l e , v a l i d for f ive yea r s and can be used t o pay for 
c e r t a i n federa l t a x e s . 
Mexico a l s o opera tes a Maquila or border i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n programme. 
This programme allows the du ty - f r ee imports of a l l machinery and m a t e r i a l s 
used in Maquila which a re obliged t o expor t a l l t h e i r p r o d u c t s . 
Republic of Korea: In the Republic of Korea f i s c a l i n c e n t i v e s have 
provided suppor t for s e l ec t ed "key" i n d u s t r i e s s ince the 1950s. I n c e n t i v e s 
mainly took the form of exemption from i n d i r e c t t a x e s . These were es t imated 
to be the equ iva len t of around 15 per cent of t o t a l i n d i r e c t t axes assessed 
dur ing 1966-71 and to around 27 per cent dur ing 1972-76 (Hong, 1979). The 
amount of d i r e c t t ax exemptions was much smal ler and was no more than around 7 
per cent of t o t a l d i r e c t t axes assessed dur ing 1966-75. However, the fac t 
t h a t d i r e c t taxes make up only a small p a r t of government revenue can a l s o be 
expla ined as p r e f e r e n t i a l t rea tment of firms ( i b i d . ) . 
The refund inc ludes import d u t i e s . 
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Quantitative import r e s t r i c t ions have been much more important than 
ta r i f f s in protecting import-substi tution indus t r ies . Protection declined in 
the early 1960s but by 1967, 40 per cent of a l l commodities were s t i l l subject 
to r e s t r i c t i ons (out of a to ta l of 1,312 basic import items 118 were 
prohibited and 402 were subject to r e s t r i c t i o n s ) . The number of prohibited 
items was reduced to zero in 1978 and that of r es t r i c t ed items to 424. 
Altogether 40 per cent of a l l items were s t i l l subject to some kind of import 
r e s t r i c t ion in 1978 (Chong Hyun Nam). Until 1978 the government a lso operated 
a system of advanced deposit ra tes which vary from 150 per cent for 
non-essential goods and luxury items to 30 per cent for raw material inputs 
for export production ( i b i d . ) . 
Comparing data on protection for 1968 and 1978 shows some in teres t ing 
features: (1) the weighted average of nominal r a t e s of protection for a l l 
industries increased from 14 to 18 per cent; (2) the pat tern of protection is 
biased in favour of the primary sector and against manufacturing (something, 
says Chong that seems unique among developing countr ies) ; (3) estimates of 
both nominal and effective protection show much greater var ia t ion among 
industry groups in 1978 than in 1968 ( indicat ing that incentives provided to 
individual industr ies have become much more discriminatory). 
Certain export incentives existed in the l a t e 1950s, such as trade 
c red i t s , the export-import link and t a r i f f exemptions on imports of raw 
materials used in export production. However, the grossly overvalued exchange 
ra t e minimised thei r impact. Therefore, of a l l the export incentives 
introduced in the f i r s t half of the 1960s, the devaluation of the won was 
probably the most ef fect ive . In 1961 i t was devalued from 65 to 130 to the US 
dollar and in 1964 to 255 won to the do l l a r . Thereafter frequent devaluations 
took place to compensate for the higher inf la t ion ra tes in the country's main 
export markets. 
The most important incentives available to exporters in the l a t e 1960s 
were*, unrestr icted access to , and t a r i f f exemptions on, imported intermediate 
and capi ta l goods; access to l ines of c red i t ; exemption from payment of 
indirect taxes on major intermediate inputs, whether imported or domestically 
And access to foreign exchange. 
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purchased, and on expor t s a l e s . This allowed expor t e r s to produce under a 
v i r t u a l l y f r ee t r a d e reg ime. 
Other i ncen t ives can be regarded as genuine s u b s i d i e s : t h e wastage 
allowance in c e r t a i n raw m a t e r i a l imports which permit ted the use of some of 
these imports in product ion for the domstic market ; reduced p r i c e s for 
e l e c t r i c i t y and r a i l r o a d t r a n s p o r t ; a 50 per cent r educ t ion in d i r e c t t axes 
on income earned from expor t ing ; p rov i s ions for acce l e ra t ed d e p r e c i a t i o n ; 
and immediate access to subs id i sed c r e d i t to f inance working c a p i t a l and fixed 
inves tments . (Westphal, 1979). 
Moreover the expor t - import l i n k system t h a t was a l ready in use be fo re 1960 
allowed s e l e c t e d expo r t e r s t o import c e r t a i n popular items not o therwise 
approved for import . 
This system remained v i r t u a l l y unchanged u n t i l 1973, when i n c e n t i v e s 
s t a r t e d to be g radua l ly reduced. 
The Government's commitment to expor ts went much beyond the b u i l d - u p of a 
s e r i e s of i ncen t ives t h a t have j u s t been r e f e r r e d t o . In p a r t i c u l a r , t h i s 
manifested i t s e l f in the p o l i t i c a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e backing for what Cole 
and Lyman c a l l ( p . 190) "an a l l - o u t government campaign to expand e x p o r t s , 
t yp i f i ed by the cons tan t s e t t i n g of seemingly u n a t t a i n a b l e expor t t a r g e t s , 
t h e i r a t t a i n m e n t , and then the s e t t i n g of even h ighe r t a r g e t s " . This campaign 
found i t s d r i v i n g force a t the p r e s i d e n t i a l l e v e l . P re s iden t Park cha i red 
monthly meetings to review the progress of the expor t d r ive a t t ended by 
Cabinet members, bus iness a s s o c i a t i o n l e a d e r s and ind iv idua l businessmen. 
"Businessmen a re asked t o r e p o r t t h e i r problems, d i f f i c u l t i e s and 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s , and the government o f f i c i a l s must respond be fo re the p r e s i d e n t ' 
to c r i t i c i s m s of p a s t government performance and recommendations for 
improvement." (Brown, p . 145) . 
An important r o l e in the Republic of Korea ' s export d r i v e was a l s o played 
by KOTRA, the Korea Trade Promotion Corpora t ion which was e s t a b l i s h e d in 
1962. KOTRA loca ted fore ign buyers and introduced them t o l oca l s u p p l i e r s ; 
i nv i t ed buyers to v i s i t Korean i n d u s t r i e s ; organised t r a d e miss ions and 
conducted overseas pub l i c r e l a t i o n s work; organised p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t r a d e 
f a i r s , e t c . I t a l s o c o l l e c t e d u p - t o - d a t e information on genera l economic 
s i t u a t i o n s and export and import t r e n d s . 
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In the early days of i t s existence, i t was also active in such a c t i v i t i e s 
as t rans la t ions , analysing foreign trade laws and regulation and inspecting 
samples, or s e t t l i n g business claims between Republic of Korean and foreign 
firms. KOTRA expanded i t s overseas f a c i l i t i e s from four offices in the 
beginning to 34 in 1970. In the 1970s KOTRA's a c t i v i t i e s became more 
sophist icated. I t introduced through seminars to explain, for example, the 
workings of the GSP and how exporters could best make use of i t (Sun Whan 
Chang, 1979). 
When in 1975 the government fe l t that new markets needed to be 
"discovered" in order to diversify from i t s t rad i t iona l markets (the United 
States and Japan) i t encouraged the establishment of General Trading Companies 
(GTCs). These companies would handle thei r own and other firm's exports . 
They were allowed to se t up branch offices abroad, to issue l e t t e r s of credi t 
and credi t in advance of sales (Michell, p . 195). 
Government and savings 
Accelerating economic growth and an emphasis on manufacturing industry 
obviously requires much new capi tal for investment. Where did that capi tal 
come from that allowed countries l ike Singapore and the Republic of Korea to 
grow a t ra tes of over 10 per cent and over 15 per cent in manufacturing? And 
how was this capi ta l "put to best use"? These are very cruc ia l but a lso very 
complicated questions that would warrant separate studies on each of the four 
countr ies . On the other hand, they are too important issues to leave out 
completely. The next few paragraphs make an attempt to highlight some aspects 
In Brazil In te rbras , a subsidiary of Petrobras, developed along 
similar l ines and became an important intermediary for export promotion. 
Among i t s other functions i t offers a package of services to potent ia l 
exporters such as the ident i f icat ion of commercial opportunit ies , preparation 
of project analyses, procurement services, in Brazil and abroad and the 
formation of jo in t ventures with foreign companies to exploit markets abroad. 
Since 1976 companies exporting through In terbras have also benefited from 
certain insurance against export r i sks (Tei te l and Colman). 
In Singapore, Intraco (Internat ional Trading Company) was set up in 1968 
by the government jo in t ly with the pr ivate sector to develop export markets 
for local manufacturers. Perhaps because of a lack of domestic exporters i t s 
ro le has been limited and it: has turned into an import/export trading company 
(Chia, 1984). 
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of the issues involved, and in par t icular the role of government, although at 
no point is there so much as a claim to completeness. 
This section wil l touch upon two things. F i r s t , i t w i l l look at Singapore 
and the Republic of Korea where investments (as a percentage of GDP) were 
lowest in the early 1960s and highest by the end of the 1970s and ask how the 
capital to finance these investments was obtained. Thereafter i t wi l l b r ie f ly 
look a t how governments have influenced the d i s t r ibu t ion of th is capi ta l to 
uses they considered p r i o r i t a r y . 
In the Republic of Korea and Singapore investments as a per cent of GDP 
was very low in the early 1960s. Thereafter they accelerated rapidly to reach 
40 per cent in Singapore and nearly 30 per cent in the Republic of Korea 
around 1980 (see table 44). This increase could never have been achieved 
without a large contribution of foreign savings and these made up a large part 
of the i n i t i a l increase indeed. But whereas in the 1960s the contribution of 
foreign savings was extraordinari ly high, the fact that investment could be 
maintained a t such high levels was largely due to a spectacular increase in 
domestic savings. 
In the 1950s the Republic of Korea's economy depended to an extraordinary 
extent on foreign (mainly United States) aid. Aid averaged 8.1 per cent of 
GNP between 1953 and 1962 and reached levels as high as 14 per cent in 1956 
and 16 per cent in 1957. Most of t h i s aid arrived before the high growth 
period s tar ted though, and in fact rapid indus t r ia l and investment growth 
occurred simultaneous to the rapid decline in the absolute and r e l a t ive (as a 
per cent of GNP) level of a id . By 1966 aid made up "only" 2 per cent of GNP, 
in 1969 i t was 1 per cent and af ter 1971 i t was less than 1 per cent (Hong, 
1979). 
The high dependency on foreign savings in the 1960s (9 per cent of GDP, or 
nearly 50 per cent of the t o t a l ) is thus explained by rece ip ts other than aid, 
and by private and public borrowing in pa r t i cu la r . Foreign investment, as we 
shal l see in the next chapter, made up only a small por t ion. 
In the f i r s t half of the 1970s the high level of foreign savings was 
maintained (8 per cent of GDP between 1970 and 1976) but thanks to a drast ic 
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inves tments . (By 1980 t h i s was no more than 13 per c e n t . ) Foreign investment 
a r r i v a l s increased in the e a r l y 1970s but among c a p i t a l inflows loans were 
s t i l l over n ine t imes as high (Bergsman, 1979). 
Singapore a l so r e l i e d h e a v i l y on foreign savings to finance i t s investment 
in the 1960s. These financed 37 per cent of investments in the 1960s (but 
much more in the second h a l f of the decade when investments a c c e l e r a t e d ) . In 
the e a r l y 1970s foreign savings became the equ iva len t of 18 per cent of GDP. 
They financed 44 per cent of a l l investments between 1970 and 1976. In l a t e r 
years they dropped to 9 per cent of GDP or 22 per cent of the t o t a l . In 
c o n t r a s t with the Republic of Korea, however, most foreign savings took the 
form of d i r e c t foreign inves tments . In the 1970-76 period these were f ive 
times a s important as foreign loans ( i b i d . ) . 
A high foreign c o n t r i b u t i o n to the investment e f f o r t was thus very 
important for the " t ake off", but the high l eve l of investment was maintained 
thanks to d r a s t i c inc reases in domestic sav ings . These increased from 13 per 
cent of GDP in the 1960s to 31 per cent of GDP around 1980 in Singapore . In 
the Republic of Korea t h i s inc rease was even more s p e c t a c u l a r . Domestic 
savings the re went up from an average of 8 per cent in the 1960s to 18 per 
c e n t ( I ) in the e a r l y 1970s and 25 per cent in the l a t e 1970s. 
To a large ex t en t a h igher p ropor t ion saved i s a "normal" phenomenon t h a t 
accompanies economic growth and h igher income. Yet t h i s was a l s o the r e s u l t 
of p o l i c y . Examples of t h i s a r e the i n t e r e s t and t a x reforms t h a t the 
Republic of Korea i n i t i a t e d in the 1960s. 
Real i n t e r e s t r a t e s in the Republic of Korea were nega t ive in the e a r l y 
1960s as a r e s u l t of high i n f l a t i o n and savings were low. In order to 
s t imula te s av ings , government doubled i n t e r e s t r a t e s on bank depos i t s in 
1965. The r e s u l t was s tupendous. Time and saving depos i t s increased from 
9,000 m i l l i o n won in September 1965 to 50,000 m i l l i o n won by t h e end of 1966 
and to 617 bn won by the end of 1972 (Kuzne t s ) . 
1
 No doubt some of t h e i n c r e a s e was due to funds d ive r t ed from the 
unorganised "curb" market i n to the o f f i c i a l c i r c u i t , but much of i t must have 
been genuinely new sav ings . Moreover, not a l l p r i v a t e savings may have 
responded so p o s i t i v e l y to h igher i n t e r e s t r a t e s . Another source of sav ings , 
r e t a ined p r o f i t s , may wel l be n e g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d with them. 
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A tax reform had equally remarkable e f fec t s . The Republic of Korea had a 
fa i r ly comprehensive and elaborate tax leg i s la t ion by internat ional standards 
but unt i l the mid-1960s, enforcement was the main problem. Tax revenue was 
low due to a lack of tax payer records, a rb i t ra r iness of tax col lect ion 
assessments and corruption (Brown, p. 63) . When a f i r s t ser ies of measures 
aimed at increased revenue fa i led , government in 1966 se t up a new Office of 
National Taxation. The job of d i rec tor was given to one of the closest aides 
of the president who gave him his wholehearted support. The new director 
brought a radical ly new approach to tax col lec t ion . He s ta r ted with a 
reorganisation, threw out corrupt o f f i c i a l s , kept permanent f i l es on the 
remaining ones, and set up an internal audit and security system. Information 
on taxpayers and new enterprises was systematically co l lec ted . Inspectors 
operating in pairs did field surveys to see whether apparent wealth of 
households and businesses corresponded with the i r tax re turns . 
Simultaneously, large taxpayers received public praise from the president . 
Seminars were organised for businessmen and accountants to explain how to f i l e 
re turns . A public campaign explained the purpose of tax paying and showed 
what was done with the money (Brown). Tax revenue went up very fas t af ter 
1965. In 1968 taxes, as a percentage of GNP, were 14.4 per cent or nearly 
double the figure for 1964. 
In Singapore many savings are generated through the forced savings route 
of (social securi ty) contributions to the Central Providence Fund. These have 
steadily increased over the years and (today) capture no less than 40 per cent 
of earned income (20 per cent employers and 20 per cent employees 
contr ibut ions) . Tax col lect ions improved thanks to a s t r i c t e r enforcement of 
the law. The share of the workforce that pays income tax in Singapore went up 
from less than 10 per cent at independence to 40 per cent in the early 1980s. 
Brazi l , which has suffered since a long time from high in f la t ion , 
introduced indexed government bonds in 1965. These bonds which yielded around 
5 per cent in real terms were a great success. They caused an "hausse" in 
indexed saving instruments in the private sector as well , such as rea l es ta te 
bonds, deposits in private savings and loan associat ions, time and saving 
deposits. The government sector , however, was more a t t r ac t ive for voluntary 
savings as , contrary to the private sector , i t could offer post facto indexed 
savings, which is of course a huge advantage in a high inflat ionary 
environment (Graham, 1978). 
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Braz i l a l s o c a r r i e d ou t tax reforms in the mid-1960s. A va lue added tax 
was in t roduced, income taxes were modernised and the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and 
enforcement of tax c o l l e c t i o n s were g r e a t l y s t r eng thened . The number of 
taxpayers g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d . Whereas in 1965 only about 350,000 people f i l ed 
tax r e tu rns (out of a popula t ion of 80 m i l l i o n ) , t h i s had increased to 7 
mi l l ion in 1970 and to 11 m i l l i o n in 1974 (Robock). Income tax r e c e i p t s 
increased from 2.2 to 3.2 per cent of GDP between 1969 and 1974. 
Despite these " success fu l " examples, i t remains a fact t h a t i n c r e a s i n g tax 
revenues may be one of the most d i f f i c u l t any bu t the toughes t government can 
hope to ach i eve . In Mexico i t has been t r i e d twice in r ecen t h i s t o r y and 
twice the government was unsucces s fu l . 
Mexico's tax revenue as a percentage of GDP is low by i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
s tandards (see t a b l e 45 ) . I t was l e s s than 8 per cent in the 1960s. This was 
not so much due to a low tax r a t i o (nominal personal income tax r i s e s to 57 
per cen t ) but more due to a narrow de^ f ac to b a s e . Many s e c t o r s r e c e i v e some 
form of p r e f e r e n t i a l t rea tment and the r a t e of avoidance i s h i g h . The 
"cedular system" allows d i f f e r e n t sources of income to be s p l i t up to avoid 
p r o g r e s s i v i t y , and the anonymity t h a t a l lows bearer s h a r e s , bea r e r bonds and 
o the r means of a c q u i r i n g anonomous weal th makes de fac to assessment of 
somebody's wealth very d i f f i c u l t . 
When the Echeverr ia government launched i t s reforms in the e a r l y 1970s i t 
counted on increased government income to f inance them. I t s tax reform, j u s t 
l i k e the one t h a t had been presented in the e a r l y 1960s, however, never 
rece ived s u f f i c i e n t support t o become law ( S o l i s , 1981). As a r e s u l t Mexico's 
2 
tax income r a t i o to GNP is s t i l l among the lowest in the world. 
1
 Bergsman (1979, p . 49) commented t h a t i t was i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t no 
negat ive e f f e c t s such as reduced p r i v a t e s ec to r investment or c a p i t a l f l i g h t 
occur red . This shows, he s a y s , t h a t in a contex t of high growth with 
cons iderab le a t t e n t i o n to p r i v a t e i ndus t ry , " impor tant and f a r - r each ing tax 
reforms can be implemented a t l i t t l e or no cos t in terms of p r i v a t e s e c t o r 
growth". 
In 1982 i t had r i s e n to 10.3 per cent when o i l expor t s con t r ibu ted 
about 35 per cent of the t o t a l (Comercio E x t e r i o r , Sep. 1984, Vol. 34, No. 9 , 
p . 831) . 
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Table 45. Tax e f for t and tax structure (per cent of GNP) 
Country Tax 
1966-68 1969-71 
Social secur i ty 
contributions 
Total taxes + 



































Sources. Tax ra t io s and tax e f for t in developing countr ies , 1969-71, by Raja 
J . Chel l iah, Hessel J . Baas and Margaret R. Kel ly , IMF Staff 
Papers, Mar. 1975, Vol. XXII, No. 1, pp. 187-205; and Alan A. 
Tai t , Wilfrid L.M. Gratz and Barry J . Eichengreen: "International 
comparison of taxation for s e l ec t ed developing countr ies , 
1972-1976", in IMF Staff Papers, Mar. 1979, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 
123-156. 
Among the many other forms of savings one other source of government 
revenue should be mentioned: public enterpr ise . With the exception perhaps 
of public o i l exporters these tend to be a drain on the State budget of many 
countries . Not so in Singapore, however, where they are run for prof i t and 
are an important source of government income. Between 1960 and 1980 they 
contributed between 15 and 20 per cent of the t o t a l . 
Government as banker 
In an environment where capi ta l i s scarce and i t s soc ia l use so crucia l 
for development, i t i s understandable that governments have wanted to keep a 
c lose eye on f inancial i n s t i t u t i o n s so as to avoid abuse of power and to 
increase the ir e f f e c t i v e n e s s . They want to act as referee , using c r i t e r i a of 
The government a l s o invests in bonds and s e c u r i t i e s at home and 
abroad. Interes t and dividends from these investments contributed about 5-8 
per cent of tota l revenue in the period (Lim and Pang). 
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social p ro f i t ab i l i t y , to decide which of the competing demands should receive 
p r i o r i t y . I t comes thus as no surprise that in many countries th i s concern 
has led to d i rec t s t a t e par t ic ipat ion in the financial intermediaries. This 
has given them the poss ib i l i ty to d i r ec t ly influence the al locat ion of loans 
and integrate t h i s instrument in the i r overall development s t ra tegy . I t 
allows them to al locate funds where they will be "most productively used" 
taking into consideration long- and short-term, private and national welfare 
considerations. The effectiveness of government in shaping the economy and 
industry according to i t s p r i o r i t i e s depends, of course, on how important 
State-controlled finance is compared to other domestic and foreign sources. 
On the other hand, by only intervening in a c t i v i t i e s that have a low pr iva te , 
but a high social p r o f i t a b i l i t y , i t s marginal influence may be considerable. 
The next paragraphs wi l l consider some of governments' e f for ts to control 
capi tal for investment. 
Mexico was in a very poor financial s i tua t ion following the revolution. 
Yet in the s p i r i t of the revolution i t was determined to keep banking under 
national control . Foreigners were excluded from ownership of domestic banks 
and foreign banks were forbidden (Bennet and Sharpe). Private banks were slow 
to develop and thus the f i r s t banks were the s ta te banks. Among them was the; 
Nacional Financiera SA (or NAFINSA) which was created in 1934, and which after 
i t s reorganisation in 1940 became the S ta te ' s principal development bank. 
I t s main function was and is to channel finance (or to guarantee loans) , 
predominantly long term, to sectors that are fundamental to the country's 
economic growth. I t s impact on indus t r ia l development has been considerable. 
I t has been estimated that since 1950 between one third and one half of the 
banking system's to ta l financing of industry originated in NAFINSA (Bennet and 
Sharpe, p . 183). 
Already in the early 1960s NAFINSA held stocks in 60 indus t r ia l firms and 
i t was a majority shareholder in 13 firms producing s t e e l , t e x t i l e s , motion 
pic tures , plywood, paper, f e r t i l i s e r s , e l ec t r i c a l energy, sugar, lumber and 
refr igerated meat (Bennet and Sharpe, p . 186). 
NAFINSA is not wholly State-owned. I t has the name of being a well run, 
competent organisation within the parameters set by the government. When i t 
is c r i t i c i s e d , i t is ra ther for supposedly taking away prof i table 
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opportunities from the private sector . I t obtains i t s funds from borrowing at 
home and abroad. 
In Singapore the main source of development finance has been the Economic 
Development Board and i t s off-shoot the Development Bank of Singapore. The 
DBS which was only created in 1968 had by the la te 19 70s become the larges t 
commercial bank in Singapore. The DBS is also not wholly State-owned, and i t s 
stocks are traded on the Singapore stock exchange. DBS par t ic ipa tes in equity 
of manufacturing firms in desirable indus t r ies . I t also provides medium- and 
long-term loans as well as guarantees loans raised by investors from 
commercial banks. The application of commercial v i ab i l i t y as a cr i ter ium for 
lending means that a considerable share of i t s investments goes to financing 
foreign en t e rp r i s e s ( ! ) . 
In Brazil the Government is a formidable force in banking. This is t rue 
for both the central and the State governments. In 1972, government banking 
accounted for 55 per cent of to ta l deposits and 58 per cent of a l l loans to 
the private sector (Mehmet, p . 157). The State-owned Banco do Brasil is by 
far the largest commercial bank in the country. In 1972 deposits a t th is bank 
were nine times as big as that of the leading private bank (Robock). In 
addition there are the s t a te and regional development banks and a network of 
s t a t e savings banks. 
Over 70 per cent of loans for development purposes between 1964 and 1976 
originated in the s t a t e investment banks, such as the National Development 
Bank (BNDE), the National Housing Bank (BNH), the Bank of the North-East and 
the development banks of the individual s t a tes (Hewlett, 1979, p . 172). The 
BNDE alone was responsable for 18 per cent of Brazilian fixed capi ta l 
inves tment (ib i d . ) . 
The BNDE is thus the most important single source of investment for 
industry. I t was created in 1952 (Robock). I t s annual lending operations 
stood at US$1,300 mill ion in 1972 and, despite slower growth in the second 
half of the 1970s, a t US$3,300 million in 1980. 
In the absence of a private long-term capi ta l market, the BNDE has been 
pract ica l ly alone as a supplier of long-term loans to private domestic firms 
in the manufacturing sector (Werneck, p . 101). By controll ing the BNDE, the 
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government has thus had an important means to guide investments i n to a reas i t 
considered p r i o r i t a r y . 
In the Republic of Korea the Government c o n t r o l l e d u n t i l r e c e n t l y 
v i r t u a l l y the whole banking system. I t was ma jo r i ty owner of a l l the major 
commercial banks from 1945 to 1957 and a f t e r 1961 and a l s o of s p e c i a l i s e d 
banks among which the Korea Development Bank. Only some smal l l o c a l banks and 
investment and savings finance companies were no t government-owned, bu t they 
were subjec t to s t r i c t r e g u l a t i o n s (Hong). I t i s c l e a r t h a t in a s i t u a t i o n 
l i k e t h i s , when foreign loans a l s o need government approval or guarantee and 
when firms ope ra t e wi th very high d e b t / e q u i t y r a t i o s , t h e i r dependence on 
banks and thus on the government becomes overwhelming. V i r t u a l l y the only 
non -con t ro l l ed source of f inance in the Republic of Korea was the curb market 
which was es t imated to account for 19 per cent of a l l borrowing, domestic 
loans account ing for 53 per cent and fo re ign loans for 29 per cent ( Jones and 
Sakong, p . 101) . The cons iderab ly h igher cos t of curb loans never made 
them a v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e , nor a r e a l chance to escape government c o n t r o l . 
"The knowledge t h a t the government can cut off t h e c r e d i t t a p 
a t any time i s s u f f i c i e n t for the o p e r a t i o n of p a r t i a l 
m u t u a l i t y . The t h r e a t need only be c a r r i e d out o c c a s i o n a l l y . 
Recognising the importance of t h i s i s c e n t r a l to unders tanding 
how business-government r e l a t i o n s work in Korea ." (Jones and 
Sakong, p . 109) . 
Conclusion 
Each government has at tempted to in f luence the growth and t h e s t r u c t u r e of 
economic a c t i v i t y in a v a r i e t y of ways. This chapte r d iscussed t h r e e aspec t s 
of t he se at tempts ' , t h e l e v e l of savings for inves tment , t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
the a v a i l a b l e funds, and the range of i n c e n t i v e s t h a t was used. I t was found 
t h a t the degree to which po l i cy i n t e r v e n t i o n s were planned and co -o rd ina t ed 
v a r i e d cons iderably per coun t ry . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y pe rhaps , t h i s was g r e a t e r 
in the sma l l e s t coun t ry , Singapore , and smal le r in the l a r g e r c o u n t r i e s , 
Figures for the per iod 1963-74. "Over the e n t i r e pe r iod , only 14 per 
cent of the cash flow came from new e q u i t y . Another 20 per cent was generated 
i n t e r n a l l y , but two t h i r d s came from bor rowing ." ( i b i d . ) . 
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Brazil and Mexico. Their large s ize causes many problems with col lect ion of 
data, which are a necessity for an accurate and proper planning exercise , and 
the simple fact that many more o f f i c ia l s are involved goes a long way in 
explaining why co-ordination is more d i f f i cu l t there than in a country l ike 
Singapore with a small c iv i l service. The high degree of autonomy of 
different government sectors is another hampering factor. 
However, to a large extent: t h i s low level of co-ordination is also the 
resu l t of policy. In Mexico for instance, during the years of " s tab i l i s ing 
development" government interventions were few for p rac t i ca l , but also for 
ideological reasons. Yet in the absence of a c lear , coherent s trategy the 
shape of industry came to depend greatly on i n i t i a t i v e s of individual 
businessmen who asked for protection to allow them to s t a r t production. Even 
if these were not very eff ic ient and l ikely to remain so, they benefited from 
protection and were given p r io r i ty over importers. 
The Republic of Korea also protected individual industr ies and continues 
to do so to th is day. However, i t can be argued that contrary to Mexico th i s 
protection was be t t e r planned and tha t government and industry together 
decided which product would be protected and for how long. 
Planning had an important place in the process of policy formulation and 
co-ordination in the Republic of Korea. In the early 1970s planning changed 
i t s character . In the 1960s the government had stressed the development of 
infrastructure and a general environment favourable to industry and had 
supported industr ies that emerged spontaneously. In the 1970s, the government 
began to take the lead much more and encouraged (heavy and chemical) 
industries in which the country was considered to develop "a comparative 
advantage", whether or not th i s choice of industr ies was correct at the time, 
i t is certain that planning errors became more cost ly . Huge amounts of funds 
were involved in promoting these industr ies which were faced with much unused 
capacity in the early 1980s. Success was thus not always obvious and i t comes 
perhaps as no surprise that the Fifth Five-Year Plan announced a return to a 
more modest government ro le : "investment choices wil l be le f t to the 
i n i t i a t i v e of the private sector , while the government wil l indicate only the 
general framework and direct ion in which such choice should be made." (EPB, 
1981, p . 10). 
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Through stimulating and a t t r a c t i ng savings, governments have acted to 
encourage indus t r i a l growth. They have increased government revenues and th is 
has given them greater leverage over the direct ion of investment. They have 
also come to control an important part of the d i s t r ibu t ion of funds for 
investment through (par t ) ownership of (development) banks. When i t came to 
exercising influence over the di rect ion of investments, the Government of the 
Republic of Korea was in a par t icu la r ly inf luent ia l posi t ion as i t managed 
both to substant ia l ly increase i t s income from taxation and to control 
v i r t ua l l y a l l the instruments of d i s t r ibu t ion , the banks. The Mexican 
Government, in contras t , has much less grip on the economy as i t had (un t i l 
recently) very l i t t l e influence over the banking sector and because i t s income 
was low. 
Governments have attempted to influenced the s t ructure of the economy and 
industry. Incentives and investment decisions have favoured (manufacturing) 
industry over agr icul ture (although the degree to which this happened d i f fers 
widely per country). Within industry too, cer ta in sectors and products have 
been favoured over o thers . In broad terms, i t can be said that Singapore and 
the Republic of Korea in the 1960s encouraged labour-intensive manufactured 
exports. Considering the limited options offered by thei r r e l a t i ve ly small 
domestic market (and high unemployment) th is seemed a logical thing to do. 
Protection of se lec t ive industr ies was provided in the expectation that within 
a reasonable period these would be able to export a t a competitive level . In 
the 1970s when labour became scarce and wages encountered upward pressure 
their pol icies changed. 
In Mexico and Brazil development objectives were defined in more general 
terms", rapid economic and indust r ia l growth. For most of the time this meant 
encouraging import subs t i tu t ion indus t r i e s . Export promotion was not r ea l ly 
considered an option. After 1967 export promotion in Brazil was very much 
inspired by the (then) prevai l ing overcapacity of industry . After 1978 i t was 
more and more a necessi ty because of the high debt servicing cos t s . Mexico 
had a similar problem but i t s o i l exports provided both much needed foreign 
exchange earnings and a reason for postponing a new exchange ra t e adjustment. 
In the four countries the choice between import subs t i tu t ion and export 
expansion proved thus more a matter of degree than a matter of p r inc ip l e . 
Singapore's economy comes closest to a free trade regime, but i t did have a 
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brief import substitution period. Thereafter, protection was gradually 
reduced. The Republic of Korea for all its emphasis on promotion of 
manufactured exports still has a fairly well protected domestic market. 
Protection is much greater in Mexico though where in contrast to the Republic 
of Korea it came about in a rather haphazard, unplanned way. This is 
considered to have been among the main causes of its poorly integrated 
industry. Post-1967 economic policy in Brazil gave much attention to the 
opportunities offered by exports. The period of trade liberalisation was 
abruptly stopped in 1974 in response to its acute balance of payments 
problems. In later years exports gained an important place although the 
combination with selected protectionism has made the situation quite 
complicated for exporters. Judging by recent experiences the country seems to 
have succeeded though. Mexico also offered certain export incentives but 
inefficiencies proved hard to overcome. 
Indeed, considering the high level of protection, the high price of 
certain products, and the overvaluation of the peso during most of the 
1970s it has been asked how Mexico's at times rapid manufactured export growth 
can be explained at all. In the late 1960s the bias against exports was 
already considerable. The effective implicit protection rate was -0.5 per 
cent for export activities against 39 per cent for import substituting 
industries (Solis, 1979). In 1975 the net anti-export bias was found to be 10 
per cent. 
The answer to the question why certain products were exported must then be 
looked at the level of the individual product. For instance, the rapid 
increase in the 1970s of exports of automobiles and parts, the single most 
important manufactured export item, can be explained by the advantages offered 
in compensation to producers on the domestic market at the time that the 
"global sourcing" drive of multinationals accelerated. 
1
 Comercio Exterior estimated (in 1983) that depending on the motor 
vehicle or part, the national produce had a price of between 30 and 100 per 
cent higher than the price of the same item abroad (Comercio Exterior, Nov. 
1983). 
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Other "successful" export categories such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
textiles and food products were to a greater or lesser extent based on locally 
produced raw materials. These raw materials often had a price that was lower 
than the international price due to export taxes and price controls. These 
manufactured exports were thus in a way "subsidised" by the agricultural 
sector. 
The case of Mexico illustrates two important aspects of incentives. 
First, that incentives to one sector, industry or product almost automatically 
imply a disincentive to other sectors, industries or products. Rarely is this 
so clear as in Mexico or in other countries where manufacturing benefited from 
agricultural price controls and export taxes but some other examples seem also 
obvious: an overvalued exchange rate that discourages exports; credit to 
industry that reduces the funds available to agriculture; protection of one 
product that raises the cost level of the producer who has to use the 
protected product as an input, etc. 
In all these cases government intervention may be necessary and wanted, 
but in increasingly complex economies this can lead to extremely complicated 
situations as the earlier mentioned example of Brazil illustrated. A 
government that wants to give equal chances to individual entrepreneurs, or at 
least does not want them to spend large part of their time lobbying for 
privileges might want to come up with a plan, a coherent strategy which shows 
what the rationale for its intervention is and how each of these form part of 
a whole. 
The second aspect is that sufficient incentives by definition will end up 
by altering entrepreneurs' original cost-benefit assessments in favour of 
production (or export). If sufficient protection, cheap credit, cheap inputs 
are offered, production (or export) will eventually ensue. If it does not, 
this can be taken as an indication that incentives were not enough to 
counterbalance other "negative" influences. 
An example of cases where tax incentives were not sufficient is those 
offered to encourage decentralisation in Brazil and Mexico. If anything, 
concentration seems to have increased there. Favourable infrastructure, 
nearness to skilled workers and main markets were obviously stronger than 
incentives offered. That some industrialists did use the incentives offered, 
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but in their own way, is illustrated by the large number of empty factory 
buildings in Brazil's North-East. In Mexico, lobbying for licences and other 
government favours is such a time-consuming effort that it has been named as 
yet another reason for industry remaining close to the Districto Federal. 
But in many cases governments have been successful in shaping the 
structure of production and exports as they wanted them. Ramirez de Wallace 
found that in Mexico at the level of the individual industry there was a high 
colleration between protection and growth, as well as between protection and 
import substitution. In Singapore, government's low wage policy and a series 
of incentives led to a boom of labour-intensive manufactured exports in the 
late 1960s. Production of ships in the Republic of Korea, and of automobiles 
in Brazil and Mexico reacted favourably to the incentives offered. 
Incentives, however, can be very costly. States have only limited budgets 
and if they want to favour some industries they are forced to neglect others. 
The crucial question that arisis is thus: were incentives offered too 
generous for the results obtained? Although this question cannot be answered 
with any precision, some remarks can be made. 
Incentives contributed to very high growth of some import-substituting 
industries in Brazil and Mexico and exporting ones in Singapore and the 
Republic of Korea. On closer inspection we see, however, that in many of the 
high growth industries such as automobiles, pharmaceuticals, domestic 
appliances in the two Latin American countries and virtually all principal 
export industries in Singapore there is a high correlation between rapid 
growth and presence of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Although this 
concentration of MNEs is in large part explained by characteristics of the 
industry - level of technology, marketing skills - it seems proper to make a 
distinction between the effect of incentives on national and international 
capital. 
Internationally, it may be felt that a country must offer certain 
incentives to compete with those offered by other countries. However, several 
authors (e.g. Chia, Billerbeck and Yasugi) have asked whether incentives are 
really that important compared to location, domestic market size, availability 
of skilled manpower, infrastructure, attitude of government, and so on. 
Probably the nature of the industry plays a role here too. Perhaps such 
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incentives as tax exemptions are necessary because surrounding countries offer 
them too, but their value may be only symbolic: they have a certain 
advertisement value, or, as Chia has argued, they signal the government's 
welcome of foreign investment. Their value to the foreign investor may be 
relative considering that the extra profit made now may be taxed later in the 
home country. 
Domestically the case may be quite different. The domestic investor has 
to accept the domestic economic and political framework as given. In his case 
incentives may be efficient in guiding his decisions to invest in a particular 
industry that is tax exempted. However, to some extent his decision whether 
to invest in manufacturing at all will still be guided by some of the factors 
that international investors consider. He may want to leave his money in real 
estate, land or put it into a bank account abroad. It can be argued that in.a 
country where few of these alternatives exist (such as the Republic of Korea) 
incentives need to be fewer to achieve desired results than in countries where 
these do exist (such as Mexico with the convertible peso and the long, 
difficult to control, border with the United States). 
In any case, there seems good reason for looking critically at the cost 
effectiveness of incentives. In countries where, for other reasons, 
government revenue is small anyway, a tax exemption may dramatically reduce 
spending capacity in other critical areas. Billerbeck and Yasugi (p. 17) have 
argued that "better general economic policies" may attract the same amount of 
investment at lower cost. 
A "sound general investment climate" and a more active, welcoming approach 
could pay better results. This could include initiating and financing 
feasibility and pre-feasibility studies and, in general, helping potential 
investors work their way through local administration. 
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Chapter 4 
ENTREPRENEURS AND ENTERPRISES 
This chapter will deal with the question of how entrepreneurs have 
contributed to industrial development in the four countries considered here. 
There is no doubt that somebody who is capable of identifying and seizing 
opportunities for profit, is willing to take considerable risks and thinks in 
terms of reinvesting income is crucial to economic development. However, it 
is not easy to determine who is a successful entrepreneur and who is not. 
Perceived "success" may not have been the result of specific entrepreneurial 
qualities or behaviour, but rather due to special "accidental" factors such as 
access to a crucial raw material or patent, preferential treatment by 
government or being the sole seller in a rapidly growing market. The opposite 
is also possible. A brilliant entrepreneur may never be recognised as such 
when he is locked in a declining market or forced to operate in an environment 
that discourages initiative and does not appreciate entrepreneurial success. 
In practice, and at the aggregate level that is by necessity our approach 
to the issue, the behaviour and the success of the entrepreneur must be 
considered through the performance of the enterprise he or she manages. 
Therefore, after a few introductory remarks on the nature and the supply of 
entrepreneurs, we will concentrate on enterprises and in particular 
privately-owned domestic enterprises. It is the domestic private enterprise 
rather than foreign or public enterprises that faces the full range of 
constraints including access to capital usually associated with economic and 
industrial development. 
Taking the domestic private enterprise as a proxy for entrepreneurial 
behaviour although justifiable on practical grounds, is not necessarily 
correct on logical grounds. Some public enterprises are profit-making and are 
operated as if they were private. Domestic enterprises may well employ many 
"expatriates" in high function just as foreign enterprises may employ almost 
exclusively national managers. Singapore's industry, for instance, is 
dominated by foreign companies, but 80 per cent of the administrative and 
managerial positions in these are held by Singaporeans (Lim and Pang). 
However, these enterprises differ from their domestically private owned 
counterparts in one crucial aspect; access to capital. 
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Having selected private domestic enterprise as the focus of this chapter, 
it should immediately be added that, in manufacturing at least, its role has 
shown continuous decline in all four countries. In some this was a marginal 
change (e.g. the Republic of Korea), in others (Singapore) they ended up with 
little more than a supportive role. For practical reasons it seemed therefore 
better to give priority to a discussion of the growing importance of public 
and foreign enterprises, as by implication this explains in large part what 
happened with privately-owned domestic enterprises. Thereafter these findings 
will be contrasted with the situation of the Republic of Korea, the only one 
of the four where the industrialisation process was largely led by the 
domestic private sector. 
The entrepreneur 
Why do some countries appear to have more, and more active entrepreneurs 
than others? This question has been approached in a number of ways, each 
reflecting in a sense a different school of thought. There are those who 
consider that the supply of entrepreneurs is the result of some "objective" 
factors. Others claim that the supply is basically the same in all countries, 
but that certain policies or institutional factors have prevented them from 
"coming to the surface". Yet others consider that the supply has little to do 
with domestic factors as it has depended to a considerable extent on the 
inflow of foreigners. 
The first school points to differences in climate, religion or indeed 
racial origin, to explain why a certain people is more "entrepreneurial" than 
another. According to this a temperate climate would be more favourable than 
a tropical one, for instance. 
Religion is considered particularly important. Much of northern Europe's 
successful economic development would be explained by Calvinism. Max Weber, 
who noticed that the industrial revolution took place first in protestant 
countries, argued that the rise of industrial capitalism had its roots in the 
protestant ethic. Early protestantism, and Calvinism in particular, stressed 
the virtues of hard work and saving. The Calvinist thus worked not merely for 
worldly ends, but because business success was a sign of spiritual grace. 
According to Weber, this belief provided the psychological foundation for the 
creation of a large class of entrepreneurs. "It gave them the necessary 
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self-discipline to devote themselves, heart and soul, to their occupation." 
(Habahkuk, 1981, pp. 16-17; and Chiew , 1983). 
A more modern version of this kind of argument is the reference sometimes 
made to Confucianism as an explanatory factor for the high quality of 
entrepreneurial supply in certain fast-growing East Asian societies. Certain 
virtues in Confucianism are considered particularly supportive to growth, such 
as "respect for education as a vehicle for self-improvement; inculcation of 
qualities of hard work, diligence and self-discipline; ... and ability to 
subordinate self and participate effectively in a hierarchical structure 
yielding a synergetic effect on output" (Jones and Sakong, pp. 302, 303). 
But, say Jones and Sakong (p. 303), the notion that the Confucian heritage 
is growth-supporting, is of a course open to the charge of "ex-postism", since 
20 years earlier it was viewed by many as the curse rather than the cure. 
Moreover, reference to Confucianism does not explain the differences in 
economic growth among Confucionist countries. It does not explain why the 
biggest "Confucionist" society (the People's Republic of China) grew so much 
slower than some of the fast-growing countries surrounding it. 
The second school considers that each country is more or less equally 
equipped with potential entrepreneurs, but that government policies and 
certain institutional factors keep them away from opportunities to prove 
themselves. Government policies that interfere too much with the economy 
through regulations and participation, would discourage potential 
entrepreneurs from taking initiatives. In contrast, a government that limits 
its interference and makes available certain incentives would encourage 
entrepreneurs. 
To some extent the previous chapter has tried to deal with this issue. 
Yet why would someone want to enter industry? Expected earnings may be a 
factor, but so is prestige. What is the social status of an entrepreneur in 
societies where an academic (or a football) career are valued higher? 
Governments may try to influence the social status of the entrepreneur and so 
indirectly industrial activity. The importance that the Government of the 
Republic of Korea attached to business success in the "economic war" it was 
staging with its northern neighbours is reported to have contributed much to 
the social standing of businessmen and helped break down the traditional 
aversion to business activity (Jones, Sakong). 
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Among the institutional factors, distribution of income and wealth and the 
degree of social mobility are also considered to explain differences in 
entrepreneurs* supply. In a highly stratified society busines leaders are 
recruited among the elite. By definition this is a small group and thus the 
number of potential entrepreneurs is limited. Someone who is born in one of 
the lower social classes with no prospect of moving upward may possess many 
promising entrepreneurial skills. Yet his success may never go beyond selling 
50 per cent more matches, plastic toys or magazines than his nearest 
competitior in the street where they both sell these items on the pavement. 
The wider the circle fom which a country draws its businessmen, the more 
likely it would seem to produce great entrepreneurs. 
Foreign, and to a lesser extent public, companies would have a favourable 
influence here. When privately owned domestic enterprises are dominated by 
the extended family and their organisational structure reflects the social 
structure in society, foreign and public companies may offer more upward 
mobility. A foreign-owned company may feel less bound by the prevailing 
social structure and may recruit managers on the basis of merit instead. 
However, the degree of mobility will then be influenced by access to 
education, which may still be highly uneven, of course. A similar situation 
may evolve in public enterprises although it will be limited by the extent to 
which the business and political elite are identical. 
There is some evidence that confirms that entrepreneurs are not drawn at 
random fromm the population as a whole and that certain socio-economic groups 
(basically the pre-industrial and industrial elites) are over-represented. 
The sample is too small, however, to bring out any clear differences between 
those countries with a more even income distribution and those with a less 
even one. A survey of 109 Mexican business leaders taken in the 1950s found 
that 75 per cent described their fathers as white-collar workers, managerial, 
large proprietors, professionals or military (Kobrin). A sample survey taken 
in the 1960s found that the majority of entrepreneurs' fathers had been 
industrialists (43 per cent) or merchants (24 per cent). Others reported that 
their fathers had been employee, or civil servant (13 per cent), professional 
man (9 per cent), or agricultural landowner, "rentier" or banker (11 per 
cent). Nobody had had a worker or peasant father, but this had been the 
profession of 8 per cent of their grandfathers (de Rossi). 
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A survey of (mainly small) private entrepreneurs in Singapore found that 
31 per cent of the entrepreneurs were formerly commercial traders, 24 per cent 
were former employees of commercial firms and 22 per cent were engineers and 
technicians; factory workers and artisans comprised 9.3 per cent of the total 
(Ch'ng Hak Kee quoted in Pang and Tan, p. 168). 
In the Republic of Korea a survey found that 21.4 per cent of 
entrepreneurs' fathers were landlords, 25.4 per cent independent farmers, 31.4 
per cent owners of industry or commerce and that 16.4 per cent of the fathers 
had a government, teaching or professional background. Only 2 per cent of the 
fathers were tenant farmers or blue-collar workers (Jones and Sakong). 
In both the Mexico and the Republic of Korea survey a high correlation was 
found between entrepreneurial success and level of education. In the Republic 
of Korea, the traditional elite which had disproportionate access to education 
was found to correlate highly with a position within the entrepreneurial 
elite. Seventy per cent of entrepreneurs had some college education, compared 
with only 20 per cent of the male cohort (Jones and Sakong). In Mexico, 63 
per cent of those from the industrial establishment were educated abroad (de 
Rossi). 
It seems that a policy aiming at increasing entrepreneurial supply could 
well start with broadening the access to educational opportunities. 
Foreigners are a third factor that is considered to have influenced 
entrepreneurial supply. By foreigners we mean immigrants who come to stay 
rather than the expatriate manager who returns home at the end of his 
contract. Their influence is explained by the know-how and experience that 
they bring along, but also by the fact that they are less deterred by 
tradition and values of the country that receives them. The first factor 
relates of course to people who had a business or exercised a skilled job in 
their home country. In a host country where initiative and skills are in 
short supply they have a comparative advantage. The second factor is related 
to the socio-cultural issue discussed above. The foreigner is not inhibited 
by the existing social structure in which there is not really a place for 
him. He/she would thus be both more free and allowed more freedom to take the 
initiative. 
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The available evidence seems to indicate that the role of immigrants has 
indeed been important. Brazil i s v i r t u a l l y and Singapore i s a wholly 
immigrant country, and in both immigrants (and the i r descendents) play an 
important ro le in industry. Although a large part of Mexico's or ig ina l 
population is s t i l l a l i v e , Mexico too has many charac te r i s t i cs of an immigrant 
country, pa r t i cu la r ly among i t s upper and middle c l a s ses . But the term 
immigrant becomes of course a r e l a t i ve one as the years go by. "Some of the 
ea r l i e s t investors to s e t t l e in the country eventually adopted Mexican 
c i t izenship a f t e r having founded firms which are now regarded in every sense 
as t ruly Mexican." (de Rossi, p . 143). A sample taken by de Rossi around 1970 
of the largest pr ivate ly owned enterprises in Mexico, found that a large 
number of entrepreneurs who were born abroad or of foreign origin were 
over-represented. Twenty per cent of them were born abroad and i f one would 
go back to thei r parents and grandparents, 44 per cent of the i n d u s t r i a l i s t s 
were of foreign origin (p . 144). 
Even for the Republic of Korea that has v i r t u a l l y no non-Korean 
immigrants, i t was found that refugees from the North were heavily 
over-represented among entrepreneurs and managers. Among entrepreneurs the 
r a t i o of Northerners to the i r male cohort was nearly f ive, and among managers 
i t was over three (Jones and Sakong). 
The enterpr ise s t ruc ture 
In each of the four countries the room for domestic pr ivate enterpr ises in 
manufacturing has decreased over the years a t leas t in r e l a t i ve terms. In the 
two Latin American countries th is has resulted from faster growth of both 
public and foreign enterpr ise . In the two Asian countries the l a t t e r was 
above a l l responsible . For Singaporean entrepreneurs th is has meant that 
their ro le has become secondary to that of foreign investors . In the Republic 
of Korea i t has meant that the share of Republic of Korean entrepreneurs has 
come down s l igh t ly from a previously very high level . Yet even today the 
private domestic sector remains by far the most important the re . 
I t is not easy to asess the precise importance of pr ivate domestic, public 
and foreign companies in the economy. This is so for two reasons. F i r s t , 
sample surveys tend to consider only the top 100, 1,000 or 5,000 or so 
companies. Since private domestic enterpr ises tend to be r e l a t i ve ly small, 
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their influence tends to be understated particularly in the smaller surveys. 
Second, the relative importance of each tends to differ considerably depending 
on whether the surveys are based on assets, sales, or number of employees. 
State companies can be very capital-intensive and they assume thus 
disproportionate weight in a distribution according to assets. Foreign-owned 
companies are mainly found in the modern sector. They use sophisticated 
technologies, relatively little labour, and their weight tends to be 
overestimated in a distribution by sales. Private domestic enterprises employ 
relatively many people. Their importance therefore appears higher in a 
distribution according to number of workers. 
In all four countries foreign ownership is concentrated in manufacturing. 
This is as much the result of legislation that excludes foreigners from 
certain other sectors as of the fact that manufacturing was the sector that 
offered the best growth possibilities. 
Within manufacturing in Brazil and Mexico a typical enterprise structure 
evolved. State enterprises came to be concentrated in basic and intermediate 
goods such as primary metals, petrochemicals, etc., where capital requirements 
are large, where technology may be fairly advanced, and where foreign firms 
showed little interest. Foreign firms tend to be found mainly in 
sophisticated consumer durables and certain capital goods, such as automobiles 
and domestic appliances, where they had an advantage in terms of access to 
technology and capital, and where management and advertising skills were 
important. Private domestic capital tends to be left with the more 
traditional consumer goods such as textiles and clothing, footwear, food 
products, furniture, where access to capital and technology, and management 
skills are less important. 
In the Republic of Korea, where the enterprise structure is dominated by 
private domestic capital, the State invested in steel, petrochemicals and 
fertiliser. Foreigners have become important exporters of electronics and to 
a lesser extent of textiles and clothing. In Singapore the large majority of 
manufacturing output and exports originates in foreign companies which also 
employ most people. Only in food, beverages, tobacco, leather, plastics, 
cement and fabricated metal has a sizeable domestically-owned sector developed. 
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Only on Brazil and Singapore are "precise" data available about the 
r e l a t ive importance of different types of ownership. In Brazil regular 
surveys are held to assess the share of each. A survey of the 5,113 largest 
firms showed that in 1974, for example, over 37 per cent of net assets 
belonged to public en te rpr i ses , 15 per cent to multinational corporations and 
48 per cent to private Brazilian firms. Using sales as a measure, State firms 
controlled 16 per cent, multinational corporations 28 per cent and domestic 
private firms 56 per cent (Hewlett, 19 79). 
Werneck (p . 86) confirms the picture on Brazil presented above. He gives 
data based on a large survey of 6,430 non-financial enterpr ises taken in 1978 
that t r ied to take account of both turnover and assets ( table 46) . 
According to th is survey the public sector had a majority share in iron and 
s t e e l , refinery and heavy petrochemicals. Foreigners had a majority share in 
e lec t r i c and electronic goods, t ransportat ion goods, other chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals and between one thi rd and one half of non-metallic minerals, 
non-ferrous metals, machinery, rubber, leather and p l a s t i c s . In a l l others 
private domestic firms had majority shares. 
In Singapore very d ras t i c changes have taken place in the enterpr ise 
s t ruc tu re . Upon independence most of the 548 manufacturing enterpr ises were 
small, locally-owned and producing for the local market. The number of 
establishments has meanwhile multiplied by s ix . The majority (74 per cent) of 
them are s t i l l local ly owned but most of the i r produce is now exported. The 
weight of wholly or majority foreign-owned firms in sales has not ceased to 
increase. In 1981, foreign firms employed nearly 60 per cent of the 
manufacturing labour force, accounted for 76 per cent of output, 67 per cent 
of value added and 87 per cent of d i rect exports ( table 47) . 
The next two sections wi l l discuss how and why public and foreign 
enterpr ise have come to take up such an important place in each economy. 
1
 As i t used rather broad sector defini t ions i t understated the 
importance of foreign enterpr ises in cer ta in narrow product groups. 
Table 46. Brazil : Foreign, public and private domestic en te rpr i ses ' 
sectoral shares, 1978 































































































1. Agriculture and livestock 
2 . Non-fuels mining 
3 . Mineral fuels extract ion 
4 . Non-metallic minerals 
5 . Iron and s tee l 
6. Foundry and metal processing 
7. Non-ferrous metals 
8. Machinery 
9 . E lec t r ic and electronic goods 
10. Transportation goods 
11. Wood and furniture 
12. Paper pulp 
13. Paper and cardboard 
14. Rubber, leather and plastics 
15. Fertilisers, alkalis and others 
16. Alcohol and vegetable oils 
17. Refinery and heavy petrochemicals 
18. Other chemicals 
19. Perfumery and pharmaceutical 
20. Textile, clothing and footwear 
21. Food, beverages and tobacco 
22. Printing, publishing and others 
23. E lec t r i c i ty 
24. Water and sewage 
25. Construction 
26. Commerce, storage, road and air 
transportation 
27. Rail transportation 
28. Waterborne transportation 
29. Communications 
30. Other services 
Source. Werneck. 
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Public enterprise 
The State has become an important par t ic ipant in the production process. 
This may come as a surprise as a l l four countries are sol idly in the camp of 
the free, c a p i t a l i s t world. The previous chapter discussed some of the 
reasons why the State has wanted to intervene in the economy. In many 
respects d i rec t par t ic ipat ion can be seen as one other tool in the hands of a 
development-oriented government. Indeed i t has been argued that production of 
s t ee l , petrochemicals and f e r t i l i s e r s is j u s t one step beyond the provision of 
infrastructure such as roads, por ts , e l e c t r i c i t y , e t c . Some have even gone as 
far as saying that production of such products fa l l s within a broader 
defini t ion of inf ras t ructure . 
Some direct par t ic ipat ion has thus resulted from conscious planning, but 
in other cases i t was an ad hoc reaction to an unforeseen event. Two examples 
i l l u s t r a t e t h i s . 
The fact that most sugar mills in Mexico are State-owned can be considered 
an "accident". Mexico's policy of keeping sugar prices low to the individual 
and indust r ia l consumer made production conditions progressively more 
precarious for Mexico's sugar mi l l s . When bankruptcy threatened, government 
provided subsidies. These proved insuff icient and in order not to in terrupt 
the supply to consumers, the State came to take over an increasing number of 
them. In the early 1960s the State controlled five mills or 5 per cent of 
to ta l production. By 1969 i t owned 18, producing 31 per cent of production. 
By 1975, 31 , or 51 per cent . By the l a t e 1970s the government owned or 
managed 56 out of the 62 remaining mills (Dominguez, 1982). 
Another example of a s ta te at f i r s t re luctant ly becoming involved in 
production is that of the Brazilian s t ee l industry. Brazil has vast iron ore 
reserves, and a number of sources report that i t was fe l t a t an early stage 
that s t ee l ought to be an important industry. In 1930 only a few small s tee l 
mills were in existence. Vargas, however, considered a large-scale integrated 
s tee l mill essent ia l for the country's development. Although th i s was 
or iginal ly seen as a purely private venture, domestic capi ta l proved unable or 
unwilling to come up with the required sum. The project , therefore , became a 
public one, and af ter long negotiations and using American technology and 
finance, the Companhia Siderurgica Nacional (CSN) bu i l t the large integrated 
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Volta Redonda Steel Plant . This plant was conveniently located halfway 
between the two larges t c i t i e s in the country, and reasonably near the iron 
ore reserves of Minas Gerais . 
With the establishment of CSN, not only did the s t a te acquire an important 
role in industry, but also an endurable, t ac i t market division between private 
and public enterpr ise was set on reasonably clear l ines (Werneck, p . 111). 
The former became engaged in the production of non-flat s t ee l products, while 
the l a t t e r was made mainly responsible for the f l a t - ro l l ed products. The 
changing pattern of indus t r ia l growth in the 1950s and the growing importance 
of the automotive, shipbuilding and canned food industry led to a t r i p l i ng of 
demand for f l a t products between 1949 and 1959. As non-flat products grew 
less fas t , government saw i t s par t ic ipat ion in the industry increase. 
Strong demand led to i n i t i a t i v e s to es tabl ish two new plants : Cosipa in 
Sao Paolo and Usiminas in Minas Gerais. Again these were pr ivate and local 
government i n i t i a t i v e s which, due to the large amount of resources required, 
became public enterpr ises . Since the inauguration of these mil ls s t ee l 
production has kept growing, and in 1980 production at tained a level five 
times higher than that of the 1960s. With a production of 15.3 mill ion tons, 
Brazil had become a medium-sized world producer (Werneck, pp. 107-120). 
Singapore*. The State is a formidable force in Singapore's economy. There 
are about 180 public enterpr ises (Seah). State monopolies provide a l l 
u t i l i t i e s , telephone and postal services , post and airport services , 
indus t r ia l es ta tes and radio and te levis ion . Government minis t r ies provide a 
large part of medical and health services , and a l l education from primary to 
t e r t i a ry level . The State Housing and Development Board houses nearly 
three-quarters of the population in public housing es ta tes (Lim). 
The State is part owner of the Development Bank of Singapore and INTRACO, 
the large trading and investment company. I t owns 75 per cent of a l l the land 
in Singapore; the national shipping l i n e , Neptune; and the national a i r l i ne 
SIA (which alone contributes 3 per cent to GDP). 
In manufacturing i t also has a large presence: in 1975 public limited 
l i a b i l i t y companies accounted for 17 per cent of value added and 16 per cent 
(or 30,000) of a l l workers in manufacturing. Government can be full owner, 
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majority owner but may a l s o take a minority s t a k e . Important public 
investments are and have been in sh ipbui ld ing and r e p a i r , and iron and s t e e l . 
The reasons for p a r t i c i p a t i o n have varied and have d i f f e r e d according to the 
investment made. The takeover and convers ion of the sh ipbui ld ing and s h i p 
repair ing f a c i l i t i e s , for i n s t a n c e , to become the Keppel and Sembawang 
shipyards was taken in response to the B r i t i s h withdrawal from t h e i r naval 
base , in an e f f o r t to prevent the f a c i l i t i e s s tanding i d l e (Seah) . 
The importance of the s t a t e has gone down in more recent years and 
contributed only 12.4 per cent of va lue added and employed 10 per cent of the 
labour force (or 28,000 people) in manufacturing in 1981 (Lim and Pang). 
Mexico: Even before the recent takeover of the banks (which made the 
State at the same time owner of many non- f inanc ia l i n s t i t u t i o n s , inc luding 
manufacturing e n t e r p r i s e s ) the State was an important part i c ipant in the 
economy. Apart from c e r t a i n publ ic u t i l i t i e s and other "typica l" 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s i t i s present in mining (sulphur, copper r e f i n i n g ) 
banking, petroleum, r e t a i l i n g , e t c . I t s presence has grown s t e a d i l y s i n c e the 
1930s ( the rai lways were expropriated in 1937 and the o i l industry in 1938) . 
After 1970 government p a r t i c i p a t i o n a c c e l e r a t e d . Between 1971 and 1975, 
public investment made up 57 per cent of a l l investment in manufacturing. I t 
was only 20 per cent in 1971, but reached 80 per cent in 1974 and 1975- The 
number of s t a t e e n t e r p r i s e s jumped from 86 in 1970 to over 700 in the l a t e 
1970s (Schagheck). In 1976 government p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the economy was 
est imated a t 45 per cent ( i b i d . ) . Public e n t e r p r i s e employed 626,000 workers 
or about 4 per cent of the labour force (Campero and Mendoza). State 
e n t e r p r i s e s vary enormously in s i z e . 
Public e n t e r p r i s e s are a drain on the s t a t e budget . Many are 
s e l f - f i n a n c i n g , but some r e c e i v e large t r a n s f e r s from the cen tra l government. 
In 1981, 55 per cent of the government's publ ic expenditure went to publ ic 
2 
e n t e r p r i s e s . Nine of these got 40 per cent of the t o t a l and PEMEX alone 
rece ived 16 per cent (Cornea A l v a r e z ) . 
1
 Their exact number d i f f e r s depending on the d e f i n i t i o n used . The 
1975 census of public e n t e r p r i s e s g ives a t o t a l of 872 public e n t e r p r i s e s of 
which 519 were majority State-owned; 64 had a minority State share; 201 were 
t r u s t s and 88 were d e c e n t r a l i s e d public organi sa t ions (Cornea A l v a r e z ) . 
These inc luded, however, the National E l e c t r i c i t y Commission (CFE), 
the Soc ia l Securi ty I n s t i t u t e s (IMSS and ISSSTE), CONASUPO, and the ra i l roads 
(Ferrona le s ) . 
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In manufacturing t h e main S t a t e investments a re in sugar , f e r t i l i s e r , 
d i e s e l eng ines , coaches, t e x t i l e s , tobacco and s t e e l . In 1975 wholly-owned 
publ ic e n t e r p r i s e s employed 82,594 people (4 per cent of t h e manufacturing 
labour force) (Campero and Mendoza). 
Government p a r t i c i p a t i o n was not the r e s u l t of a p a r t i c u l a r i d e o l o g i c a l 
s t a n d . Rather to t h e c o n t r a r y : t h e Mexican Government has always considered 
the p r i v a t e s e c t o r as the prime mover of the economy. However i t had s e t 
i t s e l f c e r t a i n development goals and when p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e was unable or 
unwi l l ing to f u l f i l t h e s e goa ls " t h e s t a t e s tood ready to i n t e r v e n e in t h e 
economy as an i n s t i t u t i o n of l a s t r e s o r t , though sometimes an impat ient one, 
a c t i ng as banker and as en t rep reneur to dea l with those problems t h a t t he 
p r i v a t e s e c t o r has been unwi l l ing or unable to h a n d l e " . (Bennet and Sharpe, p . 
171). 
An example of an investment t h a t t h e S t a t e cons idered e s s e n t i a l but t h a t 
because of i t s magnitude and the long- term c h a r a c t e r of expected r e t u r n s did 
not f ind s u f f i c i e n t p r i v a t e backing is t h e case of Al tos Homos , t h e 
i n t e g r a t e d s t e e l m i l l t h a t was s e t up during t h e Second World War. Nacional 
F inanc ie ra secured a loan from t h e (United S t a t e s ' ) Export Import Bank t o 
f inance pa r t of t h i s p ro j ec t and become minor i ty owner. As t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
took much longer than foreseen , Nat ional F i n a n c i e r a had t o come up wi th e x t r a 
funds and so r e l u c t a n t l y the S ta te became major i ty owner. 
In o the r cases t h e S t a t e became owner when i t b a i l e d out firms in 
f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s which i t considered too important for i n d u s t r i a l growth 
to go bankrup t . Examples a re t h e sugar m i l l s ( see p rev ius s e c t i o n ) , Diese l 
Nacional (DINA) and t h e i n d u s t r i a l and banking firm SOMEX (Bennett and Sharpe) . 
B r a z i l ; From a r e l u c t a n t p a r t i c i p a n t (see previous s e c t i o n ) the S t a t e 
( i . e . Federa l and S t a t e governments) has become t h e dominant a c t o r in t h e 
B r a z i l i a n economy. I t s powerful p o s i t i o n in (development and commercial) 
banking has a l ready been r e f e r r e d t o . I t i s a l so a major force in mining 
Apart from t h e s i z e of the c a p i t a l o u t l a y , t h i s unwi l l ingness has 
a l so been r e l a t e d to t h e government 's p r i c i n g pol icy t h a t aimed a t keeping 
p r i ce s low t o consumers ( in the case of f i na l produce) and producers ( in the 
case of i n t e rmed ia t e i npu t s ) b u t , i t was f e l t , did not always allow producers 
to opera te p r o f i t a b l y . 
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(CRVD), o i l refining and d is t r ibut ion (Petrobras) , services (through, e .g . 
Lloyd Bras i le i ro , the shipping company) and of course manufacturing. "In 
prac t ica l ly a l l aspects of organised economic ac t iv i ty in Brazil today, the 
government exercises a decisive influence through the administration of 
policies that affect producer p ro f i t ab i l i t y in one way or the other . To be 
sure, the present system can be considered one of s t a t e capi tal ism." (Tyler, 
1981, p . 13). 
Public enterpr ise played a key role in the rapid growth that s ta r ted in 
the second half of the 1960s. The public sector accounted for more than half 
of to ta l gross fixed capi ta l formation during the 1968 to 1974 period (Graham, 
1978, quoted in Bergsman, p . 82). Public enterprises were responsible for the 
modernisation and fast expansion - often at yearly ra tes over 10 per cent - of 
a large part of the country's infrastructure such as e l ec t r i c power, 
communication and t ranspor t . In 1969, for example, public investment made up 
60 per cent of the to ta l (Bergsman). By 1974 the 20 largest enterprises (by 
assets) in Brazil were publicly owned ( i b i d . ) . If anything th i s growth in 
importance continued af ter 1974. Evans reports that by 1979, 74 per cent of 
the assets of the 100 largest firms were controlled by State enterpr ises 
(quoted in Jenkins, p . 194). 
In manufacturing, too, the s t a t e ' s share went up quickly. I t s share in 
manufacturing by assets doubled from 8 to 16 per cent of the to t a l between 
1966 and 1974 (Hewlett, p . 157). By 1979 i t was estimated that government 
firms accounted for 25 per cent of t o t a l sales (Tyler, 1981, p. 3) . The s ta te 
invested above a l l in intermediate goods such as s t ee l , f e r t i l i s e r , a lka l i s 
and more recently in paper pulp and non-ferrous metals in an effort to keep up 
with the rapid growing demand and often engaged in import subs t i tu t ion 
(Werneck). All these a c t i v i t i e s had a high capi ta l in tens i ty and very high 
expansion ra tes in common, and they implied a tremendous investment effort 
which most probably could not have been at ta ined without extensive 
par t ic ipat ion of the s t a t e . 
The size of s t a te companies allows them to move into new areas that the 
private sector cannot match. "They enjoy high prof i t s derived from prices set 
by the government." (Overholt, p. 31). But above a l l th is success is 
explained by their privileged access to finance, largely controlled by the 
s t a t e . In a country where i t is fa i r ly d i f f i cu l t - and at times very 
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difficult - for private firms to obtain long-term finance, this is a 
considerable advantage. Moreover, and contrary to the experience of most 
domestic firms, many state companies were able to raise money via the stock 
market. 
As a result of their rapid expansion, state firms have become 
conglomerates and multinationals in their own right. They have moved into 
activities related to their original line of business. Petrobras has become 
an important producer of petrochemicals, CRVD moved into pellitising plants, 
bauxite mining and aluminium production, pulp manufacturing and steel plants. 
They have also moved into fields unrelated to their original activity. Both 
CRVD and Petrobras have branched out into the production of fertilisers and 
into shipping (Hewlett in Overholt, p. 156). 
Republic of Korea; State participation in the economy has been sizeable 
but selective in the Republic of Korea. The State has invested in areas it 
considered important and where private enterprise was unlikely to take the 
large financial risk. It has, however, also divested itself of some of its 
investments. 
Most of the 36 State enterprises that existed in 1960 can be traced back 
to colonial rule. They were enterprises that fell to the government after the 
Japanese left or were confiscated private Japanese firms that the government 
had not wanted to sell. 
The increase in their number after 1960 was clearly policy-induced. In 
1972 there were 108 public enterprises whose share in GDP had risen to 9 per 
cent, or 13 per cent in GDP outside agriculture (Jones and Sakong, pp. 149, 
and V-9). The State's dominance in finance and banking has already been 
discussed. Apart from its role in infrastructure one third of mining and 
transport and communication output was also generated by State enterprises. 
It owned the Korea Telecommunication Company and Korea Airlines, but these 
were later sold to private investors. More recently government has started to 
divest itself of its interests in the banking sector. 
The history of public enterprise in manufacturing dates back to the Koryo 
dynasty (918-1389) when the government ran its own establishments to produce 
luxury goods (such as the famous green celadon ceramics) for the Royal Family 
and segments of the aristocracy (Jones and Sakong). 
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In more recent years the State invested heavi ly in import subs t i tu t ion 
industries such as f e r t i l i s e r s , o i l ref ining and s t e e l production often in 
partnership with loca l or foreign firms. Fi f teen per cent of manufacturing 
GDP was generated by public firms in 1972. Some of the b igges t State 
companies are the Korea Oil Corporation (50-50 j o i n t venture with Gulf o i l ) , 
the Pohang Steel Company (50-50 j o i n t venture with private investors) and the 
Korea Pac i f ic Chemical Corporation (50-50 j o i n t venture with Dow Chemical). 
Between 1963 and 1972 public enterprise output increased by 14.5 per cent 
per year in real terms (compared to 9.5 per cent for the economy as a whole 
and 12.2 per cent in the non-agricultural economy). In th i s period public 
enterprises absorbed 30 per cent of gross investment (Chokski, p. 2 5 ) . 
Public companies are among the largest in the country. In 1972, 12 of the 
15 largest and 20 of the 50 largest were public (Jones and Sakong). In more 
recent years the share of value added outside agriculture generated in public 
enterprises has remained more or l e s s constant . I t stood at 11.6 per cent in 
1980 (Michell , App. table 5 ) . 
Foreign enterprise 
" . . . My ministers and economic advisors did not take long to 
convince me that the rate of development necessary i f we were to 
generate the jobs to mop up unemployment running at 10 per cent of 
the workforce in 1960, could never be achieved at the pace at which 
Chinese and Indian Singaporean enterpr ise was s lowly moving from 
trad i t iona l r e t a i l and entrepot trade into the new manufacturing or 
servic ing indus tr i e s . They saw far greater potent ia l in the 
expanding subs id iar ies of American, European and Japanese 
corporations. . . . We have never suffered from any inhib i t ions on 
borrowing c a p i t a l , know-how, managers, engineers and marketing 
c a p a b i l i t i e s . Far from l imit ing the entry of foreign managers, 
engineers and bankers, we encouraged them to come. . . . Had we 
tr ied to go into industry on our own, working from f i r s t 
p r i n c i p l e s , we would never have made i t . . . " (Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew in a speech del ivered at the 16th World Congress of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, F lor ida , October 1978, quoted in 
Chia, 1982, p. 8 . ) 
Foreign investment has been for many years one of the h o t t e s t debated 
i s sues of economic development. Many of i t s potent ia l advantages are l i s t e d 
by Mr. Lee in his speech. Others have pointed to the potent ia l disadvantages 
involved in allowing foreign enterpr i ses , and mult inationals in part icular to 
- 140 -
opera te wi thout r e s t r i c t i o n . Many of t h e s e d isadvantages r e s u l t d i r e c t l y from 
the s i z e and the r e s u l t a n t power of MNEs. Thei r s i z e , t h e i r f i n a n c i a l 
s t r e n g t h , supe r io r o r g a n i s a t i o n and know-how, make i t hard for domestic 
e n t r e p r i s e s t o compete wi th them and t h i s would reduce r a t h e r than i n c r e a s e 
compet i t ion . By t r a n s p l a n t i n g p r a c t i c e s from t h e (developed) home country 
they may produce goods t h a t a re u n s u i t a b l e for developing country marke t s , 
products t h a t are unneces sa r i l y d i v e r s i f i e d , us ing technology t h a t may be 
i napp rop r i a t e for a s i t u a t i o n in which r e l a t i v e f a c t o r s c a r c i t i e s a r e 
d i f f e r e n t . This may lead to unnecessary dependence on c o s t l y l i c e n s e s and 
higher than necessary product ion cos t s which, in t u r n , may lead to g r e a t e r 
dependence through indeb tedness . 
Aware of these p o t e n t i a l d i sadvantages many c o u n t r i e s have t r i e d t o 
r e s t r i c t the scope for a c t i o n of m u l t i n a t i o n a l s . Several have completely 
excluded MNEs from i n v e s t i n g in c e r t a i n s e c t o r s of the economy, no tab ly in 
defence, communications ( p r e s s and r a d i o ) and banking . Other economic 
s e c t o r s , of ten resource based , such as pe t ro leum, pet rochemicals and mining, 
as we l l as s t e e l , have in some in s t ances been ba r red to foreign i n v e s t o r s . 
Likewise , coun t r i e s have pushed for minor i ty or major i ty l o c a l c a p i t a l 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n ( j o i n t v e n t u r e s ) , encouraged l o c a l procurement and h igher l o c a l 
value added. 
Against t he very open a t t i t u d e t o fore ign investment of Singapore and t o a 
l e s s e r e x t e n t B r a z i l , t he more c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e of Mexico and the very 
c r i t i c a l one of the Republic of Korea should be n o t e d . Moreover, not a l l 
d i r e c t foreign investment o r i g i n a t e s in l a r g e m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s . 
Many of the fo re igne r s who inves ted in Singapore and t h e Republic of Korea for 
i n s t a n c e , were smal l or medium s i z e d firms from Hong Kong and Japan 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
However c r i t i c a l of DFI c o u n t r i e s may have been in the p a s t , in more 
r ecen t years as t h e d isadvantages of bank lending have become d r a m a t i c a l l y 
c l e a r , and as growth of o the r sources of development f inanc ing a re s t a g n a t i n g 
or worse, we have wi tnessed a r e a p p r a i s a l of DFI and i t s advantages a re 
s t r e s s e d once aga in . The very high i n t e r e s t r a t e s on bank loans have rude ly 
reminded many coun t r i e s t h a t one of t h e advantages of DFI for the ba lance of 
payments i s t h a t i t s p r o f i t r emi t t ances a re a funct ion of i t s success fu l 
opera t ion r a t h e r than a fixed cost as in t h e case of borrowing. 
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After a few genera l remarks on the p a t t e r n of foreign investment we w i l l 
b r i e f l y look a t the importance of fore ign e n t e r p r i s e in the four c o u n t r i e s 
concerned. 
For most of the n ine t een th and the f i r s t h a l f of the twen t i e th century 
foreign investment in developing coun t r i e s was concentra ted in t h e primary 
sec to r to e x p l o i t n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s . Investments were enclave in na tu re and 
wholly foreign-owned. P r o f i t s could be huge b u t few of t h e s e remained in the 
hos t country ( e . g . Mexico). Although more r e c e n t l y investments in s e r v i c e s 
and manufacturing gained in importance, even today petroleum, mining and 
a g r i c u l t u r e absorb most of the developing w o r l d ' s DFI. 
From the 1950s onwards, most new foreign investments went i n t o the 
manufacturing and r e l a t e d s e c t o r s such as sh ipp ing , a i r t r a n s p o r t , and 
banking. Governments t h a t wanted to i n d u s t r i a l i s e , and h igher t r a d e b a r r i e r s 
t ha t f r u s t r a t e d d i r e c t exports led to much mu l t i na t i ona l inves tment . Most of 
t h i s went to La t i n America. In the 1970s a new wave of investments for 
export ing manufactures gained momentum. Some Asian coun t r i e s proved t o be the 
main r e c i p i e n t s of t h i s . 
Despite t h i s more r e c e n t t r e n d , however, and a l s o because of the d i f f e r e n t 
c h a r a c t e r of t h i s type of investment (import s u b s t i t u t i o n i n d u s t r i e s proved 
more c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e than producers of manufactured e x p o r t s ) , most of the 
s tock of foreign investment i s s t i l l concent ra ted in L a t i n America. By the 
end of 1981, 52 per cen t of a l l investments by i n d u s t r i a l i s e d c o u n t r i e s in 
developing coun t r i e s was in L a t i n America, compared to 28 per cent in A s i a , 11 
per cent in Africa and 9 per cent "developing Europe" (OECD, 1983). 
Today, four d i f f e r e n t ca t ego r i e s of foreign investment in developing 
coun t r i e s can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d . Product ion for the domestic market of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y t r a d a b l e goods, i s a f i r s t ca tegory . This import s u b s t i t u t i o n 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n behind t r a d e b a r r i e r s has been a common form of DFI in the 
l a r g e r La t i n American coun t r i e s where expo r t e r s have t r i e d to safeguard or 
enlarge t h e i r previous export market or have wanted a presence .in what looked 
1 ike a promis ing market. 
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The other categories are different forms of investment for exports . These 
include those by the TNCs which s ta r ted by subst i tu t ing imports and which then 
became substant ia l exporters . The multinational automobile and parts 
exporters in Mexico and Brazil fa l l into th i s category. Next are the foreign 
firms which produce and export " t r ad i t iona l " products such as footwear, 
t e x t i l e s , processed foods and sporting goods. They use r e l a t i ve ly simple 
technology, l i t t l e product d i f ferent ia t ion and a re la t ive ly unskilled labour 
force. To the extent that foreign investment is involved in th i s type, i t is 
done more by smaller companies than by giant MNEs. Finally there are the 
"sourcing" investments where only one par t icu lar ( labour-intensive) part of 
the production process is t ransferred to the developing countr ies . The more 
capi ta l - in tensive parts are then s t i l l performed in the "home" country, where 
also the R & D is done and marketing is co-ordinated. The e lec t ron ics , 
especially the semi-conductor industry is a good example (La l l ) . 
The newly indus t r ia l i s ing countr ies , and in par t icu lar some of the ones 
considered here , have been among the main beneficiar ies of Direct Foreign 
Investment. As we pointed out e a r l i e r , the i r rapid growth cannot be seen in 
isolat ion from the rapid growth of investment in developing countries 
originating in indust r ia l i sed countries in the 1960s and 1970s. This flow 
grew by 7 per cent average per year between 1960 and 1968; by 9.2 per cent 
between 1968 and 1973 and by 19.4 per cent from 1973 to 19781 (OECD, 1981). 
Today, much of the t o t a l stock of direct investment in developing 
countries that originated in the indus t r ia l i sed countries (US$137,200 million 
in 1981) is concentrated in the NICs. If we exclude OPEC countries and 
offshore banking centres then 58 per cent of the to ta l is in newly 
indust r ia l i s ing countr ies . Within these countries nearly half was in Brazil 
(US$17,200 million or 18 per cent of the to t a l ) and Mexico (US$10,300 mil l ion, 
or 11 per cent of the t o t a l ) . A re l a t ive ly large part went also to Singapore 
(US$3.9 million or 4 per cent of the t o t a l ) . The Republic of Korea received 
"only" US$1,600 mill ion or 1.7 per cent of the t o t a l (OECD, 1983). 
1
 The acceleration af ter 1973 was smaller in real terms. Inf la t ion 
accelerated (from roughly 4.0 per cent between 1960 and 1973 to 9.1 per cent 
between 1973 and 1978). 
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Singapore: Foreign investment plays a major role in the Singaporean 
economy, and a dominating one in manufacturing. In 1980 nearly 60 per cent of 
a l l workers in manufacturing were employed by wholly or majority foreign-owned 
en te rpr i ses . These enterprises produced two-thirds of manufacturing output 
and accounted for nearly 85 per cent of manufactured exports (see table 47). 
Foreign investment reached th i s dominant posi t ion gradually. In the early days 
of independence, i t s presence was modest and what foreign enterprises existed 
were mainly in the trade and services sector and in o i l re f in ing . The 
smallness of the domestic market, the low level of protection offered, and the 
"unfavourable po l i t i c a l and indus t r ia l r e la t ions climate" have been given as 
explanation for the low level of foreign investment in manufacturing prior to 
1965 (Chia, 1982, p . 20). 
A combination of factors led to the rapid increase in DFI after 1965. 
Government made rel iance on multinationals the basis for i t s development 
s t ra tegy. I t offered investment incentives, no l imits on profi t r epa t r i a t ion 
and a l ibera l a t t i t ude towards the employment of expatr ia te staff . The 
country's improved p o l i t i c a l , labour and wage s t a b i l i t y were also prominent 
among the "pul l" factors ( i b i d . , p . 20). 
Most foreign investment in the 1960s went into petroleum ref in ing . By 
1970, 55 per cent of a l l foreign assets were in that sector . Foreign 
investments in t ex t i l e s and clothing were also prominent in the 1960s. These 
came in two waves, 1963-64 and the l a t e 1960s, from Hong Kong and another East 
Asian NIC. The f i r s t wave was the resu l t of efforts to circumvent quota 
r e s t r i c t i ons imposed on these exporters by the major developed market 
economies "even though wage ra tes in Singapore were higher than in the home 
countries" ( i b i d . , p. 21) . 
The reasons for coming to Singapore included geographical proximity, 
cul tural fami l iar i ty , absence of trade r e s t r i c t i ons imposed by OECD countries 
on Singapore manufactured exports, and generous investment incentives 
( i b i d . ) . The "push" factor of the second wave included economic and po l i t i c a l 
uncer ta int ies a t home, as well as growing labour shortages and r i s ing wage 
l eve l s . 
A third major rec ipient of foreign investment was the e l ec t r i ca l and 
electronic industry. This was by far the most dynamic growth sector in the 
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1970s when i t increased i t s share in t o t a l foreign assets from 8.2 per cent in 
1970 to 17.3 per cent in 1981. 
Another rapidly growing rec ip ient of DFI in the 1970s was the precision 
instruments industry. Texti les and clothing received no new investments af ter 
1975. Petroleum ref ining, on the other hand, kept receiving a steady inflow 
of new foreign c a p i t a l . 
The sources of DFI in Singapore have been very diverse . The United States 
and Western European countries went into o i l ref in ing; the Japanese 
concentrated on shipbuilding and repair and machinery; Hong Kong investments 
preferred t e x t i l e s and clothing, and a l l se t up e l e c t r i c and electronic 
subs id ia r ies . Investment by Japanese firms showed the most rapid growth in 
the 1970s. 
Mexico: Before the revolution s tar ted in 1910, foreign investment in 
Mexico to ta l led US$2,000 million or two-thirds of a l l investment outside 
agr icul ture and handicraf ts . Foreigners owned one-seventh of Mexico's land 
surface (Evans). This high proportion of foreign ownership "may have set a l l 
time records for any nation claiming p o l i t i c a l independence" (Vernon in 
Kobrin, p . 114). Most of these investments were in ext ract ive indust r ies and 
public u t i l i t i e s such as r a i l roads , and l i t t l e was found in manufacturing. 
Most originated in the United Kingdom, France and the United S ta t e s . 
Resentment towards foreign investors led to few new investments a f te r the 
1910 revolution. Nationalisation of petroleum, railways and agr icu l tu ra l 
properties further added to an absolute and r e l a t i v e dec l ine . By 1940, the 
to ta l amount of foreign d i rec t investment had fallen to US$411 mi l l ion , or 
about 28 per cent of the to ta l in 1911 (May, quoted in Kobrin, p . 115). 
From the l a t e 1940s onwards foreign investors s tar ted to return to 
Mexico. They responded to a gradually more posi t ive a t t i t ude towards them. 
The compensatory arrangement that President Avila Camacho reached with the 
ex-owners of Mexico's petroleum industry was a case in point . 
Most new investments went in to manufacturing. The share of that sector in 
a l l DFI increased from 7.1 per cent in 1940 to 73.8 per cent in 1970 (Waarts, 
p . 189) and remained roughly a t that level thereaf ter . The growing 
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concentration in manufacturing was no doubt a consequence of the increasing 
protection offered to producers. I t was also the resu l t of the Mexicanisation 
programme. Industries in sectors that were considered basic for the 
national economy were gradually appropriated. This happened quie t ly and 
ex-investors were compensated. Examples of th i s buying-out of foreigners were 
the e l ec t r i c companies ( in 1960), the remainder of the petroleum sector (1969) 
and sulphur mining (1967) (Waarts). 
The Presidency of Ruiz Cortines (1952-58) was par t icu lar ly favourable to 
investors. A 65 per cent rebate on machinery and equipment import duties was 
offered and the law for New and Necessary Industr ies enacted in 1955 offered 
exemption from several taxes (Evans and Gereffi) . The country did require 
local equity par t ic ipa t ion (preferably majority control by locals) as a 
condition for entry by foreign en terpr i ses . 
Within manufacturing the share of foreign enterprises has gone up rapidly 
since the 1950s. Between 1962 and 1976 foreign-owned subsidiaries grew a t an 
annual ra te of 14 per cent compared to 12 per cent for the most dynamic 
domestic companies (Krook). In 1970 they accounted for 45 per cent of a l l 
firms with more than 10 employees compared to 38 per cent in 1962 (Evans and 
Gereffi; Krook). For a l l manufacturing firms these figures were 21.2 and 
14.4 per cent (Waarts). Foreign companies are thus r e l a t ive ly l a rge . In 
1972, 52 per cent of the 300 largest manufacturing firms were foreign-owned. 
The United States alone accounted for 36 per cent (Evans and Gereff i) . 
In the early 1970s the a t t i t ude to foreigners became more c r i t i c a l . 
President Echeverrfa introduced a new Foreign Investment Law in 1973 which 
expanded the "Mexicanisation" process*, v i r t ua l l y a l l new investments were 
required to be structured with a maximum of 49 per cent foreign equity. The 
1973 Transfer of Technology Bil l limited the amount of royalty payments for 
technology that could be paid as well as the kind of technology that could be 
transferred. A th i rd , more controversial law was not adopted (Looney, p . 79). 
The Mexican Government publishes l i s t s with specific a c t i v i t i e s which 
are reserved for s t a t e ownership ( inf ras t ruc ture , basic petrochemicals, e t c . ) , 
for 100 per cent domestically-owned firms (such as c red i t , finance, insurance 
and broadcasting) and for majority domestically owned firms (such as mining, 
pr int ing, e t c . ) (de Rossi). 
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New foreign investment flows slowed down in the ear ly 1970s but in the 
l a t t e r half of the decade they increased as a r e su l t of a more l ibe ra l 
government a t t i t ude and the opportunities provided by rapid demand growth. 
Between 1950 and 1970 most foreign investment went into chemicals. Other 
important host sectors were e l e c t r i c equipment and transport vehic les , and to 
a lesser extent foodstuffs, metal products and non-electr ic machinery ( table 
48). As a r e s u l t , in 1970, production in such sectors as tobacco, rubber, 
chemicals (which includes pharmaceuticals and cosmetics), machinery and 
e l ec t r i c a l equipment originated in majority in foreign companies. In 1972 
non-electr ical machinery, t ransport equipment and metal products were also 
largely foreign-owned. 
Table 48. Mexico: Private foreign investment and par t ic ipat ion in production 
by transnational enterprises and sector , 1960 (1962), 1970. 
Sector 
1-4 Agriculture, l ive-
stock e tc . 
5 ,6 Mining 





15 Shoes , clothing 
16 Wood, cork 
IT Paper 




28 Non-metal, n i n . prod. 
23 Basic metals 
30 Metal products 
31 Machinery 
32 Electric equipment 
33,34 Transport vehicles 
35 Misc. manufactures 
Total 
1. Foreign investment 
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Source. Waarts, p . 198. 
Most foreign enterprises produce for the domestic market. Like the r e s t 
of the manufacturing sec tor , they export only a t iny fraction of the i r 
output. Their high production cost made this very d i f f i cu l t although in some 
cases i t was also the resu l t of conscious company policy. In 1970 only 3 per 
cent of a l l TNC output was exported and these covered only a narrow range; 
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foodstuffs, industr ia l chemical products and automobiles and parts (Jenkins, 
p. 118). Encouraged by Government pol ic ies multinational exports reached 6 
per cent of output or US$250 in 1975, compared to 5 per cent for the 
manufacturing sector as a whole. Most of the increase was in automobiles 
(World Bank, 1977). 
DFI in manufacturing has been concentrated in r e l a t i ve ly few high growth 
"modern" sec tors . This concentration has been explained by the comparative 
advantages that TNCs have in these sectors because of brand names, technology 
and marketing experience. I t was a l so , however, a consequence of conscious 
government policy that aimed a t reserving "basic" sectors of the economy for 
the s t a t e and required majority par t ic ipa t ion by Mexican capi ta l in companies 
that were "closely re la ted" to basic economic a c t i v i t i e s such as s t e e l , 
cement, glass and aluminium (Waarts). 
The United States is by far the most important source of DFI in Mexico. 
I t s share is declining though. I t decreased from 80 per cent of the t o t a l in 
1971, to 69 per cent in 1975. Reportedly i t went further down thereaf ter . 
Braz i l : Foreign investment in Brazil was of l i t t l e importance un t i l la te 
in the nineteenth century. The production of i t s main money earner, coffee, 
was en t i re ly local ly owned. When investment from abroad came, i t was mainly 
Brit ish in origin and in a c t i v i t i e s outside manufacturing such as banking, 
insurance, sea t ransport , ra i l roads and other public u t i l i t i e s . Early import 
subs t i tu t ing indus t r i e s , such as t e x t i l e s , were largely a Brazilian a f f a i r . 
In the f i r s t two decades of this century, an increasing number of 
investors from other countries (notably the United States) came to invest in 
Brazil and the Bri t ish influence became less pronounced. New investments such 
as those in mechanical and e l ec t r i ca l machinery hardly competed with domestic 
cap i t a l , although in food processing ( e .g . meat packing) some competition 
existed (Luis Possas) . On the whole foreign capi ta l played only a secondary 
part in pre-1930 Brazi l , although in some industries i t s influence was quite 
pervasive. 
Only foreign pr int ing and publishing companies exported a s ignif icant 
portion (25 per cent) of their output (Waarts). 
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After 1930 a largely posi t ive government a t t i t u d e led to steady growth of 
foreign capi ta l inflows, although the government made certain reservat ions 
about i t entering the o i l and mining sector (Code of Mining; Luis Possas) . 
The mid-1950s may be regarded as a borderline both for Braz i l ' s 
indus t r i a l i sa t ion process and for the record of internat ional corporation 
presence (Luis Possas) . President Kubitchek encouraged manufacturing 
investment. Foreign manufacturers were offered exceptional exchange 
advantages for imports of machinery and equipment (Evans and Gereff i) . The 
resu l t s were impressive. The automobile industry for instance, tha t was 
created v i r t u a l l y from scratch in 1956, was producing 190,000 automobiles and 
trucks by 1962 (Robock). 
The government that came to power in the early 1960s adopted a more 
c r i t i c a l a t t i t ude to foreign investment. In 1962, President Goulart had a law 
adopted tha t , among o thers , limited prof i t remittances of foreign inves tors . 
A steep drop in new foreign investments followed. The mi l i t a ry government 
that took over in 1964 quickly put inves tors ' minds a t ease and conditions for 
foreign investors improved. The years 1965-67 were in fact pa r t i cu la r ly 
favourable for them. Low growth and an an t i - i n f l a t i on policy that severely 
r e s t r i c t ed domestic c red i t supply caused financial problems to many domestic 
firms. Foreign enterprises with access to foreign credi t were able , according 
to Robock, to take over a number of Brazilian companies at "bargain p r i ce s " . 
This "se l l ing out" of Brazilian industry to foreigners and the fear of further 
denat ional isat ion was among the reasons why government reversed i t s po l ic ies 
and l ibera l i sed c red i t to the private sector (Robock, p . 32). 
Par t ic ipa t ion of foreign capi ta l in industry went up from 18.9 per cent of 
assets in 1965 to 28.6 per cent in 1975 (Luis Possas) . Most DFI went to 
industry (74.9 per cent of the stock in 1974). Services received 17.1 per 
cent . In the early 1970s four manufacturing sectors were predominantly (over 
75 per cent of asse ts) foreign owned*, tobacco, rubber, pharmaceuticals and 
transport equipment. Three other sectors had a predominance of foreign 
capi ta l ( i . e . more than 50 per cent of assets foreign-owned): chemicals, 
" I t appears that during the import subs t i tu t ing period, in many 
sectors Brazil stopped importing goods, but imported foreign firms to make the 
goods local ly ins tead ." (Morley, p . 32). 
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machinery and e l ec t r i ca l machinery. Sectors with much foreign ownership 
tended on the whole to grow much faster than other sectors between 1950 and 
1968. From 1973 to 1977 MNEs did on the whole not appreciably improve 
their position in manufacturing. In some, such as t e x t i l e s and automobile 
pa r t s , they did but in others their presence declined s ign i f i can t ly . The 
decrease in shipbuilding, a i r c r a f t , chemicals and petrochemicals and grain 
mil ls was often due to increased s t a t e par t ic ipa t ion (Luis Possas) . 
Most of the foreign enterprises produce for the domestic market. Until 
recently Brazil exported very l i t t l e of i t s manufacturing output . Even by 
1973 this was below 10 per cent. MNEs seem to have done l i t t l e be t te r or 
worse than e i ther public or private domestic companies. Only in wood, paper, 
leather and food products was more than 10 per cent exported. 
In 1972 the BEFIEX programme was introduced that aimed a t st imulating 
exports and further reducing the net foreign exchange needs of foreign 
investors . Under this programme companies were allowed a credi t for exports 
on the taxes that they would have paid on their domestic production. The 
effect on auto exports was impressive. "By 1977 auto companies were exporting 
at a yearly ra te of almost US$1700 mil l ion, creat ing a yearly trade surplus of 
over $300 mil l ion, remarkably different from the almost $100 million trade 
def ic i t they had generated only three years e a r l i e r . " (Evans and Gereff i ) . 
The United States is the main investor in Braz i l . However, thanks to 
dynamic growth of Swiss, German and par t icu la r ly Japanese investments i t s 
r e l a t ive importance declined rapidly between 1969 and 1974. In 1969 i t s t i l l 
accounted for nearly half of a l l foreign investment. By 1974 th i s was no more 
than a th i rd . The Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland and Japan had 
about 10 per cent of the t o t a l each (Robock). 
1
 These findings, however, may be a l i t t l e biased by the fact that 
foreign companies were concentrated in "modern" industries which were fa i r ly 
small in the 1950s. 
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The Republic of Korea '. The Republic of Korea had known, of cou r se , 
cons iderab le " fo re ign" investment dur ing the Japanese occupa t ion . Upon 
l i b e r a l i s a t i o n , however, t h e s e were reduced t o ze ro and t h e r e would be no 
inflow of foreign c a p i t a l o the r than loans and g r a n t s u n t i l 1960. After t h a t 
t ime, DFI was f a i r l y modest u n t i l 1970. Most investments were of an import 
s u b s t i t u t i n g na tu re and o r i g i n a t e d in the United S t a t e s . In the 1970s new 
investments a c c e l e r a t e d . This time they came mainly from Japan which r a p i d l y 
became the most important i nves to r in the country (56 per cent of a l l 
accumulated foreign investment in 1980). Their na tu re a l s o changed: most 
were geared to product ion for e x p o r t . With the except ion of consumer 
e l e c t r o n i c s for export most DFI took the form of j o i n t v e n t u r e s . Hereunder we 
w i l l b r i e f l y expand. 
The f i r s t law t h a t allowed foreign investment i n t o the Republic of Korea 
was passed in 1960. DFI was of fe red a "s tandard package of tax concess ions" 
(Westphal, 1979) but each investment needed t o be approved by a government 
committee. 
In 1966 the Foreign C a p i t a l Inducement Law was passed . This law was to be 
o f t en amended and modified in subsequent years to express changed pre fe rences 
of the government. The 1966 law gave p r i o r i t y to j o i n t ven tu re s ( p a r t i c u l a r l y 
minor i ty p a r t i c i p a t i o n ) and defined in which s e c t o r s DFI was p r e f e r r e d 
(Chaponniere) . I t a l s o formally removed l i m i t s on equi ty investments and 
p r o f i t r emi t t ances by foreign i n v e s t o r s (Westphal and Kim). 
The f i r s t case of foreign investment took place in August 1962, bu t few 
new cases followed. After 1966 t h e i r number i nc reased , bu t by 1971 a l l DFI 
amounted to l i t t l e more than US$100 m i l l i o n in cu r r en t p r i c e s (Park Yung Chul, 
1983; J o ) . Between 1962 and 1971 l e s s than 5 per cent of a l l c a p i t a l inflows 
had been DFI. 
DFI has been much l e s s important in the Republic of Korea than in 
the o t h e r NICs. However, i t i s a f a i r l y under - researched area to which few 
s t u d i e s on the Republic of Korea make s u b s t a n t i a l and e x p l i c i t r e f e r e n c e s . 
There i s moreover some disagreement over the s i z e of DFI in the Republic of 
Korea between Jo ( t oge the r wi th , in a way, Chaponniere) and Westphal . J o ' s 
f i g u r e s , based on a 1974 EPB survey, show t h a t 11 per cent of manufacturing 
output o r i g i n a t e d in foreign firms which accounted for 31 .4 per cen t of t o t a l 
manufactured expor t s (p . 22 ) . Westphal (1979) claims t h a t t h i s 1974 EPB 
survey was not r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and t h a t i t o v e r s t a t e d t h e s i z e of DFI i n the 
economy. The d i f f e r ence may be expla ined by the f ac t t h a t Jo c a l l s a l l firms 
with some fore ign ownership fore ign e n t e r p r i s e s . In f a c t , ou t of a t o t a l of 
734 e n t e r p r i s e s , 683 were j o i n t v e n t u r e s . 
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Several p o s s i b l e reasons have been suggested why, d e s p i t e f a i r l y generous 
i n c e n t i v e s , t h e volume of DFI was so low in the 1960s: those inc lude 
u n c e r t a i n t i e s about the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , poor r e source endowment, 
r e l a t i v e l y e a s i e r access to foreign loans once i t s a b i l i t y to p e n e t r a t e world 
markets had been proven, and "by purposeful a d m i n i s t r a t i v e t a c t i c s t h a t were 
apparen t ly re laxed in the e a r l y 1970s; i t was not due to the lack of 
l e g i s l a t e d inducements" (Westphal and Kim, pp. 4 - 8 ) . 
The main motive for investment in the 1960s was to take advantage of t h e 
p ro tec t ed and growing loca l marke t . Between 1962 and 1968 foreign investments 
were mainly concen t ra ted in petroleum, chemical f e r t i l i s e r s , chemical f i b r e 
2 
and o ther chemicals ( J o ) . 
Between 1962 and 1968 most: (82 per cen t ) of DFI o r i g i n a t e d in the United 
S ta tes ( J o ) . J a p a n ' s low share of 8 per cent i s , in l a rge p a r t , expla ined by 
the fact t h a t only in 1965 r e l a t i o n s with Japan were normal i sed . From 1967 to 
1971 i t s share of t o t a l DFI was 39 per cent (Westphal, Rhee and P u r s e l l ) . 
After 1970 DFI acce l e r a t ed and p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r 1972 ( J o ) . Most of 
these investments came from Japan , which accounted for 72 per cent of the 
t o t a l from 1969 to 1974 ( Jo ) - and for 88 per cen t of t o t a l from 1970 to 1976 
(Song in Krause and Sek iguch i ) . Total DFI between 1970 and 1975 was about 
US$700 m i l l i o n (compared to US$100 m i l l i o n for 1960-69). 
After 1976 the r e l a t i v e importance of DFI in t o t a l resource inflows 
decreased and so did the share of Japan in t o t a l DFI although i t remained t h e 
l a r g e s t i n v e s t o r . In 1977 and 1978 when the t o t a l volume was about US$100 
"The i n c e n t i v e s to foreign i n v e s t o r s under the l e g i s l a t i o n of 1960 
fea tured an a r r ay of tax concess ions , inc lud ing a f i ve -yea r h o l i d a y from 
income tax and guarantees for the r e p a t r i a t i o n of p r i n c i p a l and p r o f i t . 
Subsequent changes , i n t e r m i t t e n t l y in t roduced over t ime, added to the 
inducements so t h a t Korea ' s l e g i s l a t i v e i n c e n t i v e s to DFI have c o n s i s t e n t l y 
been among the most generous in A s i a . " (Westphal, Rhee and P u r s e l l , p . 1 8 ) . 
o
 t 
R e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e DFI went i n t o the export s e c t o r . This d isproves 
the t h e s i s sometimes heard t h a t the Republic of Korea 's i n i t i a l high growth 
was the r e s u l t of i t be ing used as an export base for m u l t i n a t i o n a l s . 
Moreover, the r e l a t i v e l y simple technology used and the f a i r l y s tandard i sed 
na tu re of the manufactured expor ts of t h e 1960s did not r e a l l y make DFI 
necessary for technology inputs or marketing (see a l s o Park Yung Chul; 
Westphal, Rhee and P u r s e l l ) . 
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mill ion per year, Japan's share was s l igh t ly less than half , and that of 
Western European countries a l i t t l e more than 25 per cent ( i b i d . ) . 
Among the "push" factors for the accelerated inflow of Japanese 
investments were the r i s ing rea l wages in Japan and the appreciation of the 
yen that made i t advantageous for Japanese firms to re locate labour intensive 
and technologically mature production abroad. 
The Republic of Korea's "pul l" factors for a t t r ac t i ng Japanese investments 
were i t s geographic proximity and cu l tura l a f f in i ty with Japan. This was 
par t icu lar ly important for the sizeable number of small- and medium-sized 
Japanese firms that invested in the Republic of Korea. "Investments by many 
of these firms appear to have been in the form of secondhand machinery, which 
was transferred to the Republic of Korea after i t could no longer be 
profi tably used in Japan. Some of the investments from Japan - large and 
small - were by Korean expatr ia tes residing the re . " ( i b i d . ) . 
The nature of DFI also changed in the 1970s. The p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y , low 
labour cost of unskilled and semi-skilled workers and rapidly growing world 
trade turned most DFI into the labour- intensive, export market-oriented type 
(Jo) . Marketing and export p o s s i b i l i t i e s in general were also named by local 
entrepreneurs as most important for entering a j o in t venture with a foreign 
partner (EPB survey, 1974 in Jo , p . 20). 
Most DFI went in to manufacturing. This accounted for 80 per cent of t o t a l 
stock in 1978 (Westphal, Rhee and Purce l l , p . 20), and 73 per cent in 1980 
(Chaponniere, p . 63). Within manufacturing t e x t i l e s and apparel received by 
far most DFI between 1969 and 1974, followed by e l e c t r i c and electronic 
machinery, metal and metal products, transport equipment and chemicals ( J o ) . 
Gradually however, e lect ronics became the most important rec ip ient of DFI. 
The shi f t towards t e x t i l e s , clothing and e lec t ronics re f l ec t s the r i s ing 
emphasis on production for export. Yet despite i t s growth, foreign investment 
never became the dominant form of ownership in t e x t i l e s and clothing, that 
remained largely the domain of pr ivate domestic entrepreneurs. In the 
mid-1970s foreign firms accounted for only 10 per cent of exports of t e x t i l e s 
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and clothing (Westphal, Rhee and P u r s e l l ) . 
This was not the case with e lec t ron ics . In the mid-1970s, 75 per cent of 
a l l electronics exports originated in foreign firms, most of them wholly-owned 
subsidiar ies . "Rapid changes in technology within the industry worldwide 
largely explain the Republic of Korea's dependence on MNCs in exporting 
e lec t ronics ; many of the exports are intra-f i rm transactions or based on 
subcontracting, with the MNCs providing the production know-how and c r i t i c a l 
inputs ." ( i b i d . , p. 55). 
More recently i t has become common to include the obligation to export as 
a pre-condition for approval of DFI. In 1978, 331 foreign firms were required 
to export a l l their output. Of the others , many were required to export a t 
least a s ignif icant portion of their output (Westphal, Rhee and P u r s e l l ) . 
A charac te r i s t i c peculiar to the Republic of Korea is tha t , with the 
exception of e lec t ron ics , most DFI has taken the form of jo in t ventures. Jo 
(1976, pp. 16-20) gives data on jo in t ventures and wholly owned subsidiar ies 
and export and domestic market or ientat ion for the 1962-74 period. He found 
that of a to ta l of 734 firms operating in the manufacturing industry only 51 
(7 per cent) were wholly foreign-owned subs id ia r ies . 
Chaponniere (p. 64) gives a more up-to-date breakdown for 1979. According 
to his data, 15.8 per cent of a l l projects undertaken between 1962 and 1978 
were wholly, and 28.3 per cent were majority owned by foreigners (together 
42.9 per cent of to ta l investment). The considerable difference between these 
two sets of data may be explained by proportionally more wholly-owned DFI 
(par t icu lar ly in e lectronics) between 1974 and 1978. I t may also be because 
the data cited by Chaponniere include the services sector (banks, ho t e l s , 
e t c . ) where presumably more wholly-owned DFI took place. 
Many of the foreign investments in clothing and t e x t i l e s originated 
in Japan and were used for f i l l i n g Japanese import quota in Europe, and the 
United States "charging Japanese prices for Korean produce". They were also 
used for export to Japan; t e x t i l e products which made up one-third of 
Japanese imports from the Republic of Korea largely originated in 
Japanese-Korean jo in t ventures (Chaponniere). 
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Domestic pr ivate enterprises 
The previous sections have made i t clear that a t a time of dynamic growth 
of foreign and public enterpr ise , pr ivate domestic investors in manufacturing 
have somewhat lagged behind. Singapore, where the influence of foreign 
investors has not ceased to grow and Brazi l , where the s t a t e has become 
omnipresent are the c leares t examples. All four have operated - or s t i l l 
operate - schemes that give some kind of preferent ia l treatment to small- and 
medium-sized (read: national) en te rp r i ses , but i t i s clear from the r e su l t s 
that other factors have outweighed thei r posi t ive influence. In many cases 
private domestic enterpr ises have tended to become "stuck" in more t r ad i t iona l 
sectors . These tend to grow slowly which in turn has led to a further 
decrease in r e l a t i ve importance. 
To be sure, t h i s process did not go unnoticed and action has been taken to 
reverse i t or slow i t down. But these ef for ts were not always very 
successful. Consider the case of Mexico, where after the Revolution much 
leg is la t ion - s t a r t i n g with the 1917 cons t i tu t ion - was enacted to curb the 
par t ic ipat ion of foreigners in the economy. In fact the area in which, and 
the conditions under which, foreigners are allowed to operate in Mexico have, 
over the years , become subject to an increasing number of l im i t a t i ons . 
This constant wish to "Mexicanise" however clashed with the desire to 
develop a modern industry that has been one of the key policy objectives since 
the days of Cardenas. This desire implied by necessi ty a cer ta in dependency 
on foreign capi ta l and technology. As much of these came as di rect foreign 
investment, i t was unavoidable that the body of leg is la t ion on DFI was applied 
"f lexibly". "One can observe an economic pragmatism side by side with the 
revolutionary nationalism." (Krook, p . 46) . 
In fact the law was applied very f lexibly and foreign investment grew 
rapidly, par t icu la r ly in manufacturing. In the early 1970s i t accounted for 5 
per cent of the to t a l capi ta l stock and 10 per cent of pr ivate investment. In 
manufacturing, around a third of output was produced by foreign firms. 
A favourite way to "Mexicanise" industry was to require foreign investors 
to share majority ownership with Mexican par tners . However, i t was not always 
easy to find these private investors , and that is how on some occasions the 
- 155 -
s t a t e , often through NAFINSA, became the domestic partner . There have been a 
number of reasons why i t has often proved d i f f i cu l t to locate wi l l ing and able 
Mexican private investors*. 
" . . . t h e high i n i t i a l expense of the 51 per cent equity, the weak 
capi tal market, differences between the foreign investors and 
potent ia l Mexican investors with regard to reinvestment of 
earnings and so forth. For a time the government helped 
subsidise Mexicanisation, but more recent ly , finding these 
measures to be too costly in terms of tax revenue foregone, i t 
has promoted Mexicanisation by i t s e l f act ing as an investor of 
l a s t r e so r t , providing the portion of the Mexican investment 
which private Mexican capi ta l has been re luc tant to put 
forward."1 (Bennett and Sharpe, pp. 188-189). 
A few very large domestic groups developed nevertheless , such as the 
Monterrey-based Alpha and Visa groups. They concentrated in t r ad i t iona l 
a c t i v i t i e s such as non-durable consumer goods and some intermediate goods such 
as iron, s t ee l and cement. However, "Where new products are introduced th i s 
tends to be in conjunction with foreign cap i t a l , e i ther through jo in t ventures 
or l icensing. . . . Six of the larges t ten had l inks with foreign firms." 
(Jenkins, p . 151). 
In Brazi l , one of the main reasons for the rapid incease of State 
enterprise was their privileged access to cap i t a l . Understandably domestic 
investors considered th i s as unfai r . Pressure on the government resul ted in a 
larger portion of BNDE loans going to the pr ivate sector . Another development 
that diffused the private sec to r ' s c r i t ique was the growing number of jo in t 
ventures between s t a t e companies and (large) private companies (sometimes also 
2 
with a foreign par tner ) . 
Other ways to get around leg i s la t ion was for a foreigner to use a 
Mexican "front man" ("presta nombre") whose real par t ic ipa t ion was nominal. 
The laws also gave r i s e to professional Mexican holding companies which form 
partnerships with foreign in te res t s but leave day-to-day operations in the 
hands of partner managers (Schlagheck, 1980, pp. 38, 39) . 
Evans (1974, p . 32) explains the tendency towards quiescence among 
Brazilian indus t r ia l entrepreneurs by the fact that these never experienced a 
period of unchallenged po l i t i c a l hegemony. "Before the ascension of foreign 
firms they had to share power with the primary producers of the export 
sector . The indus t r i a l bourgeoisie is a lso accustomed to looking upon the 
s t a te as a semi-autonomous i n s t i t u t i on , central to society and more powerful 
than they themselves." 
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The "crowding out" of domestic pr ivate enterprise i s above a l l noticeable 
in manufacturing and much less in trade and other services or in land-based 
a c t i v i t i e s such as agr icu l tu re . Apart from legis la t ion that excluded (or 
r e s t r i c t ed ) foreigners from operating in these sectors th is may a lso have to 
do with the fact that investing in modern industry involves a comparatively 
high level of r i sk - t ak ing . An i n d u s t r i a l i s t commits his resources for a long 
period to uses that cannot be changed. The r i sks involved in such a long-term 
commitment are great , a l l the more so in s i tua t ions where there is l i t t l e 
experienced help around for the entrepreneur to assess the r i sks correct ly and 
where there are few ins t i tu t ions designed to reduce them. Under such 
circumstances i t may be more a t t r ac t i ve "for men with more capi ta l and ab i l i t y 
to put their money into trade or land; into trade because the turnover of 
capi tal is more rapid, or into land because i t is both more secure and more 
liquid than factor ies" (Habahkuk, 1981, pp. 14-19; also de Rossi, p . 39). 
Another reason is that as firms grow, thei r need for new capi ta l increases 
and th is may not be available in suff ic ient quan t i t i e s . Whereas large public 
companies have re l i ed on the s t a t e or s t a t e banks to finance the i r needs 
through long-term loans, and foreign enterpr ises can turn to the i r parent or 
borrow on the "strength" of thei r name, pr ivate companies may find i t hard to 
obtain long-term loans or r i sk c a p i t a l . 
The transformation of large privately-owned companies in to jo in t -s tock 
companies is obviously a crucial moment. Most private firms s t a r t the i r l i fe 
as family-owned and family-run ones. Their i n i t i a l financial needs for 
expansion are sa t i s f ied by banks or by the family. 
When the firm continues to grow there comes a point that both the family 
owners and the banks would be be t t e r off i f r i sk capi ta l were ava i lab le . This 
would reduce both the fixed in t e re s t charges for the firm and the too great 
exposure by the bank to one or a few firms. Although aware of these 
advantages, large firms have often been re luctant to "open up" as the family 
does not want to lose cont ro l . 
Governments have been keen to se t up stock markets and to encourage firms 
to "go public", pa r t i cu la r ly where firms depend for much of the i r cap i ta l on 
state-owned banks. The government of the Republic of Korea, for instance, has 
been active in t h i s . Nevertheless, the volume and the number of stocks quoted 
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on the Seoul Stock Exchange have been low despite a ser ies of laws that were 
enacted in 1968, 1972 and 1974, of which the l a s t one v i r t u a l l y threatened 
firms that they would forfei t any further government loan i f they would not go 
public (Hasan and Rao, 1979). In more recent years the number of firms quoted 
and the volume of the stock exchange have indeed gone up, and since 1981 the 
exchange has, under cer ta in conditions, been opened to foreigners. 
The Mexican Stock Exchange has a lso not functioned as a major mobiliser of 
c a p i t a l . The volume of trading on the exchange has been small and has been 
concentrated in a few issues . Savers have preferred fixed income investments 
over investments in equi t ies (Looney, 1982). Among the fixed income 
secur i t ies they have preferred bank deposits over debt s e c u r i t i e s , as the 
f i r s t are in some cases tax exempt whereas the l a t t e r ones are always 
taxable. Other reasons for the re la t ive underdevelopment of the Mexican stock 
market are lack of collaboration from banks which see i t as a competitive 
threat and the readiness of finance companies and mortgage banks to 
re-purchase long-term bonds a t par at any time. 
The Brazilian Government act ively t r ied to promote the stock market in the 
mid-1960s. Various incentives were offered. The measures ranged from a new 
corporation law to an income tax rebate earmarked to be used in the 
subscription of newly-issued stocks by domestic pr ivate companies (Werneck). 
Other f iscal incentives included tax exemptions on the d i s t r ibu t ion of 
dividends and tax credi t s to individual taxpayers (Hewlett, 1979). 
For a few years the stock market was a great success. From ear ly 1968 to 
June 1971 stock prices rose 12 times and the volume went up enormously, only 
to collapse af ter mid-1971. The collapse was considered to be due to a lack 
of careful planning. "A lack of s t a t e supervision geared the way to 
considerable manipulations by large stock holders" ( i b i d . , p . 175). 
In the end the main beneficiaries of the expansion of the stock market 
were big s t a t e enterprises such as Petrobras and Electrobras. These large 
s ta te enterprises were the "only Brazilian companies that both guarantee a 
reasonable dividend and protect the in te res t s of minority stockholders" 
( ib id . , p . 174). In 1974, five s t a t e enterprises accounted for 41 per cent of 
a l l t ransact ions. 
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"The fai lure of the lower cost equity route ( i . e . the stock 
market) created the higher cost debt financing route for private 
sector expansion in Brazi l . And, i t should be emphasised, this 
was a high cost expansion strategy for private firms (due to 
indexing) and thus limited the long run pr ivate sector expansion 
that could some from th i s source." (Graham in Overholt, p . 115). 
S t r i c t government control may have been among the reasons why Singapore 
managed to develop a fa i r ly well-working stock exchange although there too 
much of the trade is concentrated in par t ly government-owned stocks such as 
the Development Bank of Singapore. 
The r e l a t ive ly reduced role of pr ivate domestic entrepreneurs in 
manufacturing par t icu la r ly in Singapore and - to some extent - Brazil 
contrasts with the s i tua t ion in the Republic of Korea. In the Republic of 
Korea rapid economic and export growth originated largely in 
domestically-owned en terpr i ses , which, with the exception of e l ec t ron ics , 
comprise the dominant form of ownership. 
The Republic of Korea has successfully t r i ed to reach i t s development 
objectives without major rel iance on foreign investors . In e lec t ron ics , which 
became an important export product in the 1970s, i t recognised that i t s 
rapidly changing technology made th i s very d i f f i c u l t . In chemicals, o i l 
refining and f e r t i l i s e r the s t a t e went into partnership with mul t ina t ionals . 
But where possible ra ther than allow DFI in, i t attempted to obtain loans, 
develop i t s own technology, purchase technical ass is tance , technology and 
know-how separately, re ly on foreign buyers for export or develop i t s own 
markets. 
Small industr ies and big conglomerates exis t side by side in the Republic 
of Korea. The former were the main producers and exporters of the 1960s when 
these were mainly l igh t indus t r ia l goods. With government emphasis changing 
to heavy industry the r e l a t ive importance of the conglomerates increased. Yet 
as l a te as 1978 small and medium enterprises exported s t i l l 36.4 per cent of 
a l l exports and 40.5 per cent of manufactured exports ( table 49) ( Jones) . 
Small and medium sized firms are dominant ("dominance" means that 
they account for a t leas t two-thirds of value added) in "early" indus t r ies , 
such as food, beverages, tobacco, t e x t i l e s , wearing apparel and l ea the r , as 
well as in paper and pr in t ing . Conglomerates dominate such middle industr ies 
as wood and wood products, non-metallic minerals and such la te industr ies as 
fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment. Together with public 
enterprise they dominate chemicals, petroleum, coal , rubber, p las t i cs and the 
basic metal industry (Jones, p. 43) . 
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Table 49. Republic of Korea: Export shares of small 
and medium industry 
Year Total small and medium exports as a share of 

































Jones, p . 60. 
The large domestically-owned conglomerates called chae-bol or jae-bul are 
a typical Korean phenomenon. Ownership of s ignif icant shares is s t r i c t l y in 
the hands of a single family and control is often concentrated in a single 
individual (the "Hoejang" or chairman). Each group is v i r tua l ly completely 
independent of the other . Each operates in a large var ie ty of a c t i v i t i e s . 
Sam Sung, one of the larger chae-bol, for example, i s act ive in t e x t i l e s , 
paper, e lectronic assembly, e lec t ronic tubes, e l e c t r i c a l equipment, 
shipbuilding, wholesale t rade, a department s t o r e , land develoment, 
construction, insurance, a newspaper, broadcasting, a ho t e l , a hospi ta l and a 
university (Jones) . 
Chaebol are found mainly in manufacturing•, construction, insurance, r ea l 
e s t a t e , and transport and communications (Jones). They did not own banks, 
1 however. 
When in 1981-82 the banks were pr ivat ised, great efforts were made to 
avoid that they could come under the control of the chae-bol. I t i s unsure 



















In manufacturing, chae-bol dominate heavy industry. Jones suggests four 
possible reasons for t h i s : (1) large-scale projects using modern technology 
would need organisation s k i l l s only available in the large corporations; (2) 
the best (and biggest) entrepreneurs have a comparative advantage over lesser 
entrepreneurs in the most innovative tasks which find the i r highest yield 
(reward) in heavy industry; (3) chae-bol have been pressured into an act ive * 
role in implementing the government's plan for development of heavy 
indust r ies ; and (4) chae-bol took advantage of the incentives (such as 
borrowing a t subsidised ra tes ) offered by the government for moving into the 
heavy sector (Jones, pp. 44-45). 
In the absence of hard data, dis t inguishing the r e l a t i v e importance of 
these factors is of course impossible, which means, says Jones, that 
"advocates of each posit ion can make a convincing case . However, one 
reasonable guess is that the f i r s t pair of factors played a major role in the 
early heavy industry spec ia l i sa t ion through the mid-1970s, but that the 
p o l i t i c a l economy elements played an increasing ro le thereafter as government 
emphasis shifted in th is d i rec t ion ." (Jones, pp. 45-46). 
Chae-bol have been growing in s ize both in absolute and in r e l a t i ve 
terms. In 1973 the top 46 business groups accounted for only 9.8 per cent of 
GDP. Five years l a t e r , in 1978, thei r share had doubled to 17.1 per cent . 
They made up 22.6 per cent of GDP outside agr icul ture and 43 per cent of 
manufacturing production in that year (Jones) . 
Within the top business groups, the biggest a lso became bigger . In 1978 
they made up 8.1 per cent of GDP (up from 3.5 per cent in 1973). 
Chae-bol a re also big by world s tandards. They are among the la rges t 
pr ivate business groups in developing countr ies . Of the five largest pr ivate 
non-oil companies with headquarters in a developing country, in 1978, no less * 
than four(I) had the i r base in the Republic of Korea (Jones) . They have also 
invested abroad: Gold Star (Lucky group) b u i l t a colour TV plant in Alabama 
and Sam Sung assembles colour TVs in Portugal for the European and African 
market (Chaponniere). 
Chae-bol were the government's main vehicle for the launch into into heavy 
and chemical indus t r ies . Yet more recently i t s view of chae-bol has become 
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more ambivalent. On the one hand they are fe l t to be necessary as they are in 
a position to move Korean industry into the forefront of current technology 
and are already doing so in the electronics industry. On the other hand, 
their size and the fact that they are s t i l l bas ica l ly owned by single families 
(increasingly intermarrying) has become a source of concern. "The Korean 
Government for a l l i t s power has been far from successful in persuading the 
chae-bol to make thei r companies publ ic ." (Michell, p . 196). 
I t is remarkable t ha t , despi te the growing concentration of businesses in 
the Republic of Korea, s t i l l such a large portion of output and exports 
originates in small- and medium-sized en te rpr i ses . I t appears that the reason 
for this is that these enterpr ises are over-represented in the " l igh t" segment 
of the indus t r ia l spectre that produces clothing, sporting goods, t e x t i l e s , 
footwear, e t c . "Light" industry, "despite" government efforts to promote 
"heavy" industry s t i l l accounts for a large portion of production and exports , 
and so do small and medium enterpr ises . 
Government f inancia l , marketing and technical assistance were cruc ia l 
factors for the success of these smaller enterprises in the early days of 
exporting. Their marketing problem was further reduced by buyers flying in a 
few times a year to place orders d i rec t ly with the producers. Some large 
United States department s tores have set up buying offices in Seoul. 
Government's involvement in marketing increased af ter the f i r s t oi l 
shock. In the export drive that followed, i t was fe l t that new markets needed 
to be created away from the t r ad i t iona l ones as Japan and the United S ta t e s . 
The government created the concept of General Trading Companies (GTCs) which 
handle their own, but also other firms' exports . They would set up agents 
throughout the world and pioneer new markets. 
GTCs were expected to have economies of scale in exploit ing overseas 
markets. Channelling exports through them would reduce excessive transact ion 
costs involved in many small volume products. They would f a c i l i t a t e export 
expansion by playing an act ive entrepreneurial ro le in seeking out foreign 
markets for v i r t ua l l y any commodity and then finding someone to produce i t . 
This pattern of corporate ac t iv i ty had been evolving informally for some 
years, but the government decided to formalise i t in 1975 (Jones and Sakong). 
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Although designed to spearhead the breakthrough in the Latin American and 
African markets, in practice they discovered the Middle East and Europe and 
took a commanding position in the t rad i t iona l markets. By 1977 the 13 GTCs, 
one of them owned by the s t a t e , handled 24.6 per cent of expor ts . By 1979, 12 
GTCs handled 35 per cent and by 1981, 40 per cent. When i t i s remembered that 
a sizeable proportion of exports are handled by foreign firms, chief ly those 
for the Japanese and United States markets, the true proportions of this 
achievement appear (Michell, p . 195). 
Conclusion 
In the previous chapter we presented an overview of government po l i c i e s , 
aimed a t encouraging manufacturing growth such as incentives and intervention 
in the d i s t r ibu t ion of funds for investment. In th is chapter we have seen 
that growth in manufacturing resul ted increasingly in foreign- and state-owned 
enterprises and that private domestic enterpr ises grew comparatively slowly. 
With the notable exception of the Republic of Korea (and to some extent 
Mexico) th i s has meant - in manufacturing - tha t these domestic investors have 
only been allowed a role secondary to foreign or public en terpr i ses . This 
puts the pol ic ies of the previous chapter in a different l i g h t . I t has a lso 
certain important implications in i t s own r i g h t . The next paragraphs w i l l 
discuss some of them. 
Public pricing pol icy . In Brazi l , Mexico and the Republic of Korea the 
State invested heavily in basic indus t r ia l inputs such as s t e e l and 
petrochemicals. These s t a t e investments were jus t i f i ed by the essen t i a l 
character of the input, the fact that they involved comparatively high capi ta l 
out lays , long gestation periods and the des i re to build a capacity that would 
ref lec t planned rather than actual demand (and thus imply considerable i n i t i a l 
overcapacity losses ) . These investments were usually too cost ly and r isky for 
pr ivate enterprises to undertake and even when governments had not planned an 
act ive ro l e , they often ended up being the main shareholders of these 
indus t r i es . 
This policy of investing in supportive indust r ies which are characterised 
by large capi ta l needs and low p r o f i t a b i l i t y have, of course, contributed to 
the public debt problem and have meant a drain on s t a t e budgets, 
In Brazil and Mexico some of the larges t debtors are public 
en terpr i ses . 
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par t icular ly where these en te rp r i ses ' operations were def ic i tary (which they 
often were). This has in turn led to a discussion of what should be 
government's a t t i t ude to "downstream" firms, and in pa r t i cu la r how the 
government should price i t s services rendered. I t is clear that cheap, 
underpriced indust r ia l inputs supplied by the s t a t e have a favourable effect 
on the p ro f i t ab i l i t y of the final goods producers which use these inputs . 
Alternat ively, a s t a t e that would want to increase the prof i t of i t s 
enterprises would cause lower profi ts in "downstream" firms. When the s t a te 
supplies cheap o i l , e l e c t r i c i t y or s t ee l and when many of these downstream 
firms are mul t inat ionals , as in Brazi l , the s t a t e has been accused of an 
"entreguista" mental i ty, serving as a "handmaiden" to the multinationals 
(Hewlett, 1979, p . 161). 
The s ta te may, however, not have much choice in i t s pricing pol icy . 
Hewlett considers that i t is of course theore t ica l ly possible for the s t a t e to 
raise the price of i t s products and thus reduce multinational p r o f i t s , but 
that would be an unlikely course of events. "Depressing prof i t margins in the 
multinational sector would be tantamount to lowering indus t r i a l growth r a t e s . 
If multinational corporations were unable to earn high ra tes of returns in 
Brazi l , they would begin to contract the i r a c t i v i t i e s in that country. Thus, 
suppressing prof i t s would impede growth and ult imately imperil the legitimacy 
of the Brazilian s t a t e , which i s , of course, based on the health of the 
domestic economy." ( i b i d . , p . 161). 
There is reason to doubt whether such pessimism about the state-TNC 
re la t ion is warranted in a l l cases. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 
government has treated foreign firms very "roughly" on occasion without fatal 
long-term consequences. In the Republic of Korea "Foreign firms may be asked 
to increase thei r exports, r a i se the domestic content of the i r output, to 
expand output, or even to res t ructure operations en t i r e ly . " (Luedde-Neurath, 
1984, p. 22). Laws affecting foreign investors have been changed suddenly and 
in some cases applied re t roac t ive ly . Foreign exchange laws have been used to 
block the payment of agreed service changes. 
In recent years government has been in confl ict over contractual issues 
with such giant corporations as General Motors and Dow Chemical. This has led 
to some of these re t rea t ing from the Republic of Korea altogether (but not to 
a wholesale departure of foreign inves tors) . "The basic government a t t i t ude 
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appears to be that business . . . should serve the government and not vice 
versa ." ( i b i d . ) . The fact that the country re l i ed r e l a t i ve ly l i t t l e on 
foreign firms to s t a r t with, obviously f ac i l i t a t ed th i s a t t i t u d e . 
Foreign-owned companies now produce and export a large part of B r a z i l ' s , 
Mexico's and Singapore's manufactures. In the Republic of Korea too thei r 
share has increased. This foreign presence is no accident . I t is the r e s u l t 
of conscious policy. Governments saw in mult inationals a useful vehicle for 
a t ta in ing the i r development goals . To be sure, the ro le of MNCs' has been 
much c r i t i c i s e d . We wi l l br ief ly look a t two examples of th is c r i t i q u e : 
thei r effect on the balance of payments, and that on dependence. 
Multinationals and the balance of payments: To what extent 'has rel iance 
on MNEs contributed to today's serious debt problems? The nature of the 
product they make (and the absence of suff ic ient linkages with domestic 
producers) has led in the import subst i tut ing countr ies , to multinationals 
importing a large part of the i r inputs which consume large quant i t i es of 
scarce foreign exchange. Governments have t r ied to induce firms to purchase 
more of the i r inputs l oca l ly . In the 1970s Mexico and Brazil were moreover 
offering generous incentives to MNCs for them to gain some foreign exchange 
themselves through exports . The BEFIEX programme introduced by Brazil in 1972 
made exports extremely prof i table through tax exemption. "For each 10 per 
cent of sales an auto company shifted from the domestic market to exports , the 
company's return on equity would increase about 20 per cent" (Evans and 
Gereffi, p . 150). The programme led to rapid growth of automobile exports . 
In other sectors i t s r e su l t s were less favourable. In 1977, five years af ter 
BEFIEX was introduced, 19 TNC subsidiaries together s t i l l generated a trade 
gap of $661 mill ion ( i b i d . ) . 
This is a huge gap, but one that should be compared with that generated by 
other big companies. Luis Possas did that for Brazil and he found that TNCs ' 
appetite for imports seemed no bigger than that of public and domestic pr ivate 
1
 Luedde-Neurath (p . 23) conclude from th i s "(1) the centra l issue is 
not whether FDI is introduced into LDCs, but precisely how i t is done; (2) 
d i rect ive s t a t e intervention is necessary to insure the complementarity 
between FDI and the domestic economy; (3) the qual i ty of such d i rec t 
intervention wil l be a crucia l determinant of whether FDI advances or re tards 
LDC development." 
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firms of comparative s i ze . He. found that of the 100 largest firms in 1977, 62 
were MNEs which were responsible for 30 per cent of the to ta l trade de f ic i t 
(US$717 mi l l ion) . The 20 larges t nationally-owned firms accounted for 25 per 
cent of the def ic i t (or $591 million) and 18 s ta te enterpr ises imported no 
less than 54 per cent (or $1,055 mill ion) of the to ta l (Luis Possas, p . 
118). A high import content thus seems common for a l l big enterpr ises and 
i t appears that in Brazil a t l eas t large national en terpr i ses , and 
par t icular ly s t a te en terpr i ses , contributed much more than MNEs to the trade 
d e f i c i t . 
Dependence*. There is no doubt that rel iance on multinationals puts a 
country in a vulnerable posi t ion. We are not referr ing to thei r market 
behaviour within a country, which we feel is outside the scope of th is study, 
but to their power to commit or reduce their investments a t w i l l . Foreign 
investors wil l respond favourably to a "good" investment climate that promises 
them a chance to make p ro f i t s , r epa t r i a t e them i f they so des i re , a low 
"po l i t i ca l r i sk" s i tua t ion , e t c . 
We are looking here at four countries that have been among the "darl ings" 
of the internat ional investment community. Yet even in these countries a 
change of pol icy, however small, sometimes led to d ras t ic and unexpected 
reductions in foreign investment. Brazil in the early 1960s is a case in 
point, but even the s l igh t ly more na t iona l i s t i c trend of the Echeverrfa 
government in Mexico in the early 1970s had a considerable impact on DFI 
inflows. 
"The implications of th is analysis for the countries of the 
semi-periphery are somewhat grim. Mexico, one of the r iches t and 
best behaved nations of the Third World, had only to s tray 
s l ight ly from the path of sound business pract ice to end up 
shift ing the impact of TNC cap i ta l and profi t flows from a 
posit ive $179 million in the 1960-69 period to a negative $349 
million in the period from 1970 to 1976." (Evans and Gereffi, p . 
151). 
This need to "behave well" in a s i tuat ion of high dependency on MNEs has, 
not surprisingly, given r i s e to concern in Singapore as well . Although 
admitting that Singapore had few other options than relying on MNEs in the 
1
 These figures exclude Petrobras, whose def ic i t in that year was over 
twice that of a l l the 100 put together. 
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early phases of indus t r i a l i sa t ion , Chia i s unhappy about thei r increasing 
share in manufacturing. As indus t r ia l i sa t ion proceeded there should have been 
ample opportunity for t raining local managers and for local firms to develop. 
The r i s ing share of MNC presence has happened in large part thanks to c r e d i t s , 
tax exemptions and minority par t ic ipat ion by the Sta te . In i t s effor ts to 
promote DFI there have been v i r tua l ly no attempts to monitor domestic 
indust r ia l entrepreneurship and the s t a t e has a t best tolerated the growth of 
an independent local manufacturing sec tor . This "must be regarded as a black 
mark against a seemingly successful indus t r i a l i sa t ion story on Singapore" 
(Chia, p . 69, a lsoHeyzer , 1983, p . 113)-1 
The re l a t ive ly small share of mult inationals in the Republic of Korea's 
exports and production could be taken as an indication that that country is 
less "dependent". Yet if we broaden the def ini t ion of dependency this may be 
less obvious because indebtedness, l icensing, buyer contract spec i f ica t ions , 
e t c . , equally create dependence (Altschuler) . Let us br ief ly review these 
other forms of dependence. 
Indebtedness i s , by def ini t ion, a form of dependence. The acuteness of 
the dependency, however, depends very much on the s t ructure of the debt (as 
expressed in servicing cost as percentage of export earnings). This was 
re la t ive ly favourable for the Republic of Korea. In Brazil and Mexico th is 
was much less so . For Singapore the foreign debt problem is v i r t u a l l y 
non-existent . 
Licensing could be called another source of dependency. In the case of 
the Republic of Korea two aspects are not iceable . F i r s t , the Republic of 
Korea's i n i t i a l growth stages used bas ica l ly simple, mature technologies, the 
cost of which cannot have been high. In the 1970s, however, when the country 
In fact , many Singapore manufacturers have been forced e i ther to 
leave the manufacturing sector and go into serv ices , t rading, r e a l es ta te or 
housing development, or to leave Singapore altogether and reinvest in 
manufacturing in neighbouring countr ies . A third poss ib i l i ty has been to 
adopt a subserviant r e l a t ion with MNCs and provide them with back-up services 
in such areas as metal fabrication, paint manufacture, special chemicals, 
engine components for the shipbuilding and repair (Heyzer, 1982, p . 115). 
When manufacturers wanted to compete d i rec t ly with foreign firms in such areas 
as t e x t i l e s , shoes and leather goods they have on occasion come into conf l ic t , 
par t icu lar ly when quota r e s t r i c t ions ex i s t in export markets. 
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d i v e r s i f i e d i n t o more complicated p r o d u c t s , t h i s was l e s s obvious . Second, 
the fact t h a t DFI took so of ten the form of j o i n t ven tu res must have kept t h e 
p r i c e of l i c ense payments down, as con t ra ry to wholly-owned s u b s i d i a r i e s , the 
Korean p a r t n e r s had every i n c e n t i v e to keep a s l a rge a share of p r o f i t s in the 
Republic of Korea. 
Buyer c o n t r a c t s p e c i f i c a t i o n s a r e an important form of dependence, 
al though t h i s v a r i e s with the type of p roduc t . On the Republic of Korea 
Westphal, Rhee and P u r s e l l r epo r t ed t h a t " t h e surveyed firms t h a t were 
expor t ing wigs , shoes , c l o t h i n g , t ab leware , s p o r t i n g goods and e l e c t r o n i c s 
goods, nea r ly a l l sold a s i z eab l e f r a c t i o n of t h e i r exports - in most cases 
more than t h r e e - q u a r t e r s - under foreign brand names, a r e f l e c t i o n of t h e i r 
r e l i a n c e on overseas firms for merchandising, even a t the wholesale l e v e l " ( p . 
64 ) . I n a case such as t h i s , the degree of dependence seems to depend very 
much on how easy i t i s to switch to another buyer . 
F i n a l l y , i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r ade as an i n d i c a t o r of dependence must be 
cons ide red . This has a number of a s p e c t s : composit ion of expor t s (how much 
i s r e l i e d on raw m a t e r i a l s and how much on manufactures)*, how concent ra ted 
a re exports by d e s t i n a t i o n ; and how much i s r e l i e d on expor ts o v e r a l l . The 
Republic of Korea and Singapore , which expor t mainly manufactures , seem l e s s 
vu lne rab le than B r a z i l , t h a t for 50 per cent and Mexico, t h a t for over 75 per 
cent depended on raw m a t e r i a l e x p o r t s . Mexico with i t s high dependence 
( two- th i rds of i t s t r a d e i s with the United S t a t e s ) on one s i n g l e t r a d i n g 
pa r tne r appears a l so for t h a t reason t o be more vu lne rab l e than the o the r 
t h r e e . 
Reliance on t r a d e in genera l i s the most d i f f i c u l t a spec t to a s s e s s . The 
two Asian coun t r i e s have by far the g r e a t e s t t r a d e r a t i o s . In the pas t t h i s 
has helped them cons iderab ly as i t allowed them to b e n e f i t from r a p i d l y 
growing overseas demand for impor t s . Today, with lower demand and h igher 
p ro t ec t ion i sm in the OECD and elsewhere t h i s i s a l e s s obvious advan tage . 
Luedde-Neurath adds t h a t p o s s i b i l i t i e s for t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g in the 
Republic of Korea a re a l s o extremely l i m i t e d : "Customs o f f i c i a l s . . . have a t 
t h e i r d i sposa l not only very d e t a i l e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r i ce l i s t s , b u t d e t a i l e d 
records of v i r t u a l l y a l l i n t e r n a t i o n a l commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s involving 
Korea. A l i s t i s compiled d a i l y , by i n d i v i d u a l l e t t e r of c r e d i t , s t a t i n g i t s 
number, the na ture of the p roduc t , i t s country of o r i g i n , i t s s u p p l i e r , i t s 
purchaser , t he volume involved and - perhaps most important of a l l - t h e u n i t 
p r i ce of the t r a n s a c t i o n . " ( p . 2 3 ) . 
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Chapter 5 
THE BENEFITS OF GROWTH 
Not everybody b e n e f i t s equa l ly from economic growth. Some, such as 
c a p i t a l owners, workers with a c r u c i a l s k i l l or r ep resen ted by a s t r o n g union 
may b e n e f i t more than o t h e r s , such as u n s k i l l e d or l and l e s s workers . 
Governments may in te rvene in t h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n process by, for i n s t a n c e , 
encouraging employment c r e a t i o n or by s e t t i n g minimum wages. After having 
considered the p a t t e r n s of i n d u s t r i a l growth and the r o l e of government and 
en t r ep reneu r s i t seems important to ask how d i f f e r e n t groups have b e n e f i t e d 
from growth. We w i l l do t h i s in t h i s chapte r and we w i l l cons ider t h r e e s e t s 
of v a r i a b l e s : employment and unemployment, wages, and t h e income d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
Before doing s o , however, two p re l imina ry remarks are in o r d e r . F i r s t , 
in t h i s chapter our e f f o r t s to d i s c u s s the manufacturing s e c t o r in i s o l a t i o n 
from the r e s t of the economy are t o meet t h e i r g r e a t e s t cha l lenge y e t . In the 
previous chap te r s i t had become c l e a r t h a t developments and p o l i c i e s in 
manufacturing can r a r e l y be understood or exp la ined wi thout r e f e r ence to o the r 
s e c t o r s . Where neces sa ry , r e fe rence was made to these o ther s e c t o r s but the 
focus remained on manufactur ing. In t h i s chapte r t h i s w i l l prove much more 
d i f f i c u l t . 
The urban s e c t o r , of which manufacturing in such an important and dynamic 
p a r t , i s expected to absorb a l a rge p a r t of the a v a i l a b l e supply of l a b o u r . 
But i t s success in doing s o , in terms of employment and p a r t i c u l a r l y un- and 
underemployment, cannot be d i scussed in i s o l a t i o n from cons ide r ing the 
o r i g i n s , t h e dynamic f a c t o r s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e t h i s labour supply such as the 
s i z e and the growth of the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r . 
S imi l a r ly i t can be argued t h a t wages, p a r t i c u l a r l y those a t t he lower end 
of the s c a l e , a r e more inf luenced by ( lack o f ) demand o u t s i d e than i n s i d e the 
manufacturing s e c t o r . This problem finds i t apo theos i s in the d i s c u s s i o n of 
the income d i s t r i b u t i o n . Although wage and sa l a ry d i f f e r e n c e s , to some 
e x t e n t , can be d i scussed w i th in one s e c t o r , a d i s cus s ion t h a t a l s o wants to 
consider income from o the r sources ( r e n t , p r o f i t s ) i s l i k e l y to end up in a 
d i scuss ion of the o v e r a l l income d i s t r i b u t i o n . Yet , h e r e aga in , developments 
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in the manufacturing sector are but one among many determinants of the 
distribution and the changes that take place therein. 
The second remark concerns the avai labi l i ty of data. The absence of 
suf f ic ient , re l iable time ser ies data has, on occasion, been evident in the 
previous chapters. For the subjects discussed here their scarcity is even 
more notable. By insufficiency we do not refer to those of a technical 
nature, such as whether working hours (very long in the Republic of Korea) are 
considered when comparing wage developments or how to express in money terms 
some of the fringe benefits offered to workers. 
The insufficiency of data re lates rather to them being col lected at too 
long intervals (censuses) to be able to identify the e f fects of policy 
changes; or different (national) sources differing widely among themselves; 
or the readjusting of earl ier data by the same source. These problems come up 
in time series data on a number of subjects . However, they appear very 
frequently in the case of wages and employment. Changes in the c lass i f i ca t ion 
of the labour force over time make censuses incomparable. A large number of 
people that is not assigned to a speci f ic employment sector a lso makes 
comparisons l ess meaningful. 
On the whole, more data tend to be available on the two Asian countries 
than on the Latin American countries. Perhaps as an indication of greater 
importance given to them since 1977, employment and unemployment data are more 
systematically col lected and compiled in Brazil than before. This remains a 
weak spot in Mexico, though. On the other hand, the avai labi l i ty of data in 
the Republic of Korea and Singapore i s not always a good indicator of their 
r e l i a b i l i t y . On the whole, though, this seems superior than in the two Latin 
American countries. 
1
 Michell and others ( e . g . Kuznets) have remarked that the accuracy of 
Republic of Korean employment s t a t i s t i c s is not always obvious. This is 
c learest in the case of seasonal fluctuations in the non-farm economy. In 
1978, for instance, when the labour market was at i t s t ightes t and 
unemployment at i t s lowest, the economically act ive population ranged from 
15.4 mil l ion workers in the second quarter to 12.1 mill ion in the last 
quarter. Some 3.3 mil l ion people were transferred from the economically 
inactive category. This, says Michell (p. 68) makes the unemployment rate 
(rat io of those c lass i fying themselves as unemployed to economically act ive 
population) somewhat suspect. 
"Had even half the transferees classed themselves as looking for 
employment, then the unemployment rate in the las t quarter of 1978 
would have been 15.7 per cent, and not 3.6 per cent." 
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Employment 
All four countries have had to cope with yearly increases in thei r labour 
force that were well (and sometimes much) above the average for middle income 
developing countries (see table 50). Most - i f not a l l - of these yearly 
increases had to be absorbed by the non-farm sector . In Brazil the number of 
those engaged in agr icul ture increased by no more than 0.3 per cent per year 
between 1960 (12.1 mill ion) and 1980 (13.1 mi l l ion) . In Mexico this increase 
was negl igible : from 6.2 million in 1960 to 6.4 million in 1978. In the 
Republic of Korea those employed in agr icu l ture decreased in absolute numbers 
(from 4.8 million in 1963 to 4.7 mill ion in 1980). l>2 
The next few pages wil l br ief ly discuss how each country coped with these 
challenges. 
Singapore: Manufacturing industry provided more than 40 per cent of a l l 
new jobs in Singapore between 1957 and 1980. The number of jobs increased by 
6 per cent per year on average between 1957 and 1970 and by 8.5 per cent in 
footnote 1 continued from previous page: 
"In rura l areas th is phenomenon can be explained in terms of 
members of farm households not r ea l ly thinking of themselves as 
employed, but merely helping the family in planting out r i c e , or 
harvest ing. But for no-farm households th is can hardly be t r ue . 
At the end of the second quarter of 1978, 8.2 mil l ion were at 
work, but only 7.7 million at the end of the fourth quar ter . One 
might have expected the number unemployed to have r isen by 558,000 
but in fact i t had r isen by only 25,000. Had the former been the 
case, the unemployment ra te amongst non-farm workers would have 
r isen from 4.9 per cent to 11 per cent . 
As might be expected the tendency was more pronounced amongst 
women than men. Of a decrease in the number of employed of 
197,000 men, only 53,000 more c lass i f ied themselves as 
unemployed. But with a drop of 371,000 women, the number of women 
classing themselves as unemployed actual ly dropped by 28,000. 
Under these circumstances unemployment s t a t i s t i c s of the Republic 
of Korea must be read circumspectly." (Michell, pp. 68-71). 
In Singapore, with i t s tiny agr icu l tu ra l labour force, the problem is 
hardly s igni f icant . The number went down from 32,500 to 17,232 between 1957 
and 1980. 
2 
In relative terms these figures are even more telling: Brazil, 54 
per cent of the labour force to 30 per cent; Mexico, 54 per cent to 36 per 
cent; Republic of Korea, 63 per cent to 34 per cent; Singapore 6.9 per cent 
to 1.6 per cent. 
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the 1970s. In o the r s e c t o r s these percen tages were 1.8 per cent and 4 per 
c e n t , and for the economy as a whole they were 2.5 per cent and 5.2 per cent 
(Chia , 1982, p . 3 3 ) . Most of the employment growth in Singapore took p lace 
a f t e r 1966 the year in which employment growth surpassed labour force growth 
for the f i r s t t ime. In manufactur ing, e l e c t r i c a l machinery and r e p a i r s was by 
far the most dynamic s e c t o r in terms of employment growth. I t grew by 22 per 
cent per year on average for over two decades t o become the s e c t o r employing 
most peop le . Sec to r s t h a t grew by over 10 per cent per year were in the 
1960s', tobacco, t e x t i l e s , chemica ls , metal p roduc ts and t r a n s p o r t equipment. 
In the 1970s these were genera l eng ineer ing and machinery and m i s c e l l a n e o u s . 
Table 50. Average annual growth of labour force 
(per cent.) 
Country 1960-70 1970-80 
Republic of Korea 3.0 2.8 
Braz i l 2.5 2.3 
Mexico 2.8 3.3 
Singapore 2.8 2.7 
Average middle 
income c o u n t r i e s 2.0 2.3 
Source. World Bank, World Development Repor t , 1982 
(Washington, DC), pp . 146-147. 
Government po l i cy of a t t r a c t i n g l a b o u r - i n t e n s i v e i n d u s t r i e s proved very 
succes s fu l . In f a c t , a remarkable f ea tu re of S ingapore ' s economic development 
has been tha t i t has been i n c r e a s i n g l y labour i n t e n s i v e ! From 1957 to 1966, 
Singapore ' s labour absorp t ion c o e f f i c i e n t , t h a t i s , t h e r a t i o of the 
employment growth r a t e to the output growth r a t e was 0 .29 . This c o e f f i c i e n t 
rose to 0.55 between 1970 and 1974 and to 0 .65 between 1976 and 1979. In 1980 
i t dropped to 0 .57 , "which suggests t h a t the c o r r e c t i v e wage po l i cy introduced 
in 1979 has helped to r e s t r a i n employment growth in 1980" (Pang Eng Fong, 
1982, p . 16, see t a b l e 51) . 
Two o ther f ea tu re s s tand out in S ingapore ' s employment s i t u a t i o n ; t h e 
l a rge p a r t i c i p a t i o n of women and f o r e i g n e r s . The percentage of women in the 
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labour force nearly doubled from 21.6 per cent in 1957 to 41.9 per cent in 
1979. Smaller sized famil ies , better educational opportunities, changes in 
social at t i tudes , "the need for greater family income in a r is ing cost urban 
environment, and the location of labour intensive export factories in densely 
populated public housing e s ta te s , a l l encouraged and fac i l i ta ted the entry of 
more women into the labour force" (Lim and Pang, p. 77) . Demand factors 
related to rapid industrial isat ion and in particular the establishment of 
export industries such as electronics and garments a lso explain rapidly 
growing female participation ( i b i d . , p. 74) . 
. 2 Women now account for nearly half of a l l workers in manufacturing 
( i b i d . , p. 74) . Most work in electronics (33.3 per cent of a l l women working 
in manufacturing) and t e x t i l e s , garments and footwear (23.5 per cent) (Chia, 
1982, p. 36). Most are young. Female participation peaks at age 22 and f a l l s 
rapidly at subsequent ages (Lim and Pang, p. 18) . 
Foreigners make up a large part of the labour force in Singapore. In 1973 
they made up one eighth (or 100,000 people). In 1980 this was s t i l l 11 per 
cent (or 120,000). Foreigners are over-represented at the top and at the 
bottom of the professional scale . In 1978 about 15,000 of them were managers, 
engineers and technicians, which made up 25 per cent( l ) of a l l professional 
and managerial workers in Singapore, "a high proportion by any standard" (Pang 
Eng Fong, 1982, p. 40) . 
Foreigners are also over-represented among typical blue-collar workers in 
construction and manufacturing: 42 per cent of them work in manufacturing. 
Male foreign workers are mainly found in construction and shipbuilding, female 
foreign workers in e lectronics and wood working (Lim and Pang, p. 78). The 
highest concentration of foreigners is found in t e x t i l e s where 44.4 per cent 
of employees were foreigners in 1980 (Chia, 1982, p. 37) . 
1
 The simultaneous decline of the male participation rate from 87.7 to 
80.7 per cent was mostly due to a sharp decrease among the 15-19 year o lds , 
which in turn was largely the result of increased educational opportunities 
that keep children longer at school. 
In 1980, 46 per cent of a l l manufacturing workers were women compared 
to 19.3 per cent outside this sector . 
Government's immigration policy towards foreigners is very s tr ic t . 
It is designed to meet domestic imbalances ( i . e . tightening supply during 
recessions and l iberating during booms), "to increase the s k i l l s and improve 
the quality of the local population, and to i n s t i l in i t desirable soc ia l 
values and work habits possessed by foreign workers" (Lim and Pang, p. 94) . 
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Most foreign workers come t rad i t iona l ly from Peninsular Malaysia, although 
in recent years employers have been allowed to rec ru i t in Indonesia, Thailand, 
Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as well . 
Mexico: In Mexico manufacturing s teadi ly increased i t s share of the 
labour force. I t s share went from 11.8 per cent in 1950 to 23.1 per cent 
(including mining and quarrying) in 1978. The number of people act ive in 
manufacturing increased from less than 1 million to over 4 mil l ion. Only 
construction showed a larger percentage increase. The t e r t i a r y sector has 
absorbed most people. 
Despite the absolute and r e l a t i ve increase of manufacturing employment, 
i t s growth is considered disappointing, above a l l in perspective of Mexico's 
great under- and unemployment problem. This has been blamed on the nature of 
the country's indus t r ia l i sa ton pa t te rn . 
In contrast to the s i tua t ion in Singapore and the Republic of Korea (in 
the 1960s), indust r ia l growth was concentrated in areas that absorbed 
re la t ive ly l i t t l e labour ( e .g . automobiles, chemicals). As a r e su l t the 
labour absorptive capacity of industry showed a steady decline (see table 52). 
In the 1950s a 5.9 per cent yearly increase in manufacturing production 
resulted in a 4.9 per cent yearly increase in employment. Employment creation 
could be maintained a t the same level in the 1960s, but for th is i t was 
necessary that production grew nearly 50 per cent fas te r . The much lower 
labour absorption of the years 1970-78 was the r e su l t of both lower production 
growth and a decrease in the employment-output coeff ic ient . 
The indus t r ia l s t ructure that developed af ter 1950 was in large part the 
resu l t of the protection offered by government to se lect ive indus t r i e s . 
Ramirez de Wallace and Ten Kate found a good corre la t ion between protection 
and growth a t the industry level . Durable consumer and capi ta l goods, for 
footnote 3 continued from page 172: 
Unskilled foreign workers are not allowed to bring the i r families to 
Singapore. On the other hand, sk i l led workers, professionals and 
entrepreneurs who have acquired permanent residence s ta tus are allowed to 
bring their families. In fac t , they are encouraged to s e t t l e in Singapore, 
especially if they are ethnic Chinese from other Asian countries ( i b i d . ) . 
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instance, combined high effective protect ion ra t e s with vigorous growth and 
considerable import subs t i tu t ion . 
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Source. Tomasini (1980), p . 56. 
Low labour absorption in industry has a lso been blamed on policy-induced 
"d i s to r t ions" . The overvalued peso together with the s t ructure of protection 
made the use of capi ta l imports comparatively cheap whereas wages and other 
labour costs were kept r e l a t i ve ly high in the formal sector . 
Looney (1982, p . 60) compared the post-1955 s i tua t ion with that during the 
Second World War when the market prices of capi ta l and labour reflected the 
real factor supply much more accurately than af ter 1955. "Mexican 
entrepreneurs had less incentive to modify or adapt (and thereby r a i s e the 
productivity of) thei r imported capi ta l than they had in the ea r l i e r period 
. . . "Entrepreneurial response" did not change: i . e . entrepreneurs reacted to 
market signals from both periods with considerable r a t i ona l i t y . The outcome 
for the indus t r ia l s t ructure changed because market signals changed." 
I t has a lso been pointed out that import subst i tut ion of goods 
incorporating a cer tain technological sophist icat ion (automobiles, e l e c t r i c a l 
appliances, capi ta l goods in general, e t c . ) made i t necessary to a t t r a c t MNEs 
(Wallace/Ten Kate, p . 179). The b ias of these enterprises towards the use of 
imported sophisticated technology and to production in larger units is 
considered to have further contributed to the decline in labour absorption 
(Tomasini). 
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Several au thors ( e . g . Tomasini, Looney) have remarked on the poor 
i n t e g r a t i o n of Mexican indus t ry and t h e lack of i n t e r - i n d u s t r y l i n k a g e s . This 
has been claimed on " t h e haphazard and ad hoc manner in which t r a d e b a r r i e r s 
were appl ied" (Looney, p . 6 0 ) . "There i s no evidence of a ca re fu l review 
leading to the p r o t e c t i o n of i nd iv idua l i n d u s t r i e s and a c t i v i t i e s on the b a s i s 
of expected p r o d u c t i v i t y growth or in fan t i ndus t ry c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Rather , 
import l i m i t a t i o n s were i n i t i a t e d l a r g e l y e i t h e r (a ) t o mediate ba lance of 
payments d i f f i c u l t i e s ; or (b) t o p re s su re f i r m - s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t s wishing to 
expand i n t o new a c t i v i t i e s " ( i b i d . , p . 60 ) . Trade and i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y 
dec i s ions a r e taken in a h igh ly pe r sona l i sed way. P r o t e c t i o n and h igh p r o f i t s 
have led to an economic s t r u c t u r e which "when subjected t o s t r ong p r e s su re on 
the demand s i d e , has produced r i s i n g p r i c e s r a t h e r than r i s i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y " 
( i b i d . ) . 
There i s one i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y in Mexico t h a t has been promoted l a r g e l y 
for employment c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; the Maquila programme. This i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n 
programme was se t up a t the border with the United S t a t e s . Maquila i n d u s t r i e s 
employed 110,000 workers i n 1979 and 130,000 in 1982 (Tomasini ; L a r r ) . Most 
people (60 per cent in 1979) work in e l e c t r o n i c s assembly, many o t h e r s worked 
in footwear and c l o t h i n g . Most employees a re young women. I n 1975 women made 
up 85 per cent of t h e labour force and in 1982, 77 per cent ( i b i d . ) . 
The Republic of Korea'. Manufacturing employment grew very f a s t in the 
Republic of Korea. Between 1960 and 1979 i t s y e a r l y i n c r e a s e was 13.2 per 
cent average per y e a r . From 8 per cent in 1963 the s e c t o r came to absorb 21.7 
per cent of a l l employed in 1980. 
I t i s remarkable t h a t a l l manufacturing s e c t o r s con t r i bu t ed s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
to t h i s o v e r a l l p i c t u r e . None grew by l e s s than 10 per cen t annua l ly ! Some 
s e c t o r s did p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l , such as bas i c meta l s and metal p r o d u c t s . 
T e x t i l e s and c l o t h i n g and metal products became the dominant s e c t o r s in terms 
of employment. Together they employed over 50 per cent of the t o t a l workforce 
in manufacturing in 1979. The share of t e x t i l e s and c lo th ing (+^30 per cen t ) 
was hard ly d i f f e r e n t from t h e s i t u a t i o n two decades e a r l i e r . Employment in 
metal p r o d u c t s , which inc ludes s h i p s , b o a t s , automobiles bu t a l s o e l e c t r o n i c 
and e l e c t r i c a l goods, grew on average by 18.6 per cent per year a f t e r 1960 and 
by 21.7 per cent a f t e r 1970. 
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Rapid output growth has thus been accompanied by rapid employment growth. 
The switch from import subs t i tu t ion (with low labour in tensi ty) to export 
expansion (with high labour in tens i ty) had a strong posi t ive effect on labour 
absorption. However, in the Republic of Korea too, pol ic ies to encourage 
further indus t r i a l i sa t ion have reduced the r e l a t i ve price of capi ta l in 
subsequent years and thus stimulated more capi tal intensive a c t i v i t i e s . 
Pol icies that favoured large over small firms had a similar e f fec t . 
Kuznets (p. 126) noted a marked decline in labour intensi ty between 1963 and 
1972. 
Hong found that manufactured exports had become more capi ta l - in tens ive 
even before the introduction of the Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan, which 
signalled government support for more capi ta l - in tens ive production. The 
capi ta l in tens i ty of the country's exports increased by an average of 10 per 
cent per annum between 1966 and 1973. This was due, to some extent, to a 
change in the composition of exports , but par t icu lar ly to factor subst i tut ion 
in production processes. From 1966 to 1968 "the d i rec t plus indirect cap i ta l 
intensi ty of exports increased by 2.3 per cent due to shif ts in the export 
composition but also increased by as much as 11 per cent due to sectoral 
factor subst i tu t ions" (Hong, p. 215). Between 1970 and 1973 these percentages 
were 5 and 35'. Hong concludes that "some of the sectoral capital- labour 
subs t i tu t ions , as well as shif ts in export composition, may be a t t r ibu ted to 
the increase in capi ta l stock in the Korea and the associated r i s e in the 
wage-rental r a t i o . However, a substantial portion may have to be a t t r ibuted 
2 to a subsidy on capi ta l use ." ( i b i d . ) . 
Kuznets (p . 121) mentions "a t a r i f f s t ructure that has favoured 
machinery and equipment imports, import l icensing tied to minimum export 
requirements . . . government guaranteed foreign currency loans . . . the 
perennial overvaluation of the won". Firms with access to government-owned 
commercial banks (mainly large firms) have obtained domestic credi t a t what 
amounts to subsidised ra tes (see a lso Jones) . 
He adds that i t is tempting to conclude from th i s that lower capi ta l 
subsidies would have provided even faster employment growth. He wonders, 
however, whether this is a correct in te rpre ta t ion : "Korea's exports might 
have been less capi ta l intensive if there had been no subsidy on capi ta l use, 
but one might question whether Korea could have expanded i t s exports so 
rapidly i f i t had insis ted upon using less capi ta l intensive production 
techniques in order to maximise the employment effects of export expansion. 
This is because capi ta l and labour might not be good subst i tutes for each 
other in terms of product quali ty and, moreover, there might be limited 
foreign demand for extremely labour intensive goods." (pp. 215-216). 
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Brazi l : There are few data available to describ'e how the employment 
s i tuat ion has evolved in recent decades in Braz i l . The manufacturing labour 
force increased by 2.2 per cent yearly in the 1950s and 4.9 per cent in the 
1960s. For the period 1960-80 yearly growth was 6.5 per cent . Manufacturing 
employment growth was par t icu la r ly high during the "miracle" years 1968 to 
1974. Most of indus t r i a l employment (and i t s growth) was concentrated in the 
greater Sao Paulo area. In that area indus t r ia l employment increased by 9.2 
per cent per year between 1970 and 1974. From 1974 to 1979 th is slowed down 
to 2.7 per cent year ly . 
Carvalho and Haddad found that in the import subs t i tu t ion period 
employment did not grow in accordance with indus t r ia l output but that i t s 
"Employment growth in the export promotion period has been more substant ia l 
since Braz i l ' s exports have been found to be labour in tens ive ." (p . 67) . 
PREALC found that exports had indeed contributed considerably to 
employment creation in the 1970s. The number of people who found a job thanks 
to manufacturing for export increased from 738,000 in 1970 to 1,810,000 in 
1980. They also found, however, that indus t r ia l exports declined considerably 
in labour in tensi ty as simultaneously the weight had shifted towards export 
of such not so labour intensive products as s t e e l , metal products and 
automobiles away from more labour intensive products as t e x t i l e s , shoes and 
processed raw mate r ia l s . 
footnote 2 continued from previous page: 
The l a t t e r argument is i l l u s t r a t e d , in h i s view, by the growing 
protectionism that the Republic of Korea's major t rad i t iona l export items such 
as cotton t e x t i l e s , synthetic t e x t i l e products, weaving apparels , footwear, 
various electronic products, tablewares such as spoons and forks and canned 
mushrooms, are facing on world markets. 
Final ly , he says that "slower growth in export earnings might a lso have 
resulted in slower growth of the Korean economy as a whole, thus reducing 
overall employment growth ra tes" (p . 216) (see also Kuznets). 
1
 The overall labour intensi ty of exports a lso declined due to the 
shif t towards indus t r ia l away from agr icu l tu ra l expor ts . 
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Un- and underemployment 
Rapid employment creat ion in manufacturing has contributed to a rapid 
decrease in Singapore's unemployment r a t e . This went down from 9 per cent in 
1966 to v i r t ua l full employment in the early 1970s. I t went up in the slow 
growth years following the o i l c r i s i s and down again soon thereaf ter . The 
best i l l u s t r a t i o n of the t ightness of the Singapore labour s i tua t ion are the 
high female par t ic ipa t ion ra t e and the high (over 10 per cent) par t ic ipat ion 
by foreigners. One of the reasons why in the l a t e 1970s the Singapore 
Government encouraged the upgrading of i t s industry was because i t did not 
want to become too dependent on these foreigners. 
The Republic of Korea too has seen a steady decline of i t s unemployment 
rate from 9.5 per cent in 1963 to v i r t u a l ful l employment in the 1970s. In 
1980 i t was s l igh t ly higher a t 5.2 per cent. Here too, low unemployment was 
accompanied by a high and r i s ing female par t ic ipat ion r a t i o (42.2 per cent in 
1978). 
In Brazil unemployment a lso declined during the high growth period. I t 
was estimated a t 3.5 per cent in 1968, and 1.7 per cent in 1976. Thereafter 
i t went up to over 5.5 per cent in 1980. In Mexico unemployment was high in 
the mid-1970s. Estimates vary widely though. I t was estimated a t over 8 per 
cent in 1977 in the main c i t i e s but went down in the subsequent high growth 
years to a l i t t l e over 4 per cent in 1980. Between 1977 and 1980, 2.8 million 
new jobs (or 16 per cent) were added to employment. 
In the two Latin American countries these unemployment figures sa.y l i t t l e 
about their a b i l i t y to provide people with an adequate job . Whereas the 
problem is non-existent in Singapore and v i r t ua l ly eradicated in the Republic 
of Korea, many people in Brazil and Mexico are underemployed, i . e . they earn 
less than the minimum wage or work ( involuntar i ly) fewer hours than normal. 
In Brazil the number showed considerable dec l ine . Yet in 1976, s t i l l 12.2 per 
cent of the labour force was considered v is ib ly (compared to 17.7 per cent 
2 in 1972) and 25.7 invis ibly underemployed (down from 29.7 per cent four 
Working fewer hours than normal. 
2
 Earning less than the minimum wage. 
- 180 -
years ea r l i e r ) (Lowenstein, 1979). In Mexico the problem is par t icu lar ly 
grave. Few observers put underemployment a t less than 35 per cent and most 
put i t closer to 50 per cent . 
Mexico is no doubt one of the countries that has the highest proportion of 
un- and underemployed in the world. This has been so for many years . I t s 
po l i t i ca l s t ab i l i t y has nevertheless been remarkable. How can this be 
explained? One of the answers to th is paradox is that many have voted with 
their feet; they have emigrated to the United S ta tes . With growing 
r e s t r i c t i ons in the United States th is has been done progressively in i l l ega l 
ways. The number of people who swim across the Rio Grande or walk across the 
2,000 mile long border is counted in thousands per day. Schlagheck (p . 86) 
estimated that in 1979 already 6 million Mexicans were l iving i l l e g a l l y in the 
United Sta tes . Today there must be many more. 
Migration thus absorbs a high proportion of the yearly increase in the 
Mexican labour force. The Mexican Government considers i t a "safety valve" 
and is re luctant to put a ha l t to i t . To employers in the United States these 
workers are a sizeable source of cheap labour. 
A worrying aspect of the migration of Mexicans is that emigrants tend to 
be be t t e r educated than those who stayed behind. A survey found that 
two-thirds of the legal immigrants had completed primary or higher schooling, 
a proportion twice as great as that found in the Mexican population. Over one 
quarter had some secondary or higher education. I l l ega l immigrants had a much 
lower level of schooling (average four years) but even this i s superior to 
that of the average ( three years) of those who stayed behind (Dominguez). 
The high level of un- and underemployment in Mexico and Brazil i s in large 
part the r e su l t of the inab i l i ty of agr icu l ture to provide more jobs . Yet 
industry i s a lso blamed, and i t is claimed that the import subst i tut ion 
policies of these countries have contributed in no small way. Crit icism of 
the labour absorptive capacity of th is policy has come from two groups*, the 
Most underemployed are in ag r i cu l tu re . In the mid-1970s i t was 
estimated that 68 per cent of the agr icu l tu ra l labour force was underemployed 
(Luisel l i Fernandez, p . 202). 
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"s t ruc tura l " and the "market" c r i t i c s . For the "s t ruc tura l " c r i t i c s the 
crucial problem with the low labour absorptive capacity of import subs t i tu t ion 
indus t r ia l i sa t ion is the limited p o s s i b i l i t i e s of factor subs t i tu t ion . 
Foreign companies introduce capi ta l - in tens ive production techniques that 
re f lec t factor sca rc i t i e s in thei r country of or igin . They do not adapt these 
techniques to the factor sca rc i t i es prevail ing in the host country. Domestic 
producers tend to copy these capi ta l - intensive/ labour saving techniques. 
Technical change in general tends to be capi ta l - in tens ive , and the lack of 
competitive appropriate labour-intensive techniques explain the growing 
capital- intensiveness of industry in their view, which considers r e l a t i ve 
factor prices of no importance (Tyle r ) . 
The "market" c r i t i c s on the other hand consider that government-induced 
dis tor t ions in wages and capi tal costs have been primarily responsible for the 
low labour absorption. Investment incentives lower the price of c a p i t a l . 
Minimum wage l eg i s l a t ion , holiday pay, bonuses, severance pay and other fringe 
benefits increase labour cos t s . As a r e s u l t , labour carr ies a price that is 
higher than i t s r e l a t ive abundance would warrant and capi tal is cheaper than 
i t s scarci ty would assume, and th i s leads the "market" to concentrate 
unnecessarily on more capi ta l - in tensive and labour-shedding investments 
(Tyler, 1981, p . 25; Ahmad, pp. 61 , 62) . 
I t i s l ikely that elements of both types of c r i t i c i sm have played a role 
in the case of Mexico and Brazil (and elsewhere). There was considerable 
price d i s to r t ion , but was there much poss ib i l i ty for factor substi tution? 
Tyler (p. 26) found several econometric studies for Brazil that concluded that 
there was a fa i r ly high e l a s t i c i t y of subs t i tu t ion . "If we are to confide a t 
a l l in the l a t t e r s tudies , which find the scope of factor subst i tu t ion far 
greater than that argued by the s t r u c t u r a l i s t c r i t i c s , i t must be concluded 
that ISI -associated economic pol ic ies and otherwise a l te r ing r e l a t i v e 
factor p r ices , must bear much of the blame in contributing to Braz i l ' s current 
underemployment s i tua t ion" ( i b id . p . 26). This has important policy 
consequences and he wonders what the outcome would have been if government had 
decided to subsidise labour rather than c a p i t a l . 
Import subs t i tu t ing indus t r i a l i s a t ion . 
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Despite the findings of the studies quoted by Tyler, one cannot help 
wondering whether the factor subst i tut ion p o s s i b i l i t i e s in such high growth 
industr ies as domestic appliances, automobiles, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, 
s tee l and rubber, were r ea l ly that g rea t . Moreover, in each case i t must be 
asked whether capi ta l and labour were r ea l ly good subst i tu tes for each other 
and what the effects of subs t i tu t ion would be on qua l i ty . The l a t t e r may not 
be so important for cer ta in industr ies in a highly protected environment, but 
must be considered if exports are considered in the future. 
If p o s s i b i l i t i e s of factor subst i tu t ion per product are not too great , 
then the problem is a lso one of product choice. In this respect the 
s t ra teg ies followed by the Republic of Korea in the 1960s and Singapore seem 
superior from the employment point of view as these countries encouraged 
production of such labour intensive goods as clothing, footwear, e lec t ron ics , 
wigs, sporting goods, e t c . I t must be added that the importance of the 
example of these two countries l i e s , above a l l , in the i r concern for 
employment as explained in thei r po l i c i e s . I t is doubtful whether such huge 
countries as Mexico and Brazil could copy thei r indust r ia l s t ruc tu re , or 
export such a high percentage of the i r output. 
Employment prospects 
Not only are current employment problems much more serious in the two 
Latin American countries, prospects for the future are a lso bleaker than in 
Singapore and the Republic of Korea. One reason for th is is the expected high 
labour force growth. In the past two decades annual labour force growth was 
high in a l l four countr ies . However, for the years to 2000 growth prospects 
differ considerably between them. The declining trend of the l a s t two decades 
in the two Asian countries is forecasted to continue, whereas in the other two 
the yearly labour force growth ra t e w i l l remain the same or even increase'. 
Mexico's labour force growth ra te i s expected to be nearly t r i p l e that of 
Singapore in the years to come! (see graph). 
Differences in labour force growth are a function of high population 
increase in the past and by effor ts to reduce i t . In Mexico, which 
h i s to r i ca l l y has had one of the highest population increases, the government, 
u n t i l recent ly , has been very re luctant to get involved in family planning on 
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involved. Singapore's family planning policy goal of reducing the average 
number of children per family from 3.1 to 2.1 is as rigorously pursued as so 
many of i t s other policy goals . 
Another reason for concern over the employment s i tua t ion in the two Latin 
American countries is the fact that the par t ic ipa t ion ra t e of women there is 
s t i l l fa i r ly low. Brazil was reported to have a 13.9 per cent female 
par t ic ipa t ion r a t e in 1978 (Lowenstein, 1979, p. 2 ) . For Mexico i t was 
2 
estimated a t 20 per cent in the l a t e 1970s (Lowenstein, p . 3) . These 
figures compare with over 40 per cent in Singapore and the Republic of Korea. 
The female par t ic ipa t ion ra t e in the Latin American countries has not 
increased much over the l a s t two decades. The low ra te s have been explained 
by a lack of demand, cu l tura l r e s t r a i n t s and the absence of child-care 
f a c i l i t i e s . " I t is also linked to the education of women. Tradi t ional ly , i f 
not a l l members of a family could be educated, schooling was reserved for the 
boys. Attendance records shows that as early as the f i f th grade, the drop-out 
ra te for g i r l s exceeds that for boys, and the proportion of women continuing 
their education continues to drop a t each advancing l e v e l . " (Lowenstein, 1979, 
p. 3 - about the Mexican case) . 
The high female par t ic ipa t ion ra t e in the Asian countries is explained on 
the demand s ide by rapid economic growth and indus t r i a l i s a t ion , especial ly the 
establishment of export manufacturing indust r ies such as electronics and 
1
 The government's campaign that s ta r ted in 1972 with the slogan "two 
is enough" provided both carrots and s t i ck s . Parents were persuaded that they 
were be t te r off with fewer chi ldren. The ava i l ab i l i ty of contraceptives was 
great ly l ibera l i sed and abortion and s t e r i l i s a t i o n was made much ea s i e r . 
Other measures were meant to work as a " s t i ck" . Child allowances are 
lower for the thi rd child than for the f i r s t two. Paid maternity leave is only 
possible for the f i r s t two chi ldren. Hospital r a t e s for giving b i r t h are 
progressive. Large families are discriminated against in public housing and 
access to education. Final ly , i f one of the parents is not a c i t i zen of 
Singapore, the mother i s obliged to have herse l f s t e r i l i s e d af ter the b i r th of 
her second child (Tro l l i e t and de Mitry, p . 27). 
2 
The many women who work as domestic servants and on family farms a r e , 
however, not included in these f igures. Yet, they are no doubt a considerable 
number. In the Republic of Korea where th i s category i s covered by 
s t a t i s t i c s , the share of "unpaid family workers" went down from 31.3 per cent 
in 1963 to 18.8 per cent in 1980 when female employment went up quickly 
(Fie lds , p. 20) . 
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garments. "On the supply side smaller family s i z e , more education for women, 
changes in social a t t i t u d e s , the need for greater family income in a r i s ing 
cost urban environment, and the location of labour-intensive export factories 
in densely populated public housing e s t a t e s , a l l encouraged and fac i l i t a t ed 
the entry of more women in the labour force." (Lim and Pang, p . 77 about the 
Singapore case) . 
Singapore and the Republic of Korea have now reached a level of female 
par t ic ipat ion comparable to that of some of the indust r ia l i sed countries (see, 
appendix t ab le ) . The low levels of Mexico and Brazil and the i r l ike ly 
increase wil l mean an extra challenge to employment creation in these 
countr ies . High economic growth wil l thus be imperative. In a longer 
perspective i t wi l l be important to further reduce population increase. This 
i s indeed happening, but i t s effects on labour force growth wil l take many 
years . 
Wages 
Rapid growth has led to the creation of many new jobs. I t has a lso meant 
be t te r l iving conditions for most. Between 1960 and 1980 per capita incomes 
(in dollar terms) grew by 2.6 per cent per year in Mexico, by 5.1 per cent in 
Brazi l , by 7.0 per cent in the Republic of Korea and by 7.5 per cent in 
Singapore (World Bank, WDR, 1982, pp. 110-111). Secondary labour and l iv ing 
conditions a lso improved considerably. 
However impressive, these averages only t e l l half the story though, as i t 
is equally important to know how these benefits were d is t r ibuted among 
different groups of the population. This section and the next t ry to come up 
with a contribution to t h i s . This section wi l l look a t wages in the 
manufacturing sec tor . The next wi l l tackle the broader issue of the changes 
in the overall income d is t r ibu t ion . The differences among countries are great 
and we will try to come up with some explanatory fac tors . 
Wage trends can be measured in terms of average and minimum wages. There 
are a number of methodological problems involved in establ ishing average wage 
trends and that is why different sources may not concide. Moreover, averages 
may hide huge d i spa r i t i e s among different groups. Where they are s e t , minimum 
wage trends may be more easy to follow, although different wages for different 
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regions and indeed different professions may const i tu te a complicating 
factor . In Brazil and Mexico the government has set minimum wage 
2 . . . . . 
l eve ls . The degree to which these ra tes actual ly signify a minimum for the 
worker i s a matter of much dispute. The significance for formal sector wages 
is nevertheless great a s , par t icu la r ly in Brazi l , many jobs in the State-owned 
or State-funded sector , as well as rents and other financial instruments are 
expressed in x times the minimum wage. 
In Singapore government influence on wages has a lso been grea t . In 1972 
this influence was formalised when the National Wage Council was set up that 
recommended a yearly wage increase. In the Republic of Korea, government has 
not d i rec t ly intervened in the wage se t t ing process, although there too, the 
prerogatives of trade unions were seriously curbed which in turn weakened the 
bargaining power of the workers, of course. 
Real wages have shown a spectacular increase in the Republic of Korea. In 
1978, manufacturing wages were four times their 1960 level in real terms. In 
Singapore, they were 53 per cent higher in 1980 as compared to 20 years 
e a r l i e r . This "modest" increase was accompanied by a great improvement in 
broadly based state-financed or State-subsidised secondary labour and l iv ing 
conditions. In Mexico, manufacturing workers earned on average around 
two-thirds more in 1980 than two decades e a r l i e r . In Brazil the increase was 
44 per cent between 1966 and 1980. These increases have been accompanied by 
widening differences among wage-earners. The next paragraphs wil l b r ie f ly 
expand on this . 
Republic of Korea; Wages have shown a spectacular increase after 1960 -
when admittedly their level was very low. Real wages in manufacturing were 
v i r t ua l ly unchanged between 1960 and 1967. When conditions on the labour 
market became t ight in the l a t e 1960s, thei r increase was very fas t . They 
doubled between 1967 and 1972. Slower economic growth and high inf la t ion led 
to stagnation u n t i l 1975 whereafter rapid growth resumed. In 1978 rea l wages 
In Mexico in 1978 there were different minimim wages for 111 labour 
market areas . Moreover, in the federal d i s t r i c t a lone, d i f ferent r a t e s were 
established for 82 different sk i l l s ' . (Lowenstein, 1979, p . 6 ) . 
o 
S t r i c t l y speaking, in Mexico, they are set by t r i p a r t i t e commissions, 
but these tend to follow government guidel ines. 
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were nearly 80 per cent higher than three years ea r l i e r (see table 53). This 
ref lects the progressive reduction of un- and underemployment as well as the 
shortage of ski l led workers, many of whom went to work in the Middle East . 
After the three years of very high rea l wage increases (1976: 15.5 per cent; 
1977, 21 per cent", 1978, 17 per cent) their growth was "only" 8.6 per cent in 
1979. In 1980 they declined by 8 per cent (Chapponniere, p . 72). 
Manufacturing in the sector which consistent ly pays the lowest wages in 
the economy (see EPB, p . 265). Within manufacturing such highly 
export-dependent sectors as t e x t i l e s and clothing pay in turn considerably 
less than the average (Chapponniere, p . 75). 
The wage d i f f e ren t i a l s are largely explained by the fact that many women 
work in manufacturing, which receive much lower wages than the average. 
Between 40 and 44.5 per cent of the manufacturing labour force are women (in 
1980) (Michell, p . 224). In leading export products th is percentage is even 
higher: 50 per cent in rubber shoes, 55 per cent in e lec t ron ics , 55 per cent 
in other manufacturing, 68 per cent in t ex t i l e s and 77 per cent in c lothing. 
Women earn between 50 and 70 per cent of what thei r male coleagues earn for 
often the same kind of work (van Liemt; Chaponniere) . 
This predominance of low-paid women in crucia l export sectors has 
important consequences for the economy, says Michell; 
"If equal wages had been paid for equal work, then ei ther male 
wages would have had to drop d ras t i ca l ly , or a substantial portion 
of the Republic of Korea's export industr ies might ground to a 
h a l t . I t i s assumed that while women earned less than their 
marginal product, men probably earned more than their marginal 
product, so that the aggregate wage b i l l was close to the marginal 
product of a l l employers in those industr ies where women formed a 
substantial part of the labour ofrce and not a l l the benefi ts went 
to the employer. Certainly estimates of prof i t s in such industr ies 
do not suggest a high prof i t r a t i o . In new industr ies where men 
predominated such as shipbuilding, iron and s t e e l , petrochemical 
industr ies and vehicle manufacture, the high wages paid to men in 
t ex t i l e s and electronics encouraged a higher degree of efficiency in 
the use of labour . . . than might otherwise have been the case. 
Likewise the growing shortage of young women in preferred age 
cohorts encouraged t r ad i t iona l export industr is to improve their 
labour efficiency in the 1970s." (pp. 224, 225). 
Michell draws an interes t ing conclusion regarding social equity 
from th i s heavy rel iance on female labour. Until the shif t towards 
heavy and chemical industry the country's export success was not so 
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Singapore: The case of Singapore poses in some ways an interes t ing 
contrast to that of the Republic of Korea. In the Republic of Korea wages 
were very low in 1960. In Singapore they were, a f te r Japan, the highest in 
Asia. The government considered that only by keeping wages low could the 
unemployment problem be solved and this is indeed what happened. Again, in 
contrast with the Republic of Korea, where no social security exis ts and 
1 . 2 
government spending on social development (other than education ) i s low, 
the Singapore Government provided i t s population with a unique set of 
secondary labour and l iving condit ions. 
High unemployment, increased female par t ic ipa t ion and government's control 
over the trade unions a l l helped to government preventing rea l wages to 
increase between 1960 and 1968 ( table 54). In fact rea l wages declined by 10 
per cent between 1963 and 1968. In cer ta in labour-intensive export industr ies 
rea l wages fe l l even more. In t e x t i l e s , for instance, wages f e l l by 20 per 
cent between 1963 and 1968 (Tro l l i e t and de Mitry, p . 51) . 
footnote 1 continued from p.188: 
much based on an adequate supply of well educated labour, but on an 
adequate supply of well educated young females. "However, since education 
fees are ident ical for men and women, the r a t e of re turn to families 
educating a female has been approximately half that for a man. What i t 
represents is a considerable transfer from poorer households (since middle 
and upper class g i r l s do not enter industry) to the nation in general". 
He concludes tha t : 
" i t may not be unreasonable to ask for a sacr if ice on behalf of 
national development by g i r l s in the age groups 16-25, but i t i s highly 
regressive to tax-poorer families who pay to educate them. An extension 
of free education and perhaps an extension of non-pecuniary honours in 
recognition of th i s contribution of the young female labour force seems 
called for ." (p. 225). 
Primary schooling in the Republic of Korea is free but beyond primary 
school, schooling becomes an expensive business for households. The high 
pr ior i ty given to schooling has led to many students taking on extra c l a s ses . 
The costs of this together with other costs such as textbooks, uniforms, 
t ransport , supplies and fees can become the main expenditure items for 
par t icular ly the poorer households. The cost of educating one college student 
has been found to take as much as 40 per cent of a wage-earner's household 
expenditure. 
Medical costs in the Republic of Korea are now considered to be as 
high as in the United States and many people have to borrow money a t high 
in teres t ra tes to be admitted to hosp i t a l . 
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Table 54. Singapore; Average annual remunerat ion per worker and labour cost 
per u n i t of o u t p u t , manufacturing s e c t o r , 1960-80 
Year Average annual 
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8 . 1 
9 . 4 
8 . 6 
8 . 4 
8 . 8 
8 . 3 
8 . 0 
1
 Refers to persons employed d i r e c t l y in the process of p roduc t ion , t h a t 
i s , p roduc t ion workers . 
Average annual remunerat ion per worker de f l a t ed by the consumer p r i c e 
index. 
Source. Chia (1982) . Data on average remunerat ion and labour cos t per un i t 
of ou tpu t are from Singapore, Department of S t a t i s t i c s * . Report on 
the Census of I n d u s t r i a l P roduc t ion , v a r i o u s y e a r s ; da ta on the 
consumer p r i c e index are from Yearbook of S t a t i s t i c s . 
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When f u l l employment was reached around 1970 i t became more d i f f i c u l t to 
keep wages under c o n t r o l . Between 1968 and 1972 these increased by 20 per 
cent in rea l terms. The government then took formal contro l over the 
s i t u a t i o n and s e t up the National Wage Counc i l . This " t r i p a r t i t e " body 
s u c c e s s f u l l y "recommended" low wage i n c r e a s e s . 
"Since 1972 wage g u i d e l i n e s , though vo luntary , have s t rong ly inf luenced 
wage increases in both the pr iva te and publ ic s e c t o r s . During, and in the few 
years immediately a f t e r the world r e c e s s i o n of the mid-1970s, the Council 
recommended modest wage increases to ensure the compet i t iveness of the 
l abour - in tens ive export i n d u s t r i e s " (Lim and Pang, p . 3 4 ) . These g u i d e l i n e s , 
whi le he lp ing t o keep exports compet i t i ve , did not encourage firms to use 
labour e f f i c i e n t l y or to upgrade t h e i r operat ions q u i c k l y . As a r e s u l t , 
labour shortages i n t e n s i f i e d and manufacturing p r o d u c t i v i t y su f f ered , growing 
by an average of on ly 2 - 3 per cent a year u n t i l 1979. In 1979, the Council 
began a three-year wage c o r r e c t i o n p o l i c y , i . e . recommended high wage b i l l 
increases averaging near ly 20 per cent a year , t o r e s t o r e wages to market 
l e v e l s . The government has indicated tha t in future wage changes w i l l be 
more c l o s e l y t i e d to p r o d u c t i v i t y g a i n s . The Counc i l ' s g u i d e l i n e s w i l l be 
more f l e x i b l e to r e f l e c t more f u l l y than in the past the d i v e r s i t y of 
2 p r o d u c t i v i t y ga ins among firms (Lim and Pang) . 
Al l in a l l , nominal wages in manufacturing increased by 2 .7 per cent in 
the 1960s and by 11.5 per cent in the 1970. In r e a l terms these increases 
were 1.7 per cent per year on average between 1960 and 1972 and 2 .8 per cent 
per year between 1972 and 1980 (Chia, 1982, p . 3 9 ) . 3 
1
 Workers, however, enjoyed average wage increase s of about 14 per cent 
a year because part of the increase in the employer wage b i l l was channel led 
in to increased Central Provident Fund c o n t r i b u t i o n s and in to a S k i l l s 
Development Fund to t r a i n and upgrade workers required by the r e s t r u c t u r i n g 
s t r a t e g y . Thus the i n f l a t i o n a r y consequences of the wage c o r r e c t i o n p o l i c y 
were minimised. 
The Wage Correct ion P o l i c y has apparently met with some s u c c e s s . 
Employment c r e a t i o n in the economy, e s p e c i a l l y the manufacturing s e c t o r has 
s lowed. National product iv i ty ga ins have doubled, averaging over 5 per cent a 
year s i n c e 1979. Foreign investment commitments, most of i t in des i red 
i n d u s t r i e s , rose to record l e v e l s , d e s p i t e the large wage i n c r e a s e s . At the 
same t ime, there has been a resurgence of l oca l manufacturing investment 
commitments (Lim and Pang, pp. 34, 3 5 ) . 
Chia claims that increases in weekly earning in manufacturing were 
e x c l u s i v e l y due to an increase in the numbers o f hours worked. Real hourly 
earnings of workers in manufacturing remained a t v i r t u a l l y the same l e v e l 
(Chia, 1982, p. 4 0 ) . 
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As in the Republic of Korea, manufacturing is one of the lowest paying 
sec to rs . Among the reasons why manufacturing pays such low wages is that 
among i t s employees there i s a high proportion of unski l led, foreign and 
female workers, a l l of whom tend to be paid l ess than the average. 
Women earn on average only 65 per cent of men. In manufacturing they 
receive about 54 per cent of the mean income of a l l workers, and only 45 per 
cent of the mean income of male manufacturing workers. The concentration of 
women in labour-intensive export manufacturing indust r ies coincides with thei r 
low mean incomes. 
The modest wage increases have been accompanied by rapid progress in 
non-wage components which have d ras t i ca l ly improved workers' welfare. 
Low-income workers have benefited from subsidised housing and other public 
welfare f a c i l i t i e s , such as heal th and education which have rapidly expanded. 
Public socia l services such as heal th , san i ta t ion , education and housing 
are available to the population free or a t low cost . Over two-thirds of the 
population l ives in a f l a t provided by the government Housing and Development 
Board. Rents are low. I t i s also possible to use one's CPF savings to 
purchase a f l a t . Much a t tent ion is given to heal th care and education. 
Secondary and higher education is fee-paying, but ample financial aid is 
available for bright s tudents . 
Among the secondary labour conditions special mention should be made of 
the Central Provident Fund (CPF). This State-control led social secur i ty 
system is both an important source of forced savings for financing the 
development effor t and a way to provide old people, i f not with a pension, 
with a lump sum, the frui t of the i r (and the i r employers') savings. 
These great improvements in the basic needs of the population gained the 
government a large measure of p o l i t i c a l support. I t a lso contributed to 
economic growth and indus t r ia l development. "Improved heal th and education 
represented an investment in human capi ta l which would pay off in more 
productive workers, while mass public housing a t low cost represented an 
implicit subsidy to low rea l wages in manufacturing. The provision of 
subsidised public social services therefore contributed to the competitiveness 
of 1abour-itensive export manufacturing - by "buying" the contentment of the 
- 193 -
working c lasses , thus ensuring po l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y and labour peace, and by 
ensuring that low wages did not imperil basic standards of l i v ing . " (Lim and 
Pang, p . 142). 
Mexico: Average r ea l wages in the Mexican manufacturing industry showed a 
steady increase of 4.5 per cent per year in the 1960s. Minimum wages 
increased even faster (5.7 per cent average per year) . In the 1970s growth 
became more e r r a t i c . The f i r s t two years s t i l l showed some improvement and so 
did 1976. In that year the outgoing President Echeverria decreed no less than 
three increases of the minimum wage: 21 per cent in January, 23 per cent in 
October and 9 per cent in December. On the whole, and no doubt because of 
accelerat ing inf la t ion , overall wage increases were much smaller in that 
decade. Average wages increased by 15 per cent and minimum wages by 10 per 
cent ( table 55). 
Secondary labour conditions are generous in Mexico. Upon cessation of 
service the worker receives 12 days wages for each year of service , and 
sometimes more. The law also s t ipu la tes paid holidays and vacation and a 
Christmas bonus (equal to 15 days pay). There is a profi t -sharing scheme. A 
fund (INFONAVIT) to overcome the shortage of housing was set up in 1972 which 
is financed by a 5 per cent payroll t ax . Social securi ty i s well developed. 
The Mexican Social Insurance I n s t i t u t e (IMSS) exis ts since 1942. Together 
with i t s s i s t e r organisation for State employees, ISSSTE, i t provides for 
medical care, unemployment benef i t s , old age and d i sab i l i ty pensions. 
Social securi ty is financed by the S ta te , workers and employers. The 
exact d is t r ibu t ion of the contribution of each differs per wage group, number 
of employees in the company and type of benefi t . For IMSS medical expenses 
2 
and old age pensions, for example, 12.5 per cent of the t o t a l premium i s 
contributed by the Federal Government, 25 per cent is deducted from employees 
s a l a r i e s , and 62.5 per cent is paid by employers (Schlagheck, 1980, p . 101). 
Depending on the wage level of the employee fringe benefi ts payable by the 
employer add about 60 per cent to base payroll expenses ( i b i d . , p . 102). 
"The net r e su l t was that overal l monthly earnings jumped 151 per cent 
in Mexico during President Echeveria's administration (1970-76), adding 
considerably to the country's vicious wage-price s p i r a l . " (Schlagheck, 1980, 
p . 64). 
Excluding workman's compensation. 
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 Taking t o t a l number of persons engaged. 
Sources . (1) S o l i s (1981) . 
(2) Own c a l c u l a t i o n s from t h e Manufacturing Selected I n d u s t r i e s 
Survey d a t a , taken from the Yearbook of I n d u s t r i a l S t a t i s t i c s . 
Figures de f l a t ed by the consumer p r i c e index from t h e World Bank 
t a b l e s , 2nd e d n . , 1980. For 1963 the CPI was c a l c u l a t e d from the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c i a l S t a t i s t i c s e r i e s . 
(3) PREALC: "El mercado de t r aba jo en c i f r a s , 1950-1980" 
(San t i ago , 1982) . 
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However impressive wage developments have been and however admirable 
of f ic ia l social security provisions a r e , i t appears that only a minority has 
benefited and that most people are excluded. I t has been estimated, for 
example, that in the 1970s up to 80 per cent of ru ra l workers and 50 per cent 
of urban workers received less than the minimum wage (Looney, 1982, p . 120). 
The problem with social security i s s imi lar . This is estimated to benefit 
only around one third of a l l workers and thei r famil ies . 
Brazi l ; There is general agreement on two aspects of wage development in 
Brazi l . F i r s t , the well educated, and in general those possessing a cer ta in 
s k i l l did well - and some very well - during the high growth period. Second, 
the o f f i c i a l ly set minimum wage showed a dramatic decline u n t i l 1974 (and a 
small increase the rea f te r ) . There is wide disagreement about the question to 
what extent the decline of the l a t t e r i s representat ive for the fate of the 
masses. 
Table 56 shows some figures for average r e a l wages that indicate a 
s ignif icant increase: 3.5 per cent per year on average in the 1970s, or 60 
per cent between 1970 and 1979. These figures understate how well cer ta in 
groups did. Schlagheck reported that sk i l led workers improved thei r rea l 
wages by 2.6 per year between 1964 and 1974, and executives saw thei r income 
increase by 8.1 per cent on average in that period (p. 41 ; see also Robock). 
He found that in 1973 in Sao Paulo, accountants, sales managers and marketing 
d i rec tors were earning annual sa lar ies of US$11,000, US$23,000 and US$46,000 
respect ively . Four years l a t e r in 1977 these were between 50 and 100 per cent 
higher. Legal minimum wages a t that time were much lower (p. 41) . In May 
1975, the legal minimum wage was only US$68 a month in the c i ty of Rio de 
Janeiro and the lowest legal minimum wage in the country was US$48 (Robock, p . 
135). 
The system of minimum wages was introduced in 1940 with the intent ion of 
ensuring that the worker received the minimum necess i t ies of nu t r i t i on , 
clothing and housing. But as a subsistence level i t is low. Moreover, i t 
showed a continuous decline u n t i l 1974. This decline s ta r ted well before the 
1964 coup d 'fitat and was already noticeable during the 1961-64 Goulart 
presidency. I t was par t icu la r ly fast between 1965 and 1974. After 1974, with 
the for the government so disappointing r e su l t of the e lect ion, the r ea l 
minimum wage was allowed to recoup some of i t s lost t e r r a in . When "Apertura" 
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ea rn ings for 
Yearbook of I n d u s t r i a l 
and 1980 data ft ora the Anuario 
Stattstico do Brasil was used. The PCI from the world tables, 2nd 
and 3rd editions was used to deflate. 
(2) IBGE, Brazil: Series statfsticas, 1977, and Anuario 
Statistico do Brasil. Deflated by the CPI for Rio de Janeiro. 
Conjuntura Econoomica, Apr. 1981, taken from: "Industrial 
policies and manufactured exports", World Bank (for officialuse 
only), 1982. 
(3) "Mercado de trabajo en cifras, 1950-1980", PREALC, 1982. 
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brought g r e a t e r and more t r ade union a c t i v i t y , i t was given even more 
a t t e n t i o n . After 1979, a t a time when the government was making g rea t e f f o r t s 
to b r ing down i n f l a t i o n , and h ighe r wages were undercompensated for i n f l a t i o n 
( e . g . 85 per cent compensation a t 15 times the minimum wage), t h e minimum wage 
was even overcompensated (110 per cent i n c r e a s e ) . 
Never theless the d e c l i n e in purchasing power has been impress ive , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y during the very high growth y e a r s . DIEESE c a l c u l a t e d t h a t in 
order to purchase a minimum baske t of e s s e n t i a l goods a worker r e c e i v i n g the 
minimum wage would have had to work 65 hours i n 1959. I n 1965, he would have 
had to work 88.25 hours and in 1974 163.5 hours to buy the same basket ' . In 
1978 t h i s improved to 137 hours ( i n 1980, 157 hours and 131 hours i n 1982) 
(Bole t in do DIEESE, a b r i l de 1983, p . 7 ) . 
The d i scuss ion on the minimum wage has cen t red not so much on i t s l e v e l , 
but on how s i g n i f i c a n t i t was as an i n d i c a t o r for s o c i a l p r o g r e s s . Those 
( inc lud ing the government) who want to play down the importance of the minimum 
wage as a measure for the we l l -be ing of t h e popula t ion a t l a r g e , c la im t h a t 
the number of people who earn the minimum wage went down dur ing the high 
growth y e a r s . They argue t h a t those who earned t h e minimum wage in 1974 a r e 
not the same as those who were ea rn ing i t f ive or 10 yea r s e a r l i e r ( implying 
tha t those have moved up the s c a l e ) . For those who were p rev ious ly un- or 
underemployed, earn ing the minimum wage i s equal to having gained a wage 
i n c r e a s e . 
Those who consider the minimum wage (and thus the worsening t r end ) 
i n d i c a t i v e for the wel l -be ing (or the absence of i t ) of the masses, po in t out 
t h a t the 1970 census , for example, found t h a t 60 per cent of the r u r a l and 20 
per cent of the urban workers were ea rn ing l e s s than the lowest minimum wage 
p r e v a i l i n g in t h a t year (Robock, p . 136) . In 1973 approximately 54 per cent 
of B r a z i l i a n workers s t i l l earned l e s s than the minimum wage (Hewle t t , p . 
323) . In 1975, 19 per cent of the employees in the g r e a t e r Sao Paolo area 
earned one minimum wage or l e s s ; 54 per cent earned up to two minimum wages, 
and 75 per cent up to t h r e e ( J u s t i c e and Peace Commission, Sao P a o l o , p . 4 6 ) . 
In Braz i l labour l e g i s l a t i o n has c rea t ed many b e n e f i t s such as the forced 
savings schemes (PIS/PASEP) and s o c i a l s e c u r i t y (INPS). An Employees 
Indemnity Guarantee Fund (FGTS) e x i s t s . Access to school ing for the lower 
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classes has greatly improved, although in the ear ly 1970s s t i l l 20 per cent of 
children of school-going age did not attend school. The National Housing Plan 
established in 1964 financed, through the National Housing Bank, the 
construction of many new dwelling u n i t s . As in Mexico, however, i t seems that 
these measures have benefited the workers in the urban formal sector above a l l 
and those outside that sector much l e s s . 
Equity and the income d is t r ibu t ion 
Economic and indust r ia l growth has resulted in considerable material 
progress. A clear indicator of this is the smaller portion of the population 
(but not necessari ly a smaller number'.) tha t l ives below the poverty l i n e . 
Indicators such as the infant mortal i ty r a t e , the adult l i t e racyra te and the 
percentage of people attending secondary school have a l l shown considerable 
improvements in the l a s t decades (see table 57). 
There are , however, important differences across countries and even these 
few indicators of the table make that c lear . The infant mortal i ty r a t e in the 
Republic of Korea, for example, has only now reached the level of Singapore 
two decades ago. Brazil in turn has only now reached the level that the 
Republic of Korea had reached in I960'. 
In secondary education similar comparisons can be made. The level of 
schooling at tained in 1960 in the two Asian countries was much higher than 
that of the two Latin American countr ies . Today the proportion of the 
relevant age group attending secondary school in Brazil has reached the level 
of Singapore 20 years ago. These few indicators are fa i r ly representat ive of 
many others not included in the l i s t . 
A more serious matter is that in the countries that did r e l a t i ve ly less 
well these averages hide huge differences between different groups. This i s 
well i l l u s t r a t ed by the income d i s t r ibu t ion in the two Latin American 
countries which i s among the most uneven in the world and, what i s more 
ser ious, has shown a s teadi ly worsening t rend. The r e s t of th i s section wi l l 
br ief ly discuss some of the evidence available and the background of this poor 
d i s t r ibu t ion . 
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Table 57. Selected i n d i c a t o r s of s o c i a l development 
Infant mortality rate 
(aged 0-1) 
Adult literacy rate 
Number enrolled in 
secondary education 
as % of age group 
% of people living 


























































Notes . (1) 1958; (2) 1975; (3) 1966; (4) 1965; (5) 1976; (6) 1970. 
Sources, ( a ) van Ginneken, f a m i l i e s ; (b) F i e l d s , i n d i v i d u a l s ; (c) F i e l d s , 
households; (d) Morley, f a m i l i e s ; o t h e r s : World Bank: World 
Development Repor t , 1982, 1983, 1984. 
Before doing s o , i t should be s t r e s s e d once again t h a t however t e l l i n g 
these f i gu re s a r e , they r e f l e c t the end r e s u l t of a long development process 
t ha t s t a r t e d wel l before 1960 and t h a t moreover, depended not only on 
manufacturing. The r o l e of a g r i c u l t u r e i s perhaps more important as the two 
extreme cases of Mexico (where the l a rge a g r i c u l t u r a l sec to r v i r t u a l l y 
s t agna ted a f t e r 1965) and Singapore (where t h i s s ec to r i s i n s i g n i f i c a n t ) 
i l l u s t r a t e . Yet manufacturing growth and i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n p o l i c i e s have been 
equal ly important as we have t r i e d to show in the previous s e c t i o n s and 
c h a p t e r s . 
The Singapore exper ience i s q u i t e excep t iona l in t h a t i t s income 
d i s t r i b u t i o n a c t u a l l y appears to have improved between 1966 and 1972, when the 
Gini r a t i o went from 0.4983 to 0.4428 ( s e e t a b l e 5 8 ) . This may be explained 
by decreas ing unemployment in these y e a r s . In the 1970s the d i s t r i b u t i o n 
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hard ly changed. I t s tood a t 0.455 i n 1980. The household income 
d i s t r i b u t i o n a l s o showed some improvement and went from 0.40 in 1972-73 to 
0.37 in 1977-78. This may have been the r e s u l t of i nc reas ing female 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 
Table 58 . S ingapore : Gini r a t i o s 
Year Pe r sona l income Household income 
d i s t r i b u t i o n d i s t r i b u t i o n 

























Sources . (1) Rao and Ramakrishnan, p . 24, 
(2) F i e l d s , p . 28 . 
(3) Pang and Tan, p . 158 
The Republic of Korea i s the ou ts tand ing example of a country t h a t has 
combined r ap id economic growth and a remarkably equal income d i s t r i b u t i o n . To 
a large e x t e n t t h i s was the r e s u l t of events t h a t took p lace be fo re t h e rap id 
growth p e r i d . After r ap id growth had s t a r t e d i t appears t h a t the income 
d i s t r i b u t i o n has s l i g h t l y worsened al though i t remained remarkably e q u a l . I t 
seems the re fo re a p p r o p r i a t e to d i s cus s b r i e f l y both the o r i g i n of the equal 
income d i s t r i b u t i o n and how post-1962 events have a f fec ted i t . 
The fac t t h a t many e n t e r p r i s e s and many u n s k i l l e d workers a r e of 
foreign o r i g i n has no doubt con t r i bu t ed to t h i s f a i r l y equal income 
d i s t r i b u t i o n , i n p a r t i c u l a r to the ex ten t t h a t each group r e p a t r i a t e d t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e p r o f i t s and e a r n i n g s . 
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The income d i s t r i b u t i o n of the Republic of Korea was one of the most equal 
in the world in the e a r l y 1960s ( see t a b l e 5 9 ) . This was the r e s u l t of many 
f a c t o r s , the most important ones being the l a r g e - s c a l e d e s t r u c t i o n of phys ica l 
proper ty during the c i v i l war and the thorough land reforms t h a t took place in 
the l a t e 1940s and e a r l y 1950s (van Liemt)* These land reforms r e s u l t e d in 
maximum farm s i z e s of t h r e e cheongbo (approximately 3 h a ) . 
Table 59. Republic of Korea: Income d i s t r i b u t i o n ( i n per cent of 
t o t a l income) and Gini r a t i o 
Year Top 20% Middle 40% Bottom 40% Bottom Gini 
20% 








































(2) Chaponniere (World Bank and Korea Exchange Bank). 
(3) World Bank in Michell ( p . 226) 
(4) F i f t h Five-Year P l an in Michell ( p . 226) . 
(5) F i e l d s , p . 28 
I t i s remarkable t h a t on seve ra l occas ions government has in tervened to 
mainta in e q u a l i t y . The Chang Myon regime, for i n s t a n c e , passed a s p e c i a l law 
for punishing those who had accumulated weal th i l l i c i t l y dur ing the Rhee years 
by taking advantage of t h e i r p o s i t i o n s and power (Jones and Sakong, p . 2 8 0 ) . 
P r e s iden t Park passed a s imi la r law in June 1961 to dea l with i l l i c i t l y 
accumulated wea l th . Under t h i s law, P a r k ' s m i l i t a r y government 
"immediately a r r e s t e d most of the n a t i o n ' s l ead ing bus iness men" ( i b i d . , p . 
281). 
This law defined a s i l l i c i t p r o f i t e r s - a l l those who between 1 J u l y 
1953 and 15 May 1961 had " (1 ) i l l i c i t l y ea rn ing p r o f i t s t o t a l l i n g more than 
100 m i l l i o n Hwan by e i t h e r purchasing or r e n t i n g publicly-owned p r o p e r t i e s 
( l a r g e l y those conf i sca ted from the J a p a n e s e ) ; (2 ) obta ined loans or 
purchases of more than 100,000 d o l l a r s worth of government - or bank-owned 
- 202 -
After 1963, there have been simultaneous trends towards a widening as well 
as towards a narrowing of income d i f f e r e n t i a l s . On balance the income 
d i s t r ibu t ion seems to have s l igh t ly improved in the 1960s and worsened in the 
1970s. Each of these trends found the i r origin in pol ic ies that meant to 
d i rec t ly affect the income d i s t r ibu t ion , as well as in other pol ic ies that 
indirect ly affected i t . We wi l l br ief ly discuss each. 
The pol ic ies that meant to influence the income d is t r ibu t ion in a posi t ive 
way included the continued enforcement of the 3 cheongbo cei l ing as well as 
measures that banned the use of, or heavily taxed many consumer goods. The 
importation of foreign c igare t tes was for a long time s t r i c t l y prohibited 
(Jones), car buyers were obliged to buy bonds aimed at financing public 
transport (Chaponniere). The importation of re f r igera tors and te lev is ions was 
also forbidden. A par t icu la r ly well known case was that of colour 
te lev is ions . Despite enormous pressure from domestic industry that had a huge 
(over)capacity to produce them, President Park refused to the very end the i r 
sale on the domestic market. 
S t r i c t l y speaking consumption bans do not affect income d i s t r ibu t ion as 
such, as they only l imit the spending s ide . However, i t can be argued that 
footnote 1 continued from previous page: 
foreign exchange; (3) provided po l i t i c a l funds of more than 50 mil l ion Hwan 
in return for bank loans; (4) earned prof i t s of more than 100 mill ion Hwan in 
the process of contracting or bidding for public works or commodity trade in 
an i l l ega l way; (5) earned prof i ts of more than 200 mill ion Hwan by 
monopolising the purchase or a l locat ion of foreign exchange; (6) avoided 
taxes of more than 200 million Hwan; (7) i l l e g a l l y transferred the i r wealth 
abroad." (Jones and Sakong, p . 281). 
"In the end . . . a compromise was worked out whereby criminal sanctions 
were abolished, and the accused businessmen were to build factor ies and turn 
them over to the government. The matter was closed in December 1964 with most 
paying thei r fines in cash", ( i b i d . ) . 
They conclude that "Some wi l l view th is episode as a " se l l -ou t" while 
others wi l l agree with us that i t r e f l ec t s the government's dominant 
commitment to growth coupled to a bel ief that entrepreneurs were an essen t ia l 
scarce commodity to be u t i l i s e d in pursuit of that goal" ( i b id . pp. 281-282). 
A number of authors (Michell, Brown, Kuznets, Fields) have pointed, 
however, a t the many d i f f i cu l t i e s involved and thei r potent ia l d i s to r t iona l 
effects of the way relevant data are col lected, compiled and processed in the 
Republic of Korea. 
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diminishing the poss ib l i t i es to spend (foreign travel was also largely 
r e s t r i c t ed , i f not outright impossible), puts the importance of gaining more 
income somewhat into perspective. 
The Grain Management Fund, and the F e r t i l i z e r Fund were set up to improve 
the rural-urban income d i s t r ibu t ion . When by the l a t e 1960s i t became clear 
that the gap between rura l and urban incomes kept increasing, the Grain 
Management Fund was introduced in 1969. This fund was used by the Government 
to buy up r ice and barley a t a cer tain price to support farmers' incomes. As 
a t the same time i t did not want to increase the price of these products for 
urban workers, i t sold them to consumers at a lower p r i ce . The F e r t i l i z e r 
Fund sold f e r t i l i s e r a t a set (subsidised) p r i ce . Whatever the precise effect 
of the operation of these two funds on the rural-urban income d i s t r i bu t ion , 
their effect on the s t a t e ' s budget was considerable, as thei r operation 
involved considerable subsidies (Hasan and Rao; vanLiemt) . 
Final ly , the policy of st imulating labour-intensive exports led in the 
1960s to more employment, lower unemployment and contributed to higher wages. 
Simultaneously a s ignif icant portion of the labour force shifted from 
lower-income sectors (such as agr icul ture) to high-income sec tors . Between 
1966 and 1971, wages and sa la r ies rose from 32.5 per cent to 39.1 per cent of 
national income (Brown). 
Among the pol ic ies that contributed to a worsening of the income 
d i s t r ibu t ion was the agr icu l tura l policy of the 1960s that kept r i ce prices 
low. This considerably worsened the rural-urban income d i s t r ibu t ion and led 
to much migration (but was l a t e r corrected) . Government's policy of 
control l ing the unions has without doubt kept wages low and hours of work long 
in many indus t r i e s . 
Government's policy of allowing the chae-bol to outgrow thei r smaller 
competitors may have been appropriate on eficiency grounds, but the pr ivi leges 
awarded to them also allowed inequality to go up further . 
More recent ly , growing inequali ty has resul ted from the increase in 
property income ( r en t s , i n t e r e s t s , dividends) r e l a t i ve to other (chiefly 
labour) income. The share of a l l forms of property in national income rose 
from 12.7 per cent in 1975 to 18.6 per cent in 1981. That this should occur 
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after the so-called turning point in the labour market i s d is turbing, says 
Michell (p . 227). Moreover, the steepest r i s e in income from property 
occurred between 1979-81, which indicates say Michell, that the slowdown in 
the economy has affected rea l wages more than other incomes. 
Summarising, the available evidence seems to point to a worsening of 
income d i s t r ibu t ion after 1970, but how serious th is deter iorat ion has been 
cannot be precisely assessed. The rural-urban income d i s t r ibu t ion worsened 
quickly in the second half of the 1960s, but th is worsening was redressed in 
the 1970s. The re la t ion between big and small enterpr ise has continuously 
changed in favour of big en te rp r i se . 
The Mexican income d i s t r ibu t ion has shown a steady decline for the 
(1950-75) period for which data are available ( table 60). The high population 
growth, stagnation in the agr icu l tura l sector and the pat tern of 
indus t r i a l i sa t ion that led to an increasing dualism in urban areas between 
those in the formal, unionised sector and those outside i t are no doubt among 
the main explanatory fac tors . To be sure, government did t ry to influence the 
cost of l iving of (par t icu lar ly the urban) poor through price controls and the 
CONASUPO food d i s t r ibu t ion chain. However, such measures failed to outweigh 
the negative impact of other measures such as protectionism and agr i cu l tu ra l 
pricing po l i c i e s , and the lack of adequate employment of half the population. 
In Brazi l , too, the income d i s t r ibu t ion i s very uneven and has worsened 
over time ( table 61). This seems to have been the effect of two factors in 
par t i cu la r . F i r s t , wages for the unskilled and semi-skilled failed to 
increase s ignif icant ly and second, those of the well educated and of those in 
managerial posi t ions were bid up as a r e su l t of the i r r e l a t i v e s ca r c i t y . 
Wages of the low-skilled workers were kept low through three mechanisms. 
F i r s t , there was the government's policy to keep minimum wage increases behind 
inf la t ion , which was discussed in the previous sect ion. Second, there was 
the vast reserve army of poor landless workers who moved from the poor 
agr icu l tura l north-east to the indus t r ia l south. Their presence kept a 
downward pressure on wages of the un- and semi-ski l led. 
The government a lso had d i rec t ly a great influence on the income 
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and 10 (for part A) and cuadros 12 (for part B). 
Data in panel A computed from income and expenditure 
surveys; see table A-l for citations. For panel B, see 
the appendix for details on the income adjustment process, 
Source. Felix. 
Percentage of t o t a l family 
income a f t e r tax accru ing t o : 
Lowest 20% 
30% below the median 







































Source. van Ginneken. 
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Table 61 . Brazil1 : S ize d i s t r i b u t i o n of income, 1960-80 (per cent of 
income) 
Dec i l es 1960 1970 1980 
In the Accumulated In the Accumulated In the Accumulated 





















































































Sources. Werneck, from: 1960 and 1970, Langoni (1973; 1980, FIBGE: 
Tabulacoes avancadas de Censo Demogrgfico (1981) . 
A t h i r d fac to r was the government 's i n t e r f e r e n c e in the wage ba rga in ing 
p r o c e s s . By g r e a t l y reducing the r o l e of the t r a d e unions and indeed by 
assuming c o n t r o l over t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s t h e i r power was g r e a t l y reduced . 
Post-1964 l e g i s l a t i o n fu r ther weakened t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e i n d i v i d u a l worker 
(he could e a s i l y be d i s m i s s e d ) . 
Facing t he se d i so rgan i sed workers were a wel l -o rgan ised group of 
employers. Morley did a survey to e s t a b l i s h the wage-se t t ing mechanism in the 
Sao Paulo area and found t h a t personnel d i r e c t o r s of l a r g e firms of ten 
belonged to t r ade a s s o c i a t i o n s in which s a l a r y informat ion was exchanged. He 
concluded t h a t the personnel departments of some l a rge firms s e t wages for 
t h e i r i n d u s t r i e s , and the smal le r f irms and the workers adapted to those 
wages. "Workers had no inpu t in t h i s p r o c e s s . " ( p . 225) . 
At the o the r end of the s c a l e educated and s k i l l e d workers d id wel l ( s e e , 
for example, t a b l e 6 2 ) . 
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Table 62. B r a z i l : Index of r e a l wages by s k i l l , 
1961-76 
1961 1966 1971 1976 
Unski l led 
Semi-sk i l l ed 
Sk i l l ed 
Foremen 
Managers 























DIEESE (1977) . 
Wages d e f l a t e d by DIEESE cos t of l i v i n g 
(COL) index . Sample i s for four 
unions*, t e x t i l e s , m e t a l , j o u r a n l i s t s 
and n u r s i n g . 
This in t u rn was the r e s u l t of two f a c t o r s . F i r s t , t h e r e were r e l a t i v e l y 
few h igh ly educated and s k i l l e d workers and managers about when r ap id growth 
s t a r t e d . Second, t h e p a t t e r n of growth was s k i l l - i n t e n s i v e . The c o n t r a s t 
wi th , for example, the Republic of Korea could not be g r e a t e r . In t h a t 
country , rap id growth s t a r t e d in low-sk i l l ed i n d u s t r i e s in an environment with 
a r e l a t i v e l y wel l q u a l i f i e d labour fo rce . In Braz i l (and Mexico) the opposi te 1 
happened. I n d u s t r i a l growth was concentra ted in s e c t o r s which because of the 
products they produced and because of the techniques they used had a 
r e l a t i v e l y high demand for s k i l l e d and we l l educated s t a f f in an environment 
where those were r e l a t i v e l y s c a r c e ! ( a l s o Morley, p . 202) . 
The worsening income d i s t r i b u t i o n in B r a z i l seems thus in no small p a r t 
po l icy- induced . The government was f u l l y aware of t h i s worsening income 
d i s t r i b u t i o n . However, i t considered i nc rea s ing i n e q u a l i t y an i n e v i t a b l e , i f 
un fo r tuna t e , accompaniment of r ap id growth. The i n e l a s t i c supply of educated 
workers on the one hand and t h e la rge r e s e r v e of u n s k i l l e d workers on the 
o the r "has the shor t run e f f e c t of inc reas ing the d i s p e r s i o n of incomes and, 
t h e r e f o r e , of i n c r e a s i n g i n e q u a l i t y " (Car los Langoni, e x - P r e s i d e n t of the 
Cen t ra l Bank, quoted in Hewle t t , p . 332) . 
The experience of the two Asian c o u n t r i e s appears to i n d i c a t e t h a t t h i s 




This study has compared the process of growth in the manufacturing 
industry of Brazil, Mexico, Singapore and the Republic of Korea, four of the 
most dynamic newly industrialising countries. It has concentrated on the 
period 1960-80 with particular attention being given to the impact of 
government policies. However, a number of other variables have also been 
taken into account: the contribution of public, domestic private and foreign 
enterprises; the impact of growth on wages and employment, as well as changes 
in the distribution of income. These elements were included because it was 
considered that each would contribute significantly to a better understanding 
of the central issue of this study - how government policies influence 
economic performance. The disadvantage of such a broad approach is that it 
loses out in depth. The study may at times have done no more than scratch the 
surface, and the analysis may occasionally have raised more questions than it 
answers. Nevertheless, this approach was chosen because a purely economic 
approach could not alone explain their remarkable performance. In addition, a 
search for possibilities of emulation of their achievements would need to take 
account of these non-economic factors. 
The newly industrialising countries became the focus of attention in 
industrialised and developing countries alike because of their high and 
sustained economic and manufacturing growth, and the large investment and 
international loans that they received. In the industrialised countries the 
rapidly rising exports of some NICs were blamed for affecting employment. 
Developing countries with similar ambitions, but unable to reach similarly 
high growth rates, asked how and under what circumstances their rapid growth 
had occurred. 
Yet apart from above-average economic and manufacturing growth, the four 
countries selected have remarkably little in common. If one were to draw a 
caricature one could say that the first country is, for all practical 
purposes, an island which feels threatened by its northern neighbour with 
which - after a bloody war - it has never signed a peace agreement, and of 
which its own and other governments feel that the ideological war in which it 
is also engaged is far from over. Moreover, this country (the Republic of 
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Korea) has another neighbour, whose outstanding economic success is equally 
felt as a challenge. The second is a small independent territory built around 
an excellent natural harbour which is very strategically located. From a 
trading centre it became a manufacturing "miracle", and now is promoting 
itself as a services centre. This country (Singapore) has a large 
"hinterland" that is, in part, the basis of its success, but of which it is 
legally independent, allowing it to regulate the inflow of migrants at will. 
The third country shares a 2,000 mile border with the world's most powerful 
economy, to which it lost nearly half of its territory and which today is both 
its main trading partner and principal source of foreign investment. This 
country (Mexico) has also seen many of its citizens migrate north in search of 
an income. The fourth country is so huge that it dominates a whole 
continent. Indeed it has been called a continent in itself. It is a country 
(Brazil) with vast mineral, agricultural and forestry resources and with a 
domestic market that is among the largest in the world. 
Even in their manufacturing industry the differences between them are 
remarkable. For example, in Brazil as early as 1949, 20 per cent of the GNP 
was generated in manufacturing, whereas 10 years later in the Republic of 
Korea this was still only 7.8 per cent. In Singapore, two-thirds of 
manufacturing output is exported, whereas in Mexico, until recently, most 
manufacturers would only think of export when for some reason the domestic 
market could not absorb all their production. 
Despite these differences it was considered that the dynamic and sustained 
growth of their manufacturing industry, which had earned them a place among 
the newly industrialising countries, warranted their selection for further 
study. A choice of countries is, of course, always arbitrary, but as these 
four appeared on all selections of NICs, any other choice would have been at 
least as arbitrary. 
The focus on domestic policies and other, essentially domestic issues 
should not be interpreted as a judgment on their importance relative to 
external factors. The underlying idea was that most countries and governments 
have to take the external environment very much as given, but that in the 
period under consideration, they had at least some autonomy over domestic 
policy. The focus on domestic policies seemed, therefore, more practical and 
potentially useful. It can, of course, be argued that their rapid growth was 
the result of the rapid expansion of demand in the OECD, and the rapid growth 
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of overseas lending and d i rec t foreign investment that occurred in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Such a view is correc t , but not complete. Many countries grew at 
a much slower r a t e during that period, and, therefore, pol ic ies must have been 
an important component of the explanation for these differences. 
Nevertheless i t is true that both domestic and external factors play thei r 
role in the process of development. This i s perhaps best i l l u s t r a t e d by what 
has become the most crucial development issue today, the foreign debt and how 
to service i t . Until not too long ago i t was considered normal for a 
government to indebt i t s e l f through loans, to finance an infras t ructure that 
would benefit future generations as well as the present one and who were thus 
expected to contribute to i t s financing. Today, however, being in debt i s 
frequently regarded as something bad - a t l eas t for developing count r ies . Yet 
when these countries contracted the i r debt, th is was generally considered a 
correct , even desirable (because r ea l costs were negative), thing to do. 
True, not a l l exercised sufficient control , and to these the level of the 
t o t a l outstanding debt may have come as a surpr i se . Not a l l may have paid 
sufficient a t ten t ion to having a well s tructured debt, and the i r large share 
of short-maturity loans may have caught them off-guard when these were 
suddenly cut off. 
I t is obvious that countries that contracted debt, wi l l ingly increased 
the i r vulnerabi l i ty and dependence on outside events . But, a t the same time 
i t must be asked who could have foreseen that the US dol lar would appreciate 
by 50 per cent against other major currencies, that nominal i n t e re s t r a t e s 
would double at a time when inf la t ion came down, and that cap i ta l inflows 
could dry up as quickly as they did in Latin America, where private inflows of 
US$24,000 mill ion in 1981 turned into a net outflow of US$5,6 00 mil l ion two 
years later1 . 
Another question that must be asked is how important were pol ic ies 
compared to cer ta in objective factors . Are not objective factors far more 
important in determining the nature and pace of a country's development? 
Large natural resource-rich countr ies , for instance, may see no need to export 
IADB: Economic and social progress in Latin America (Washington, 
DC, 1985, p.419). 
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manufactures as long as their primary exports finance thei r necessary 
imports. Indeed, the i r r e l a t i ve abundance of natural resources may render the 
underlying exchange r a t e so "strong" that i t effectively discourages 
labour-intensive manufactured exports from being competitive and encourages 
imports of food and consumer goods, undercutting both ru ra l and indus t r ia l 
development. 
By the same reasoning, small natural-resource poor countries would have no 
choice but to engage in manufactured exports. Yet the fact that many such 
countries have not followed th i s path can only be explained by p o l i c i e s . 
Comparing the to ta l ly different development path of Singapore in the l a s t two 
decades with the once great port of Aden offers a clear example of what a 
difference pol ic ies can make. 
A discussion of the resu l t s of po l ic ies must also consider the magnitude 
of the problems that governments faced. Manufacturing, export and employment 
growth, for example, was much higher in Singapore than in Brazil and Mexico. 
But i s such a comparison meaningful? Singapore's high population density 
gives i t a high yield on inf ras t ructura l investments and there i s no large, 
slow growing agr icu l tura l sector to pul l overall growth down. Few other 
c i t i e s can control the inflow of migrants the way Singapore can. Considering 
t h i s , i t could be asked whether Singapore's economic growth was r ea l ly so much 
faster than that of a r e l a t ive ly well-off area in S^o Paolo of equal s i ze . 
Despite the i r very high growth, one could also ask whether the Republic of 
Korea and Singapore could have grown even faster than they did. Such a 
question is not a l l that s t range. What, for instance, would have happened if 
the massive investments made in the heavy and chemical industr ies in the 
Republic of Korea in the 1970s which resulted in huge overcapacity had been 
made in other ac t iv i t i e s? 
"Lessons" 
Whether "lessons" can be learned for other developing countries was the 
principal question that th is study addressed. If anything i t must surely have 
shown that th is question can only be answered with great caution. Moreover, 
In the extreme case of oi l -export ing countr ies , t h i s has been called 
the "Kuwait effect" (Ranis in Baer and G i l l i s , p. 215). 
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i t is doubtful whether there are many lessons that have such general va l id i ty 
that they can be applied to a group containing a large var ie ty of countries at 
different levels of development. Therefore, by necessi ty, these lessons must 
be formulated in very general terms. 
1. The example of the NICs has shown tha t , given the r igh t external 
environment and the r ight po l i c i e s , sustained growth of manufacturing output, 
employment and exports a t r a tes exceeding 5 and even 10 per cent per annum is 
possible. This puts a very high upper l imit on developing count r ies ' 
ambitions. I t is important to bring th i s out, but i t is a lso clear that not 
a l l countries may be able to achieve these high ra t e s and indeed the four 
countries considered might not have been able to reach such high growth under 
the present circumstances. 
2. The domestic environment, in which high growth occurred in the NICs 
cannot possibly be described as "a free play of market forces". To the 
contrary and despite the i r rhe to r i c , in each the government played and plays a 
s ign i f ican t , i f not a dominant r o l e . I t seems important to s t r ess th i s point 
as the opposite is often suggested. Even in tiny Singapore, where government 
involvement in the economy was perhaps smallest , the s t a t e owns dozens of 
en terpr i ses . In Brazil many of the largest enterpr ises are government-
control led. Yet the fact that these governments intervened heavily in the 
period of high growth is not, of course, proof in i t s e l f tha t th is 
intervention helped or hampered growth. One should not forget that a large 
part of the foreign debt in the Latin American countries was contracted by 
public enterpr ise . The question to be asked therefore, seems to be not so 
much whether government intervened, but rather how much and what kind of 
intervention contributed to success. 
3 . Close contacts between governments and business both in the 
formulation and implementation of pol ic ies were found to have been very 
benef ic ia l . Maintaining good contacts proved by no means synonymous to 
governments s lavishly following business desires (these are in any case too 
heterogeneous). In a mixed economy, however, government must be aware of the 
constraints facing business and i t is doubtful whether i t i s wise for a 
government to stray too long and too far from market-indicated so lu t ions . 
Naturally governments are concerned with the long-term in te res t s of the 
population as a whole, but these need not be incompatible with a respect for 
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the market. In Singapore, for example, public enterprises are a l l 
profit-making but at the same time ci t izens enjoy a social security system 
that is v i r t ua l l y unique in the developing world. 
4 . The two Asian countr ies ' success with exporting, and the Latin 
American debt c r i s i s have underlined the central importance of the external 
sector . On the posi t ive s ide , the experiences of the Republic of Korea and of 
Singapore are clear examples of how countries can benefit from strong overseas 
demand and how the need to compete in ternat ional ly puts a check on the number 
of d i s tor t ions a country can to le ra te in te rna l ly . On the negative s ide , there 
is now dramatic evidence of the r i sks involved in not taking timely act ion to 
redress sustained current account de f i c i t s and of neglecting the s t ructure of 
the foreign debt. This puts an important check on the type of development 
chosen and how i t should be financed. In addi t ion, the experience of the four 
countries has shown how important i t is to keep the exchange r a t e from 
becoming overvalued. Apart from obvious advantages such as avoiding an 
anti-export b i a s , th i s has proved important for avoiding capi ta l f l i gh t . 
5. The dichotomy between countries that followed import subs t i tu t ion and 
those that followed export promotion paths proved much less sharp, being a 
matter of degree at most. All four countr ies , a t some point, had an element 
of both in their trade po l i c i e s . Broadly speaking, one could say that for a 
long time the two Latin American countries stressed import subst i tu t ion which 
indirect ly discouraged exports. The two Asian countries had a more open 
approach and proved much be t te r a t taking advantage of the opportunities 
offered by the rapid growth of the world economy. Even Singapore, however, 
protected certain industr ies and the Republic of Korea, s t i l l protects 
important segments of i t s manufacturing industry thus showing that even in 
these two countr ies , which are often referred to as "super-exporters", 
openness is a matter of degree. I t could be argued, however, tha t in the 
Republic of Korea protection was be t te r planned and therefore less costly 
than in Mexico for example. In Brazi l , more a t tent ion to exports in the 
second half of the 1970s led to them increasing in a spectacular manner. I t s 
experience shows how complicated i t i s , however, to superimpose an export 
promotion regime on top of a system that is geared towards import protect ion. 
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6. C l a r i t y and t ransparency of o b j e c t i v e s and p r i o r i t i e s and t h e i r 
combining in a coherent s t r a t e g y , in a d d i t i o n to comprehensive and u p - t o - d a t e 
s t a t i s t i c s , a quick r e p o r t i n g system and a q u a l i f i e d c i v i l s e r v i c e a l l proved 
e s s e n t i a l for guiding economic growth. In the Republic of Korea, t h e 
ou t s t and ing example of a country which managed to combine high growth and 
d r a s t i c s t r u c t u r a l changes, a combination of p lann ing ; g r ea t concern for the 
economy a t the h i g h e s t l e v e l ; a pragmatic approach to day- to-day p o l i c i e s , 
and a modest degree of d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n in indus t ry proved p a r t i c u l a r l y 
success fu l . Planning con t r ibu ted to g r e a t e r c o - o r d i n a t i o n wi th in the publ ic 
sec tor and publ ished t a r g e t s helped b u s i n e s s to check i t s investment d e c i s i o n s 
a g a i n s t government p r o j e c t i o n s a t an e a r l y s t a g e . P lans were, however, not 
allowed to become a dogma. Day-to-day p o l i c i e s were f l e x i b l e enough to manage 
cons tan t change. P o l i c i e s were matched to o p p o r t u n i t i e s and c o n s t r a i n t s , and 
were reviewed and changed when they did no t work (Bergsman, 1979, p . 9 0 ) . 
S i m i l a r l y , S ingapore ' s success has been a t t r i b u t e d not to the magic of the 
marketplace "but r a t h e r to the shrewd, f l e x i b l e , pragmatic use of 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s and market s i g n a l s " (Lim and Pang, p . 135) . 
7 . Successful p o l i c i e s a r e as much a mat te r of formulat ion as of 
implementat ion. However well thought out a development s t r a t e g y may b e , i t 
w i l l remain wi thout e f f e c t u n l e s s the a p p r o p r i a t e means to ca r ry i t out 
e x i s t . The d i f f e r e n c e in the exper iences of Mexico and the Republic of Korea, 
in t h i s r e s p e c t , a r e both t e l l i n g and d r ama t i c . When in the e a r l y 1970s 
P r e s i d e n t Echever r la t r i e d to push through some s o c i a l reforms he found he 
lacked the power to get them financed through h igher t a x a t i o n ( i n s t e a d he had 
to borrow ab road ) . In c o n t r a s t , the Government of the Republic of Korea i s 
e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y powerful . Exchange c o n t r o l s , c o n t r o l over v i r t u a l l y a l l of 
the banks and over foreign t r a v e l ( a l l n o n - e x i s t e n t in Mexico) fu r the r add to 
the government 's powers. 
The combination of a development-minded government and a s t rong c e n t r a l 
power has proved a very successful combination in economic terms in the 
Republic of Korea. 
However, i t i s doubtful whether i t i s f e a s i b l e and d e s i r a b l e to achieve or 
r e - c r e a t e such a h igh ly c o n t r o l l e d s i t u a t i o n e l sewhere . A " s t r o n g " government 
may appear d e s i r a b l e in economic te rms , bu t the p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s w i l l 
often* r u l e i t o u t . 
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8. Rapid growth need not necessari ly be accompanied by growing 
inequali ty. Government intervention can prevent th is or slow i t down. The 
incentives to encourage investment tend to cheapen the price of the scarcest 
production factor, c a p i t a l . Governments that want to promote growth may be 
concerned, therefore, that they are impl ic i t ly encouraging a worsening income 
d is t r ibu t ion : d i r ec t l y , because capi ta l owners receive a higher return on 
their investments, and indi rec t ly because by encouraging capi ta l - in tens ive 
, growth, ski l led workers also receive a premium. However, the experiences of 
both the Republic of Korea and Singapore have shown that growth and equity can 
occur together. True, in the Republic of Korea th is was in large part the 
resu l t of a red is t r ibu t ion before growth. Large-scale destruction of property 
after the war, and the land reforms of the l a t e 1940s and early 1950s greatly 
contributed to t h i s . These were made possible by exceptional circumstances, 
such as the departure of the Japanese occupiers. 
But pol ic ies undertaken during the high growth period also contr ibuted. 
The most important of these were the emphasis on universal education, and the 
policy that s tressed labour-intensive indus t r ia l i sa t ion that made intensive 
use of the most abundant production factor . In the two Latin American 
countries the lower level of education of the majority of the people, together 
with a policy that stressed capi ta l and ski11-intensive indus t r i a l i s a t ion , bid 
up the income of the few who possessed scarce s k i l l s and cap i t a l , compared to 
the many low and unskilled workers whose services were in less demand. 
9. This study has concentrated on the manufacturing industry. However, 
such issues as income d i s t r ibu t ion and un- and underemployment have proved to 
be far more sensi t ive to developments in the agr icu l tura l sector and to 
population growth. Perhaps one of the c leares t conclusions which ar i ses out 
of th is study on manufacturing is the importance of agr icu l ture . Internal 
terms of trade which do not discriminate against agr icul ture wi l l have a 
• favourable effect on income d i s t r ibu t ion . They wi l l allow that sector to 
prosper and contribute to overall economic growth, to supply food to the 
population saving foreign exchange, and wil l discourage people from migrating 
to the c i t i e s . 
The quest for "lessons" from the experience of the four NICs, taking into 
account of economic and po l i t i c a l factors , has not resulted in the emergence 
of a par t icular model. At most one might say that th is chapter and the ones 
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tha t preceded i t , have s t r e s s e d c e r t a i n elements t h a t appeared t o have proved 
p a r t i c u l a r l y s u c c e s s f u l , or t h a t should be avoided a t a l l c o s t s . Government 
i n t e r v e n t i o n s were found t o be important a l though these should show a r e s p e c t 
for the "market" and t h e c o n s t r a i n t s imposed by the e x t e r n a l s e c t o r . The 
choice of t rade p o l i c i e s proved t o be determined more by pragmatic f a c t o r s 
than by a s t r a igh t fo rward choice between import s u b s t i t u t i o n and expor t 
promotion. A combination of high commitment to development, a p roper ly 
defined s t r a t e g y , in combination with f l e x i b l e t r a n s p a r e n t p o l i c i e s has proved 
p a r t i c u l a r l y s u c c e s s f u l . F i n a l l y , i t was shown t h a t economic growth need not 
au toma t i ca l l y lead t o a worsening d i s t r i b u t i o n of income. P o l i c i e s can 
success fu l ly r e d r e s s such a t rend al though much depends on a g r i c u l t u r e and 
r e s t r a i n e d popu la t ion growth. 
Rapid manufacturing growth has l i f t e d o v e r a l l economic and employment 
growth in a l l the four c o u n t r i e s . Applying the above l e s sons would i t be 
p o s s i b l e for o ther c o u n t r i e s to follow a s imi l a r and equa l ly suces s fu l 
development path? The answer to t h i s ques t i on depends very much on t h e i r 
l e v e l of development. I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n t akes t ime . Bui ld ing an 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , t r a i n i n g people and a c q u i r i n g the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s k i l l s i s a 
process t h a t takes y e a r s , i f no t decades . I t must be remembered t h a t none of 
the four coun t r i e s s t ud i ed was a " t y p i c a l " low-income country by t o d a y ' s 
s t a n d a r d s . B r a z i l , Mexico and Singapore had per cap i t a incomes of over $700 
in 1960, and the Republic of Korea, d e s p i t e lower income per head , had many 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a middle-income coun t ry , such as high l i t e r a c y and a 
r e l a t i v e l y high educa t iona l l e v e l of i t s people . The Republic of Korea had 
a l so a l ready known a rap id i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n phase in the 1930s. 
Moreover, r a p i d growth through manufactur ing may be a h igh c o s t r o u t e 
t h a t , by i t s e l f , does not provide the s o l u t i o n to the employment problem. A 
job c rea ted in manufacturing c o s t s much more than in a g r i c u l t u r e , for example, 
and t h i s argument has gained much weight now t h a t investment funds a r e so 
sca rce and expens ive . From an employment p o i n t of view, t h e r e f o r e , i t seems 
important not to favour indus t ry undu ly . 
The growing p ro t ec t i on i sm in the world today makes i t more d i f f i c u l t to 
a t t a i n high economic and employment growth through manufacturing and e x p o r t s . 
I n s e c u r i t y about growth of expor t markets makes investment in t h i s s e c t o r more 
hazardous . Cer ta in " s u c c e s s f u l " p o l i c y elements have been i d e n t i f i e d bu t i t 
r i 
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i s a fac t of l i f e t h a t p o s s i b i l i t i e s for emulation depend today more than ever 
on what happens o u t s i d e developing c o u n t r i e s - i . e . how f a s t demand w i l l grow 
and the p rospec t s for an a c c e l e r a t i o n of lending and investment f lows. 
Although l a r g e l y o u t s i d e the scope of t h i s s tudy , some space must be ded ica ted 
to t h i s . 
The NICs in the world economy 
The NICs a r e l inked through t r a d e and f i n a n c i a l flows with the 
" e s t a b l i s h e d " i n d u s t r i a l i s e d c o u n t r i e s . The i r g r e a t e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the 
world economy and rapid growth made them, for a long t ime , i n t o the most 
dynamic markets for OECD c o u n t r i e s . The NICs, in t u r n , have become s i z e a b l e 
expor te r s of such products as t e x t i l e s , c l o t h i n g , footwear and s h i p s . At a 
time of low economic growth and high unemployment these imports from the NICs 
a re no longer as welcome. Ca l l s for p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t these imports a r e 
of ten " j u s t i f i e d " by r e f e r r i n g to the poor working condi tons of workers in the 
expor t ing c o u n t r i e s . ("Workers r e c e i v e low wages and a r e being e x p l o i t e d , and 
t h i s makes i t so d i f f i c u l t for us to compete with them. L e t t i n g in expor t s 
from these c o u n t r i e s would encourage e x p l o i t a t i o n of these workers . " ) 
C e r t a i n ob jec t ions must , n e v e r t h e l e s s , be r a i s e d a g a i n s t t h i s kind of 
r eason ing . F i r s t , i t t r e a t s importing a s a p r i v i l e g e , r a t h e r than as a means 
to inc rease w e l f a r e . Second, taken t o i t s extreme form, such reason ing would 
exclude a l l imports from c o u n t r i e s a t a lower l e v e l of development. The most 
important ob jec t ion t h a t can be r a i s e d to t h i s reasoning i s , however, i t s 
e s s e n t i a l l y s t a t i c c h a r a c t e r . A more dynamic approach would r ecogn i se t h a t 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e i s a means for a l l coun t r i e s to a c c e l e r a t e growth of 
ou tput , income and wages. 
Such an approach f inds cons iderab le support in the experience of the two 
coun t r i e s t h a t r e l i e d most on expor t s for growth*. Singapore and the Republic 
of Korea. Thanks in no small measure to the p o s s i b i l i t i e s offered by 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e , Singapore now has a per c a p i t a income h ighe r than I t a l y ' s 
and 40 per cent h igher than S p a i n ' s . I t s government, moreover, p rovides i t s 
c i t i z e n s with a generous system of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y . 
In the Republic of Korea per c a p i t a income went up from $100 in 1960 to 
US$2,000 in 1983. Real wages in manufacturing quadrupled between 1960 and 
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1978. Low wages may have been advantageous in the e a r l y s t a g e s of 
e x p o r t a t i o n . Today, and thanks to having been ab le t o grow and expo r t , they 
have reached much h igher wage l e v e l s . 
I t i s t r u e t h a t working hours a re s t i l l long and t h a t wages of women 
workers a r e much lower than t h a t of t h e i r male c o l l e a g u e s . I t should be 
asked, however, whether these are problems t y p i c a l of the NICs or whether they 
a l so e x i s t e l sewhere , given the s u b s t a n t i a l gaps p e r s i s t i n g in OECD c o u n t r i e s . 
The focus on imports a l s o ignores the importance of NICs as m a r k e t s . 
B r a z i l and Mexico, for example, a r e huge marke t s . Together they a r e over four 
times the s i z e of Sweden or Swi tzer land . For many years they were among the 
wor ld ' s most dynamic expor t marke t s . 
The world r e c e s s i o n and, above a l l , t h e debt c r i s i s has changed a l l t h i s . 
The dear th of fresh loans and the h igh debt s e r v i c e - c o s t s have forced B r a z i l 
and Mexico to cut t h e i r imports to the ba re minimum and t h i s brought about 
domestic r e c e s s i o n . I t has a l s o robbed the OECD c o u n t r i e s of many expor t 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s and j o b s . Using ILO d a t a , UNCTAD has c a l c u l a t e d t h a t the 
c o n t r a c t i o n in expor t s to developing c o u n t r i e s has r e s u l t e d in a l o s s of c lo se 
to 7 m i l l i o n work-years of employment in OECD Europe and c l o s e t o 1 m i l l i o n 
work-years in North America between 1981 and 1984 - i . e . a l o s s of 2 t o 3 
m i l l i o n jobs in the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d world (UNCTAD T + D Report 1985) . 
The absence of f resh c a p i t a l , both in the form of e q u i t y , and loans 
seve re ly l i m i t s the p o s s i b i l i t y for o ther developing c o u n t r i e s of emulat ing 
the exper ience of the NICs, which a l l r e l i e d , to a l a rge e x t e n t , on fore ign 
c a p i t a l to i n i t i a t e the necessary investments and b r i n g about r ap id growth. 
I t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t in the absence of t he se massive c a p i t a l inf lows such a 
rapid turnaround from low to h igh growth as occurred in the Republic of Korea 
and Singapore can be r epea t ed . The c u r r e n t low l e v e l of demand in the OECD 
and the r i s e in p r o t e c t i o n a r e a d d i t i o n a l f a c to r s which w i l l i n h i b i t a 
r e p e t i t i o n of the high growth p r o c e s s . Worse s t i l l , the i n s e c u r i t y about OECD 
Workers in the manufacturing i n d u s t r y worked 53 .1 hours per week in 
the Republic of Korea, 48 .6 hours in Singapore and 46.5 hours in Mexico in 
1980. In the OECD t h e s e f i gu re s va r i ed from 33.4 hours in Belgium t o 43 .8 
hours in Switzer land in the same year ( ILO). 
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demand growth and protectionism wil l deter foreign investments and 
loan-capital flows because investors and lenders cannot be sure of the 
generation of necessary high growth to turn these flows into sound business 
opportuni t ies . This insecurity about developing country growth prospects is 
added to a general reluctance among entrepreneurs to invest due to high 
in te res t ra tes and the i n s t ab i l i t y in foreign exchange markets. 
If the current s i tua t ion continues a vicious c i r c l e may resu l t as 
recession in the NICs and other heavily indebted developing countries wi l l rob 
OECD countries of jobs in the i r exporting sector , which in turn wi l l lead to 
greater pressure for protectionism. This wi l l reduce developing country 
expor ters ' chances of servicing thei r debt and wil l prolong the i r domestic 
recession. 
Urgent action is needed to break out of t h i s c i rc le by providing loans and 
investments, rescheduling "old debts" , lowering in te res t r a t e s , and reducing 
protectionism. Through i t s budget and trade d e f i c i t s , the United States has 
provided the world with a huge demand stimulus in the past few years . Now 
that these de f ic i t s have become unsustainable i t is imperative that Japan and 
European countries with low inf lat ion take the lead in t h i s . This wi l l allow 
sufficient growth to be resumed. In the introduction to th is study, i t was 
s tated that the ra t ionale for the focus on the period 1960-80 was that the 
current s i tua t ion was considered to be an exceptional one. I t is p o l i t i c a l 
action that must make sure that i t i s . 
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ANNEX 
Some s o c i o - c u l t u r a l background information 
This annex g ives a b r i e f and broad overview of the s o c i o - c u l t u r a l 
"background" of B r a z i l , Mexico, t h e Republic of Korea and S ingapore . I t i s 
included because such information i s cons idered r e l e v a n t for a b e t t e r 
unders tanding of the d i s c u s s i o n of t h e i r performance. I t remains n e v e r t h e l e s s 
t r u e t h a t i t i s not always c l e a r how p r e c i s e l y a c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
inf luences or has inf luenced c e r t a i n growth v a r i a b l e s . 
The s i z e of each country , p a r t i c u l a r l y in connect ion wi th popula t ion 
d e n s i t y , g ives an i n d i c a t i o n of the communication problems t h a t may e x i s t and 
the y i e l d on the a v a i l a b l e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . A l a r g e , s c a r c e l y - p o p u l a t e d 
country would have to spend r e l a t i v e l y more on i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l investments 
than a small dense ly-popula ted one. The very dense ly-popula ted two Asian 
t e r r i t o r i e s would thus seem t o have a c l e a r advantage . 
The v a r i a t i o n s i n land a rea a re huge. The Ci ty S t a t e of Singapore 
2 
comprises no more than 620 km , whereas B r a z i l occupies n e a r l y h a l f t h e 
2 South American c o n t i n e n t . I t s 8.5 m i l l i o n km make i t the f i f t h l a r g e s t 
country in the wor ld . Mexico i s the w o r l d ' s t h i r t e e n t h l a r g e s t c o u n t r y . I t s 
2 
surface comprises 2 m i l l i o n km , some 20 t imes l a r g e r than the Republic of 
Korea. Although i t i s p a r t of mainland Asia , for a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes the 
Republic of Korea i s an i s l and due to the absence of any means of 
communication with i t s neighbours to the n o r t h . 
The d i f f e r e n c e s in the number of i n h a b i t a n t s a r e l e s s extreme. In the 
e a r l y 1980s Singapore had 2.4 m i l l i o n i n h a b i t a n t s and B r a z i l 120 m i l l i o n , the 
Republic of Korea 38 m i l l i o n and Mexico 70 m i l l i o n . These d i f f e r e n c e s a r e 
widening r a p i d l y , however, as the popu la t ion of the two La t i n American 
coun t r i e s grows much f a s t e r than those of the two Asian c o u n t r i e s . The 
popula t ion of Mexico grows p a r t i c u l a r l y f a s t . In the 1970s i t grew twice as 
f a s t a s t h a t of S ingapore . 
Race and r e l i g i o n have shown to be of ten more a d iv id ing r a t h e r than a 
unifying force in the b u i l d i n g of a na t ion s t a t e and the achievement of common 
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goals. When one group t r i e s to impose i t s cul ture on the others these 
differences may not be immediately apparent as they may l inger on underneath 
the surface for a long time. A policy that allows for pluriformity and t r i e s 
to avoid one group dominating p o l i t i c a l , economic or cul tura l l i f e , may prove 
beneficial in the long run, although a l l depends on how minori t ies perceive 
these efforts and how successful these pol ic ies are in achieving stated aims. 
The feeling of not being discriminated against would seem to free much energy 
for achieving pos i t ive (constructive) goa ls . 
The Republic of Korea, which consists of one homogeneous race speaking one 
language, thus seems to have an advantageous s ta r t ing pos i t ion . The country 
also has few regional differences. In terms of re l igion i t i s a pluriform 
society. Buddhism is the main re l ig ion (44 per cent of the population), but 
significant minori t ies believe in Chris t iani ty (28 per cent) and Confucianism 
(17 per cen t ) . The Confucianist her i tage appears to have worked as a unifying 
force however, and has been inf luent ia l in terms of respect for the Sta te , 
prestige attached to the administration, respect for one's superior and the 
place occupied by scholars . 
The other three countries are dominated by immigrants. Mexico was 
or iginal ly an Indian country. After i t was "discovered" many (mainly 
southern) Europeans migrated there and have kept on doing so to th is day. The 
descendants of these immigrants have come to dominate p o l i t i c a l and economic 
l i fe in Mexico. Many Mexicans are of mixed blood (Mestizos). Many Indians 
have survived and l ive mainly in the South of the country. They are also the 
poorest group in socie ty . 
Braz i l ' s population has been shaped by different waves of immigrations and 
i s as much a "melting pot" as the United S ta te s . Some descendants of the 
original inhabi tants , the Indians, can s t i l l be found in the Amazon region. 
The Portuguese co lonia l i s t s imported many mil l ions of Africans as slaves to 
work on the sugar p lanta t ions . The nineteenth and twentieth century saw the 
immigration of many other Europeans, such as Germans, Poles and I t a l i a n s . 
This century has also seen a steady inflow of Japanese (called Nissei in 
Braz i l ) . 
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Language (Spanish in Mexico and Portuguese in Brazil) could be considered 
a unifying force in the two Latin American countr ies , although the Indians 
have their own languages, and much German and Japanese is spoken in Southern 
Brazi l . The same could be said for r e l i g ion . Both Brazil and Mexico are 
considered Roman Catholic, although for some people from Indian and African 
origin this faith has been at most only p a r t i a l l y integrated into the i r 
t r ad i t iona l b e l i e f s . 
Singapore's population is very d ivers i f ied , both in origin and c u l t u r e . 
I t s population is made up ent i re ly of immigrants and the i r descendants. Most 
people are of Chinese origin (77 per cent of the population), but there are 
signif icant minori t ies of Malays (15 per cent) and people of Indian origin (6 
per cent) as well as some Europeans. The re l ig ious pluriformity is even 
greater and p a r t i a l l y follows r a c i a l or ig in . Most Malays, for example, are 
followers of Islam. The Chinese and Indians are more diverse in the i r 
re l ig ious a f f i l i a t i o n . Hinduism is the re l ig ion of most Indians, but Islam 
and Chris t iani ty are also important. Most Chinese declared themselves Taoists 
or Buddhist in the 1980 Census. 
Such diversi ty can easi ly lead to r a c i a l and re l ig ious problems and th i s 
indeed occurred a t the end of the Japanese occupation. However, even before 
independence in the 1950s, effor ts were made for greater r a c i a l and language 
integrat ion. After independence, the government took great care to promote 
ingration of the different races . English was promoted as the universal 
second language but Chinese (Mandarin), Malay, Tamil and English are a l l 
o f f ic ia l languages. 
History. Each of the four countries has been colonised by a different 
world power. The Republic of Korea's location between Japan and China made i t 
vulnerable to invasions from both s ides . Over the centuries these have indeed 
taken place on a number of occasions. From 1910 to 1945 i t was formally a 
colony of Japan. This contributed, in no small way, to the modernisation of 
the country's industry and inf ras t ructure . The American l ibe ra to r s who 
arrived in 1945 in South Korea are s t i l l there , a lbe i t in a reduced number 
(38,000 troops) . The d i rec t influence of the United States on Korean society 
seems to have been less than that of Japan although the country undoubtedly 
benefited from i t s aid and from being in the American "safety ne t " . 
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From 1950 to 1953 a war between the two Koreas destroyed large par ts of 
the country and many l ives were l o s t . In 1961 General Park Chung Hee became 
president . He remained in th is job u n t i l he was murdered in 1979. 
I t has been argued tha t for a number of reasons, such as the modernisation 
of the legal and administrative systems, the Japanese occupation reinforced 
the remarkable f luidi ty of the Republic of Korea's c lass s t ructure (Cole, 
Lyman, pp. 154-157). The large-scale destruct ion of physical property during 
the 1950-53 war and the land reforms must have further worked as an equalizing 
force. 
Singapore became a Bri t i sh colony in 1824. I t was used as a centre for 
entrepot trade and as a mi l i ta ry base. The country became an important 
regional o i l refining centre under Br i t i sh ru l e . I t gained self-government in 
1959 and formal independence in 1963. Between 1963 and 1965 i t formed part of 
the Malaysian Federation. Since 1959 the same party (PAP) and the same prime 
minister (Lee Kuan Yew) have been in power. 
The two Latin American countries gained formal independence in the early 
nineteenth century. Mexico was colonised by the Spanish. The colonial power 
extracted as much wealth as possible which was shipped back to increase the 
grandeur of Spain. Local noblemen were given par ts of the overseas t e r r i t o r y 
as reward for services rendered. The overseas noblemen took care to es tabl ish 
a class s t ructure in the faraway country, carefully shaped af ter the one they 
had known a t home. The r ac i a l undertones and the exploi ta t ive character of 
the arrangement laid the ground work for the s t r a t i f i c a t i o n and huge 
differences in wealth and income that are s t i l l ex i s t en t . 
Although Mexico gained independence from Spain in 1821, modern his tory is 
generally regarded to have s tar ted a century l a t e r when the revolution ended. 
The nineteenth century saw a war with the United States (as a resu l t of which 
i t los t half i t s t e r r i t o r y ) , occupation by France (1861-67) as well as a 
period of r e la t ive s t a b i l i t y under Porf i r io Diaz ("The Por f i r i a to" : 
1876-1911). Diaz followed a policy that welcomed foreign investment. His 
ru le was based on the support of a small group of (around 800) large 
landowners (hacendados). These very independent hacendados greatly expanded 
their lands at the expense of the small peasant landholders. At the beginning 
of th is century these peasants had become so impoverished that the s i tua t ion 
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had become untenable. They joined forces with the small middle-class and 
fractions of the upper-class who f e l t threatened by the growing influence of 
foreigners, and in 1910 the Mexican Revolution broke out . 
Different armies under leaders such as Pancho Vi l la and Emiliano Zapata 
managed to defeat Diaz in a very bloody c i v i l war that lasted nearly 10 years 
and cost the l ives of approximately 1 million people (Novib and Schlagheck). 
» 
After the end of the revolution i t took another 10 years u n t i l a cer ta in 
degree of p o l i t i c a l s t ab i l i t y was re-es tabl i shed . In 1928 the National 
Revolutionary Party (PNR) was created that would regulate the pres ident ia l 
succession. 
Although nationalism and agrarian reform had been the main themes of the 
revolution, very l i t t l e had been redis t r ibuted u n t i l 1934 when Lazaro Cardenas 
came to power. Cardenas introduced a whole ser ies of reforms. He 
redis t r ibuted land on a massive scale (18 mil l ion hec ta res ) , promoted 
indus t r ia l development, and nationalised (in 1938) cer ta in key indus t r i e s , 
including the o i l industry. In order to mobilise support for these radical 
changes, Cardenas organised the peasants and the workers in federations (CNC 
and CTM, respect ive ly) . These two organisations were adopted by the rul ing 
party that changed i t s name into PRM (Mexican Revolutionary Party) and in 1946 
into PRI ( In s t i t u t i ona l Revolutionary Par ty ) . All Mexican presidents of the 
l a s t 55 years have been selected by, and have been members of the PNR, PRM or 
PRI. 
The colonisation of Brazil by the Portuguese had a much more modest 
character than that of the r e s t of America by Spain. Portugal was much 
poorer than Spain and Brazil appeared not to have any gold or s i l v e r . When, 
however, in 1768 th is proved incorrect and gold was found in Minas Gerais, a 
true "gold rush" developed and 300,000 people came over from Por tugal . 
Unlike most of Spanish America, Brazil has not needed to b a t t l e for 
independence. In 1808 the Portuguese royal family moved to Brazil (when 
Napoleon neared Lisbon), and l a t e r , in 1822, the King' son Pedro refused to go 
back with h is father and stayed behind to become Emperor of Braz i l . In 1889 
the country became a republic . Individual s t a t e s enjoyed great independence 
and centra l power was very loose. The Military Coup of 1930 brought Getulio 
Vargas to power and his "new republic" marked the beginning of strong central 
power in Braz i l . 
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Vargas stayed in power u n t i l 1945 and returned in 1950, th is time 
elected. When he committed suicide in 1954, Kubitchek became president . In 
1964 a mil i tary coup d'fitat took place. Different generals served as 
president u n t i l 1985 when the f i r s t non-general was elected president . 
Land d i s t r ibu t ion . Land i s very unevenly dis t r ibuted in Brazil and 
Mexico. In the Republic of Korea, in contrast i t s d i s t r ibu t ion is remarkably 
equal. In Singapore the issue is not important. 
In Brazil huge "fazendas" of over a mill ion hectares exis t side by side 
with many small peasants ' "minifundistas". These minifundistas make up 
three-quarters of the peasant population but they own only 12 per cent of the 
land. On the other hand some 10 per cent of the land owners own 
three-quarters of the land. There are over 12 mill ion landless peasants. 
Inequali ty among regions i s also great . Farmers in the south-east are 
prosperous compared to the many poor people who work the poor so i l s of the 
North-East. Much agr icu l tu ra l land in the Aroazonas and in the South-West is 
yet to be colonised or is being colonised. 
Brazil has never known land reform, although a law to that effect was 
passed in 1964. The ensuing coup d'e"tat, however, prevented i t s 
implementation. The Government did help the agr icu l tura l sector by providing 
loans and subsidised inputs as well as by supporting coffee p r i ces . However, 
these pol icies benefited mostly the modern, commercial farmers. 
Mexico in i t i a t ed a land reform as part of the 1910 revolution. The reform 
aimed at d i s t r ibu t ing the land to the landless workers and tenants who were 
cul t ivat ing i t . The land reform programme created communal landowning 
en t i t i e s (ej idos) . Many people have benefited from the reform, but i t has 
taken a long time. Between 1916 and 1976, 68 mil l ion hectares were 
red is t r ibuted , of which 2.6 mill ion people benefited. Yet 60 years a f te r the 
revolution 56 per cent of the land dis tr ibuted is s t i l l waiting to be 
Morley (p. 241) reports that the land d is t r ibu t ion in Brazil i s 
exceedingly unequal. The Gini coefficient for land d i s t r ibu t ion was already a 
very high 0.84 in the 1950s when i t was 0.72 in the United Sta tes , 0.57 in 
Canada and 0.51 in India . 
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regularised by the cour ts . Moreover, the land d i s t r ibu t ion is s t i l l highly 
unequal and t h i s appears to be worsening. Moreover, productivity differences 
are enormous. At the large non-ejido farms i t i s high thanks to considerable 
private investment and i r r iga t ion f a c i l i t i e s . In the reformed (ejido) sector 
due to i t s subsistence character , capi ta l accumulation is small or 
non-existent . This sector did benefit from some public credi ts but these had 
often to be used to finance running expenses. The poverty of the small 
peasants does not allow them to cu l t iva te a l l the i r land and nearly half of 
a l l ag r icu l tu ra l land is not used as such. Despite upper l imi ts on 
landholdings, the best agr icu l tu ra l land used for export crops and 
agro-industry is in a few hands and is cul t ivated very in tensively . 
In the Republic of Korea no large landholdings are permitted by law. 
Nobody can own more than 3 hectares . As a r e su l t absolute differences in size 
of holdings are very small . This r e l a t i ve ly equal land d i s t r ibu t ion is the 
resu l t of a se r ies of land d i s t r ibu t ion programmes that took place in the l a t e 
1940s and early 1950s. 
Natural resource endowment and energy supply. Mexico i s well endowed with 
natural resources. I t i s one of the world's main producers of s i lve r and 
uranium. Proven reserves of these minerals are considerable. At a daily 
output of 2.6 mil l ion bar re ls (half of which i s sold abroad), i t is the fourth 
largest world producer of o i l . In 1981 proven o i l deposits were over 70 
mil l ion ba r re l s , probable holdings 30 b i l l i o n and potent ia l reserves 300 
b i l l i o n (Looney, p. 34). Mexico also produces natural gas, bismuth, sulphur, 
f luor i te and lead. Arable land however i s scarce. The ar id climate and the 
harsh topography l imit i t to 16 per cent of t o t a l land area . 
Brazil i s v i r t u a l l y se l f - suf f ic ien t in agr icu l tu re . The only important 
agr icul tura l product i t has to import is wheat, which made up about 5 per cent 
of t o t a l import value in 1980. Oil and high qual i ty coal are in short supply, 
but the country i s r ich in other minerals such as manganese, lead, copper, t i n 
and gold. Braz i l ' s iron ore deposits are among the r iches t in the world. 
Until very recently Brazil had to import over 80 per cent of i t s o i l needs. 
The cost of th i s made up 40 per cent of t o t a l merchandise imports in 19 79. 
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Oil and coal may be scarce, but the country has considerable supply of 
other energy sources. Its hydroelectric potential capacity, for instance, is 
estimated as being at least 200 million kwH. The recently completed Itaipu 
project in the Parana river, a joint Brazilian-Paraguay undertaking, is the 
biggest hydroelectric plant in the world. Alcohol from sugar cane has become 
an important substitute for petrol. The country also possesses enormous 
forest resources which cover 60 per cent of its surface. Brazil owes its name 
to the reddish "pau Brazil" wood. 
The Republic of Korea's natural resources are very limited. Its soil only 
produces some low quality coal, some iron ore and tungsten. Most of its 
energy sources, particularly oil, need to be imported. To reduce its 
dependence on oil, the country is developing an important nuclear and 
hydroelectric programme. Only 23 per cent of this "land of high mountains and 
sparkling streams" is cultivated. 
Singapore has no natural resources to speak of. It has to import all its 
energy requirements. As the "lion city" is an important regional refining 
centre, it imports more oil than it needs for domestic consumption. Only a 
very small and declining portion of its territory is cultivated. 
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Some i m p o r t a n t h i s t o r i c a l and p o l i t i c a l d a t a 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
1876 The "Hermi t Kingdom" opens up t o t h e wor ld 
1910-45 Korea i s annexed by J a p a n 
1945 K o r e a i s l i b e r a t e d , b u t d i v i d e d i n t o Nor th and South 
1945-48 Sou th Korea r u l e d by an Amer ican M i l i t a r y Government 
1948 C r e a t i o n of t h e R e p u b l i c o f K o r e a ; Synghman Rhee p r e s i d e n t 
J u n e 1950 The C i v i l War b r e a k s o u t 
J u l y 1953 A T r u c e Agreement i s s i g n e d 
1960 Syngman Rhee s t e p s down a f t e r s t u d e n t s r e v o l t 
A new government (Chang) i s e l e c t e d 
1961 M i l i t a r y coup d ' e t a t , G e n e r a l P a r k Chung Hee becomes p r e s i d e n t 
1963 P a r k i s e l e c t e d p r e s i d e n t 
2 6 . 1 0 . 7 9 P a r k i s k i l l e d 
SINGAPORE 
1819 S t a n f o r d R a f f l e s l a n d s on t h e i s l a n d of S i n g a p o r e , which i s t h e n 
i n h a b i t e d by 120 Malays and 30 C h i n e s e . 
1824 G r e a t B r i t a i n buys S i n g a p o r e . 
1942-45 J a p a n e s e o c c u p a t i o n . 
1959 I n t e r n a l s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t , PAP ( P e o p l e ' s A c t i o n P a r t y ) comes t o 
power . Lee Kuan Yew, P r i m e M i n i s t e r . 
1963 Independence from Britain. Formation of the Malaysian Federation. 
1965 End o f f e d e r a t i o n w i t h M a l a y s i a . 
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BRAZIL 
1500 Pedro Alvares Cabral "d i s cove r s " B r a z i l . 
1822 Independence d e c l a r e d ; Dom Pedro I becomes Emperor. 
1889 Braz i l becomes a r e p u b l i c . 
1930-45 A coup d ' e t a t b r i ngs Ge tu l i o Vargas to the p re s idency . The "New" 
Republic (Estado novo) i s dec l a r ed . 
Post-1945 P r e s i d e n t s ; 
1945-50 Dutra 
1950-54 Vargas e l ec t ed p r e s i d e n t . 
1954-60 J u s c e l i n o Kubi tscheck. 
1960 Janio Quadros 
1961 Joao "Jango" Goulart. 
1964 M i l i t a r y coup d ' f i t a t , p r e s i d e n t s : 
1964-67 Humberto C a s t e l l o Branco. 
1967-69 Ar turo da Costa e S i l v a . 
1969-74 Emilio Gar ras taza Medici . 
1974-79 Ernes to G e i s e l . 
19 79-85 Joao Figueiredo 
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MEXICO 
1519 Mexico "discovered" by the Spaniards 
1821 Independence from Spain 
1847 War with the United States; California, Nevada, Utah and New 
Mexico become part of the United S ta tes . 
1861-67 Occupation by the French army 
1876-1911 "The Por f i r i a to" . Porf i r io Diaz President 
1910-20 Revolution 
Post-1920 Pres idents : 
1920-24 Obregon 
1924-28 Calles 
1928-30 P. Gil 
1930-32 0. Rubio 
1932-34 Rodriguez 
1934-40 Lazaro Cardenas 
1940-46 Avila Camacho 
1946-52 Miguel Aleman 
1952-58 Ruiz Cortines 
1958-64 Lopez Mateos 
1964-70 Diaz Ordaz 
1970-76 Echeverria 
1976-82 Lopez Po r t i l l o 
1982- Miguel de la Madrid 
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